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Dear Lewis:
As you requested, I am writing to confirm that
in August or September of this year I made an inquiry of
inside counsel at First Colony Life Insurance Company
(a wholly owned subsidiary of Ethyl Corporation)---~
determine if it had any interest in the case of ~tropolitan
Life Insurance Company, et als. v. ward, involving an
Alabama tax on out of state insurance-business.
I was assured that because of its unique insurance
products and its unusual way of doing business through
general agents, First Colony had no interest whatsoever in
the case and would not be affected by its outcome in any
significant way.
Please let me know if you think I should seek to
obtain any additional information about First Colony's
position.
Best regards to you and Jo, as always.
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Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
United States Supreme Court
Washington, DC 20543
Dear Lewis:
As you requested, I am writing to confirm that
in August or September of this year I made an inquiry of
inside counsel at First Colony Life Insurance Company
(a wholly owned subsidiary of Ethyl Corporation) to
determine if it had any interest in the case of Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company, et als. v. Ward, involving an
Alabama tax on out of state 1nsurance business.
I was assured that because of its unique insurance
products and its unusual way of doing business through
general agents, First Colony had no interest whatsoever in
the case and would not be affected by its outcome in any
significant way.
Please let me know if you think I should seek to
obtain any additional information about First Colony's
position.
Best regards to you and Jo, as always.

S~e~

~:c. Cart:-Jr.
16/274

8299

~nvrtmt

Qtltud ttf tltt 'Jtttittb ~fattg
'llaslrittghtn. ~. Qt. 2llgtJ!.;l

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

~I

December 6, 1984

Re:

No. 83-1274-Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward

Dear Lewis:
I await the dissent.
Sincerely,

flU.
T.M.

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

.i'nprtmt <q,utri o-f tlrt ~tb ,jta:tt$
Jfa;gJrbtghtn. ~. <!J. 2ll~~~
CHAMBERS OF'

..JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

December 6, 1984

83-1274 Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Ward

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

lgs December 7, 1984

MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

Lynda
The Conclusion to Our Opinion in Metropolitan Life
The conclusion to our opinion now reads as follows:
We conclude that the Alabama domestic preference tax
statute violate the E
Protection Clause as ap lied
to appellants. T e judgment of t e Alabama Supreme
ourt 1s reversed, and the case is remanded for fur
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

We might add some limiting language such as the following to the

fo'v ~~~At . .

first sentence:

~e conclude~hat

,

da

t::.- ~1-L. ,.IIJI~,:;ai!!!lijj-.jtil'rc:c:"Tf~ ~

f/k;,./ ~

t,~

prefere~c~:~c';sus~
a~x~;~;~. . . .~~~r

the Alabama domestic
~atute, as m asured by the two purposes found by the
<!;ircuit ~ urt to be legitimate, violates the Equal
Protection Clause as applied to appellants. ~------------

5

.h}trttttt Qfltltrl ltf tqt J{ttittb ~htttg
._Mltittgbm. ~. Qf. 211~~~
C HAMBERS OF

December 11, 1984

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 83-1274, Metropolitan Life Ins. Life Co. v . Ward

Dear Lewis:
I have one problem with the opinion now circulating.
You hold that the two purposes asserted here do not legitimate the Alabama tax.
~ agre~
But, for me, it does not
follow, as is asserted on page t2 of the second draft, that as
applied to appellants the tax therefore violates the Equal
Protection Clause. One or more of the other 15 asserted purposes may save it. Do you not agree?
Of course, the briefs here addressed the 17 asserted
purposes and there is enough in the record for this Court to
rule on them, even though the courts below adjudicated only
two.
In light of their rulings, with which we disagree, this
for them was all that was necessary . I am willing to leave it
to you whether to remand or to pass upon the other reasons.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc : The Conference

December 11, 1984

83-1274

Metropolit~n

Life v. ward

Dear Harry:
Thank you for your letter. of December 11. I think you
have a good point, and t will be glad to make the remand in
this case more specific.
What would you t~ink of changing the last paragraPh to
read as follows:
We conclude that the Alabama domestic
preference tax statute, as measured by the
two purposes found to be legitimate by th~
Circuit Court for Montgomery ~ounty, see
supra, at 3, violates the Equal Protection
Clause as applied to appellants. The judgment of the 'labama Supreme Court accordingly
is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
I then would add a footnote similar to n. 5 that '"'as in my
first circulated draft to state that some fifteen additional
purposes w~re advanced by the state. As none of these was
addressed by the courts belm-1 we express no opinion with
respect to any of them.
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the
LFP/vde

Confe~ence

,,

.

'

.hvr.tntt <qourt ~ tit~~~ .jtattg
'Jrulfington. ~. QI. 2ll.;i'l~
CHAMI!IERS OF

December 12, 1984

-.J USTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 83-1274, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward

Dear Lewis:
Your suggested change in the last paragraph, plus the
addition of a footnote similar to the old n. 5, alleviates my
concern, and I join your opinion.
I might be a little happier if the last paragraph would
read as follows:
~ ~~sue
"We conclude that neither of the two purposes
fur the red by the preference tax statute .(addressed by
the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, see supra1 at
3, is legitimate under the Equal Protection Clause.
The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court accordingly
.-· is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion."
My joinder is firm, in any event.
Sincerely,

II,.M.--

~
t-·

I

'

I

I

~mtt

<4.ourt of tlrt ~tb' ~
•a•ftinghnt. J. <; 2.0bi~~
D£C.l 2 1984

Dear Justice Powell:
Re: Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. W. G. Ward
No. 83-1274
Attached is a draft syllabus for your opinion in the
above case which I shall appreciate your returning to me
together with any suggestions that you care to make.
If
the lineup of the Court is not included in the draft
syllabus but is now available, please send it to me.
This draft syllabus is based on the opinion whose
draft number appears in the upper right-hand corner.
Please send me two copies of any subsequent draft of your
opinion necessitating changes in the syllabus so that
appropriate revisions can be made and resubmitted to you
before the syl~abus and opinion are issued.
When I receive the syllabus back from you, I shall
have the Publications Unit prepare a printed version, and
I shall then send you a proof copy.
Respectfully,

YMt!t ~
Henry C. Lind
Reporter of Decisions

Attachment
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Associate Justice

DRAfT

~YllAbUS

(Baud on uraft
No. ..
« \he

~}

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO. et al. v. WARD et al.

appeal from the supreme court of alabama

No. 83-1274.

Argued October 31, 1984--Decided

An Alabama statute imposes a substantially lower gross premiums
tax rate on domestic insurance companies than on out-of-state
(foreign) insurance companies.

The statute permits foreign

companies to reduce but not to

eliminate the differential by

investing in Alabama assets and securities.

Appellant foreign

insurance companies filed claims for refunds of taxes paid,
contending that the statute, as applied to them, violated the
Equal Protection Clause.
denied the claims.

The State Commissioner of Insurance

On consolidated appeals to a county Ciicuit

Court, in which several domestic companies intervened, the
statute was upheld in a summary judgment.

The court ruled that

the statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause
because, in addition to raising revenue, it served the
legitimate state purposes of encouraging the formation of new
insurance companies in Alabama and capital investment by
foreign insurance companies in Alabama assets and securities,
and that the distinction between foreign and domestic companies
was rationally related to those purposes.

The Alabama Court of

Civil Appeals affirmed the finding as to legitimate state
purposes, but remanded for an
of rational relationship.

evidentiary hearing on the issue

On certiorari to the Alabama Supreme

SYLLABUS

2

Court, appellants waived their rights to such an evidentiary
hearing, and the court entered judgment for the State and the
intervenors on appellants' equal protection challenge to the
statute.

Held:

The Alabama domestic preference tax statute violates the

Equal Protection Clause as applied to appellants.

Pp. 4-12.

(a) Under the circumstances of this case, promotion of
domestic business by discriminating against nonresidents is not
a legitimate state purpose.

Western & Southern Life Ins. Co.

v. State Board of Equalization of California, 451 U.S. 648,
distinguished.

Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is

purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost to
foreign corporations also seeking to do business there.
Alabama's purpose constitutes the very sort of parochial
discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to
prevent.

j

A State may not constitutionally favor its own

residents by taxing foreign corporations at a highter rate

sol~ because

of their residence.

Although the McCarran-

Ferguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Commerce
Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit the
applicability of the Equal Protection Clause.

Equal protection

restraints are applicable even though the effect of the
discrimination is similar to the type of burden with which the
Commerce Clause also would be concerned.

Pp. 6-12.

..

SYLLABUS

3

{b) Nor is the encourgement of the investment in Alabama
assets and securites a legitimate state purpose.

Domestic

insurers remain entitled to the more favorable tax rate
regardless of whether they invest in Alabama assets.

Moreover,

since the investment incentive provision does not enable
foreign insurers to eliminate the statute's discriminatory
effect, it does not cure but reaffirms the impermissable
classification based solely on residence.

So. 2d

__,

reversed and remanded.

Pp. 12.

;hpr~utt ~ourl ~ tfr~ ~~ .jfahg

-aslfington. ~. ~· 2ll.;i'l~
CHAMBERS OF

December 12, 1984

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 83-1274, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward

Dear Lewis:
Your suggested change in the last paragraph, plus the
addition of a footnote similar to the old n. 5, alleviates my
concern, and I join your opinion.
I might be a little happier
read as follows:

if the last paragraph would

"We conclude that neither of the two purposes
furthered by the preference tax statute addressed by
the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, see supra at
3, is legitimate under the Equal Protection Clause.
The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court accordingly
is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion."
My joinder is firm, in any event.
Sincerely,

~~
---

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

~u.pumt ~ourl of t4t~h ~bdts
~as4ittghtn. ~. <!f. 2llpJt.~
CHAMBERS OF

PERSONAL

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re:

No. 83-1274 - Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
W. G. Ward, Jr.

Dear Lewis,
I have been "struggling" with this and I may wind
up joining the judgment. I'll wait on the dissent, but
I doubt it will persuade me to affirm.
Regards,

Justice Powell

s~ L ~
~

-CL

~

December 29, 1984
PERSON AI,

83-1274 Metropolitan Life v. Warrl

Dear Chief:
Your personal note of December 2A indicating that
you are "struggling" with this case concerns me.
Following the November arguments, one of the caqeq
vou assigned me was 83-240 LawrPnce Countv v. Lead-Deadwood
School District. Because Byron han writt~n a dissent from
denial of cert, you reassigned Lawrence Countv to nyron and
said you would give me another case to write.
This turned out to be A3-1271 l\lfetropolitan r~ifP. v.
Ward. But at that time there were only three votes to reverse, i.nclufling my own. At Conference vou ha<'l voted tentatively to affirm, and Ryron had "passed". T talked to Byron
and he conclud~rl - after further consideration - that he
wouln ioin me in a reversal.

I then talked to you, a~ T waP still o~~ votP
short. In response, vou wrote on November 14 (1Ptter enclosed), statinq that you ha~ chanqPd vnur vote to "reverqe
on equal protect ion qrounns." Indeed, vour vote ~,.;ras necessary to enable vou to make the assiqnment.
I have wrttt0n the cas~ orecisPly as it was arqued
on behalf of ~1etropo1.itan r.ife, and consistent Ni.th our
equal protection cases in this area. ThP McCarr~n Act applies only to Comm~rce Claus~ casf'o;. A.1so, mv opinion r~
mands the case for cnnsi~eration on qrounds Al1eqed by thP
state but not ~ecined. Ree Part IV, n. 12, and n. 10.
In short, I need your vote for a Court.
I therefore hooe, aftet further consideration, vou
will stay with me and not merely join the judgment. After
all, as the saying goes: "You qot me into this case".
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

..

C-t.r> .

~w~~~~ .a,
~

~ E-//J A-"..J.·~~~
:)

~&:z.t. ~~ ~ ~ 1\....._~
1(1- .
Pre 1m1nary Memo
~~/ a~ ctr ~_j

,

1

.

.

_;}

April ).--3 ,.-----1984 Conference
~.
~- ---~
List/ 3, Sheet 1
/1.-&.,..C_:P,......,._. ~
No. 83-1274

j-u...,n • .H..t. . . . . .~,...-~.~~

METROPOLITAN LIFE
~~
INSURANCE CO., eta~

v.

!

k

WARD, et al.

1

Appeal
Ala
(0

LV

ae

~

~S~.~C?t·.~~~~~~~~

,r-)

~ ~1;....,-

~ ~Civia:'~

-~

1

~imely

C3:)£:-~~

~

k

w~.<-io~ IA.4.~~~.....

-.tc.

Ala, _;vio ! ate~ th ~ ~qual Protection
~ ~...,. -'..4A r4..t II....
Clause by faxi~g Ala. insurance companies at a lower rate t1ra ri' ~

1.

suMMARYa
1-ttA

out-of-stat~

, Zher

«

~~ ~ ~~
2.
FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: ~
~ .~
~reign life insurance companies pay a gross premium ~ '
percent.

insurance companies.

Foreign companies selling other forms of insurance,

f) r~.r'~f Qproperty

and casualty insurance, pay 4 percent. _ n_o_m_e s_ t_i_c_

-2-

--

insurance companies pay a rate of only 1 percent on all forms of
insurance premiums.

The statute provides that foreign companies

may reduce the amount of their taxes by investing pre.scr ibed
)

percentages of their total worldwide assets in specified

---

investments in the state of Ala.

However, foreign life insurance

companies can never gay a gross premium tax rate of less than 2
percent, and other foreign insurance companies can never pay a
tax rate of less than 3 percent.
Following this Court's decision

in~ tern

& Southern Life

Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451

u.s.

648

(1981) , in which the Court held that domestic preference taxes on
foreign insurance companies can be challenged on equai protection
I

grounds, ~pellants sought refunds of more than $32 million in
taxes paid to Ala. for tax years 1977 through 1980.

The

Commissioner of Insurance denied all these claims.
Appellants then filed the present suit in Ala. state court,
seeking a judgment declaring the domestic preference tax statute
unconstitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make
appropriate refunds.
the

st~te,

•

The TC granted summary judgment in favor of

ruling that the statute was constitutional.

On

appeal, the ~urt of Civil Appeals affirmed.
The court observed that in Western & Southern, the Supreme
Court held that taxes that discriminate against foreign insurance
companies are invalid only if they fail to satisfy the rational
basis test of the Equal Protection Clause.

The court noted that

the TC had found that the Ala. tax had at least two legitimate
purposes in addition to raising revenue:

------------------

(1) encouraging th e

-3-

formation of new insurance companies in Ala., and (2) encouraging ?
capital investment by foreign insurance companies in Ala. assets
and governmental securities.

The court ruled that both
of these
\

were legitimate state interests, but held that the TC erred in
denying the foreign insurers the opportunity to fully present
their evidence as to the rational relationship between the
foreign/domestic classification and these legitimate state
purposes.

It therefore remanded the case for an evidentiary

hearing on that issue.
--seeklng review by the Ala.

s.

Ct., appellants waived any

right to an evidentiary hearing or trial with respect to the
issue whether the legislature could have reasonably believed that
the classification would promote any legitimate state interest.
The Ala. S. Ct., noting this stipulation, granted review and in
an order entered final judgment in favor of the state, stating
"that the foreign insurers' equal protection challenge to the
Ala. premium tax statutes should be denied."
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Appts contend that prior to this Court's

decision in Western & Southern, it had long been held that a
state tpx imposed on foreign corporations for the privilege of
doing business in the state was not subject to review under the
Equal Protection Clause because such a tax was merely a condition
on the foreign corporation's right to enter the state.
Nat'l Life Insurance Co. v. Reed, 325

u.s.

673 (1945).

Lincoln
However,

those states which attempted to impose a greater tax on foreign
corporations without calling it a privilege tax had their taxes
struck down on equal protection grounds.

Hanover Fire Insurance

-4Co. v. Harding, 272
Glander, 337
Bowers, 380

u.s.

u.s.

494 (1926); Wheeling Steel Corp. v.

u.s. 562 (1949); Reserve Life Insurance Co. v.
u.s. 258 (1965); WHYY v. Borough of Glassborough,

117 (1968).

I

393

When the Supreme Court overruled Lincoln Nat'l

in Western & Southern, the rules articulated in Hanover and the
other cases became the governing law.

The statute at issue in

this case does not meet the standard outlined in those cases.
~~

\

First, the state's interest in persuading insurance

~mpanies to incorporate or locate in Ala. is not sufficient to

uphold the tax because this obvious purpose could have been
ascribed to each of the domestic preference tax laws this Court
invalidated in the prior cases.

If such a purpose were

legitimate, these cases would all necessarily have been decided
the other way.
380

u.s.

Indeed, in Reserve Life Insurance Co. v. Bowers,

258 (1965), this Court reversed an Ohio court decision

upholding a personal property tax on foreign but not domestic '
insurance companies even though the state in its brief asserted
that the legislature might have enacted the discriminatory tax in
order to encourage insurance companies to locate in Ohio.
pecond, Ala.'s interest in encouraging capital investment
by foreign companies in Ala. assets cannot be used to justify the
discriminatory tax because the so-called "investment incentive"
provision never permits a foreign company to eliminate the
discriminatory differential entirely.

Even if a foreign company

invests all of its assets in Ala., it still pays a substantially
higher gross premium tax than a domestic competitor doing the
same type and volume of business.

' ·~

Appts contend that the Court

'

...

-5-

should review this issue because over 20 states have similar
discriminatory tax preferences and a number of state courts have
held state domestic preference tax laws unconstitutional on equal
\

protection grounds.
Appees, American Educators Life, et. al, a group of domestic
/

insurance companies who intervened in the proceeding below,
contend that there is no reason for this Court to review the
present case since the lower courts merely applied the standards
articulated in Western & Southern to the facts of this case.
Moreover, the result reached by the lower courts is clearly
correct.

Encouraging insurance companies to incorporate and

carry on their business in Ala. is clearly a legitimate state
purpose.

In Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358

u.s.

558

(1959), this Court held that Ohio could grant a tax preference to

foreign corporations in order to encourage them to locate in the
state.

In the Commerce Clause context, the Court has

consistently held that encouraging the formation of domestic
industries is a legitimate state interest.

u.s.

Parker v. Brown, 317

341 (1943); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397

u.s.

137 (1970).

Similar1ly, Ala.'s interest in encouraging capital investment in

•

Ala. investments is also a legitimate state interest.

In Western

& Southern, this Court recognized "the legitimacy of state

efforts to maintain the profit level of a domestic industry."
451

u.s.,

at 671.

It was clearly reasonable for the Ala. legislature to
conclude that a tax scheme that required domestic insurers to pay
lower premium taxes would encourage the formation of new

-6-

insurance companies in Ala.

Likewise, it was reasonable for the

legislature to conclude that a statute which reduced a taxpayer's
taxes if he invests in Ala. investments would encoura.ge capital
investment in Ala. assets.

'

The domestic insurers also submit a

list of 12 other possible legitimate state interests that could
support the tax.
Appee the Commissioner of Insurance echoes most of the
arguments advanced by the domestic insurers.

He also contends

that since appts waived their right to an evidentiary hearing on
the reasonableness issue, the only issue before the Court is
whether either of the two purposes identified by the lower courts
is a legitimate state purpose.

Both clearly are.

Appts'

reliance on Reserve Life Insurance is misplaced since that case
was a summary decision with little or no precedential value.

In

any event, the controlling law is now Western & Southern, the law
applied by the lower courts.
In addition, the Commissioner asserts, without citing any
authority to support the proposition, that appts' waiver of their
right to an evidentiary hearing deprives this Court of
jurisd~tion

•
remedies.
4.

because appts have not exhausted all available state

DISCUSSION:

~

In Western & Southern, the Court reviewed

its prior decisions in this area and held that tax statutes

--

discriminating against foreign insurance companies are valid if
the discrimination is rationally related to a legitimate state
interes~

(such statutes are not subject to Commerce Clause

analysis because of the McCarran-Ferguson Act).

In Western &

.,

·,,

-7Southern, the Court upheld a Calif. tax that provided for

hi~her

tax rates on foreign insurance companies whose state of
incorporation had a higher tax rate than did Calif.

The Court

held that Calif. had a legitimate interest in promoting the

}

......

by -----------~-----~----~~------~----~------'
deterring barriers to interstate-- business"

--------------~~~_,-

"domestic industry
451

I

u.s. , 671, and that Calif. could reasonably conclude that its

tax would advance that goal because other states would respond by
J

keeping their taxes lower.

Ala.'s desire to encourage insurance

companies to locate in the state seems to be as legitimate an
interest as that asserted in Western & Southern, and providing a
tax advantage to companies that locate ih the state is certainly
a rational way of accomplishing that goal.

In their reply brief,

appts attempt to distinguish this case from Western & Southern by
asserting that while a state can encourage the growth of the ·
domestic industry by promoting the elimination of barriers to
interstate businesses, it cannot do so by erecting barriers to
such businesses.

That is really a Commerce Clause argument which

has no place in this case because of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
Appts correctly note that almost any discriminatory tax
against foreign insurance companies can be sustained on that

.

.
bas1s

I

and that two post-Western & Southern state cases have

struck down discriminatory taxes on equal protection grounds.
Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Kirkpatrick, 652 S.W.2d 128 ('Mo.
1983)

~

Gilbert Associates v. Commonwealth, 447 A.2d 944 (Penn.

1982).

However, the courts in those cases did not address the

arguments accepted by the courts in this case.

Appts are also

correct that the Court struck down a domestic preference statute

7

-o-

in Reserve Life even though the state in its brief stated that
the legislature might have enacted the tax in order to encourage
foreign insurance companies to locate in the state.

However,
~

there was no opinion in that case so it is hard to tell on what
basis the statute was struck down.

Thus, while the Court may

want to note the case in order to offer the lower courts some ·
guidance on what can be a permissible state interest (the
Commissioner's jurisdictional argument is meritless), the Ala.
courts' application of the rational basis test seems entirely
proper to me.
I recommend DFWSFQ.
There are two responses and a reply.
April 4, 1.984
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Question Presented

1!)d.AA-~~. ~~~
~~~-~~~

~Whether

Alabama's domestic preference

ta1

statute ,""

which taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate
than domestic insurance companies, violates equal protection.

/ik--1- ;t~ ~~-~-

.

..

"

'

.
-

.

...

,

I. Background

A. Statutory Background

Alabama,

along

with

-

grants

other ~ es,

many

a

preference to domestic insurance companies by imposing a...__
substantially lower gross premiums tax rate on Alabama insurance
companies

than

on out-of-state

(foreign)

Under

companies.

the present Alabama scheme, foreign life insurance companies

'3

Pf,tO

pay a gross premiums tax of three percent.

Foreign companies

4- "7,10

selling other forms of insurance pay four percent.
§27-4-4 (a)

(1975).

Domestic companies,

Ala. Code

by contrast,

pay a

IIJ,..o

rate of only one percent on all forms of insurance premiums.
Id.

§27-4-5 (a) •

same

type

and

As

a

result,

volume of

a

business

company will generally pay

three

foreign company doing

the ·

in Alabama as a domestic
to four

times

as much

in

gross premiums taxes as its domestic competitor.
~

'}1AP1

'

The Alabama tax scheme does allow foreign companies

to reduce

the discriminatory differential by investing pre-

companies can never
than
never

-

gross premiums

tax

-

rate of less
._;

two percent and
pay a

pay a

tax

other

foreign

insurance companies can

rate of less than three percent.

By con-

trast, domestic companies are automatically entitled to a tax
rate of one percent, even if they have virtually no invest'--

ments in the state.

In other words, the investment provision

permits foreign companies to reduce--but never eliminate--the
discrimination inherent in the domestic preference scheme.

B. Factual Background

In early 1981, appellants, a group of foreign insurance companies, filed claims with the Alabama Dept. of Insurance contending that the preference tax was unconstitutional
as applied to them.

They sought refunds of domestic prefer-

ence taxes paid to Alabama for
On

July

8,

1981,

tax years 1977 through 1980.

the Commissioner

of

Insurance denied

all

their claims.
In August 1981, appellants appealed to the state Tc. ·
After intervention by numerous domestic insurance companies,
the TC consolidated
lead cases

to be

summary judgment,
plying

the

equal

the appeals and

treated

rc..
it held

as

selected

two claims as

binding on all claimants.

the tax scheme constitutional.

protection

standard

articulated

by

On
Apthis ~

Court inVWestern & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board ~fr~
of Equalization,

451

u.s.

648, 668 (1981), the TC found that

~

/J

the domestic preference tax statute had legitimate state pur\\

poses

and

that distinguishing

between

----~·· ~
v\
was 1! ationall
related

foreign

and domestic

'---

companies

to those purposes.

The TC

identified the asserted legitimate state purposes as being, ~
"in addition to raising revenue:

(1)

encouraging the forma-

tion of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) encourag-

:!

ing capital investment by foreign insurance companies in the
Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth
statute."

J.S. App. 20a-2la.

in the

It also held that "the Alabama

legislature could have reasonably believed that the statute's
classification would promote the foregoing purposes."

J. s.

App. 2la.
The foreign companies appealed.

On April 27, 1983,

/

the state appellate court affirmed on the legitimate state
purpose issue, but remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on

the

rational
-.:-

summary

relationship issue because

it believed

\

judgment

tioned the Ala.

was
s.ct.

inappropriate.

Appellants

then peti-

for cert on the legitimate state pur-

pose ~ue and appellees petitioned for review of the remand
order.
an

In their pleadings, appellants waived their right to

~
evidentiary
hearing on

--

the

----------------------relationship issue.

rational

~

On Sept. 23, 1983, the Ala. s.ct. denied all the cert petns,
thus leaving it unclear on the record whether its order was
intended to be a final judgment or to leave the lower court's
remand order standing.

Subsequently, to avoid an unnecessary

evidentiary hearing on the rational relationship issue, appellants

again waived

their

right

to a

hearing

and

sought

rehearing in the Ala. s.ct. in order to obtain a final judgment they could immediately appeal.

The Ala.

the motion for rehearing and entered final
them.

S.Ct. granted

judgment against

This Court then noted probable jurisdiction.

II. Discussion

In Western

&

Southern Life Insurance Co.

v.

State

Board of Equalization, 451 u.s. 648 (1981), this Court abandoned its long-held "privilege tax" doctrine which had immunized

some

state

taxes

protection objections.

on

foreign

companies

against equal

The Court stated

"whatever the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from doing business
within its boundaries, tqat authority does not j ustify imposition of more onerous t axes or other bur- ~
den'S on ~Tgn cor por ations t:l'la'rlthose imposed on 11
~
domest~ corpora ti ons, ~ s the discrimination .~~ 1~ ,,
bet~ and dome st 1c corpo-ra. tions p ears_ a ~~
rational relation to a legitimate state purpose." ~ ~
Id -: , a f" GoB.
--~~
Since appellants waived their right to an evidentiary hearing
on

the

rational

relationship

sented to this Court

issue,

the 2 n1y ques _!J on pre- ·

stat~

is whether a 1i egi timate

purp'6'se

9

justifies Ala.'s domestic tax preference.

'

/•~
~ '"'

~

1

is

The only recent s.ct. case discussing this

_

l~

\/western & Southern itself.
California could impose a
insurers.

~·

It concerned whether the

of

4...-

r;:;r;;

~~
~

"retaliatory" tax on

Under its tax scheme, Cal. taxed

at a higher rate if the insurer's state of incorporation imposed higher

taxes on Cal.

insurers doing business

in that

State than Cal. would otherwise impose on that State's insurers doing

business

Court held,
tic

insurers

in Cal.

The pur_pose of

.

'

.'

the

"is to promote the interstate business of domesby deterring

other

criminatory or excessive taxes."

· · rt·~:~."'

such laws,

1.,

States
Ibid.

from enacting dis"(I] t is clear," the

{J~
'

tJ?
J/V"'

~~

~· -

Court found, "that the

·

purpose~: gener~e:::
to

at

the expense of out-of-state insurers, but to apply pressure
on

other

States

insurers."

to

maintain

Id., at 669-670.

th~gi~cy

low

taxes

on

C

ifornia

And there was no question as to

------

of that purpose:

"There can be no doubt that g romotion of domestic industr by de"'Eei r '
b rr · r
Interstate
bus1 ness---rs a egitimate state purpose. This Court
has recognize
e
egi Imacy of state efforts to
maintain the profit level of a domestic industry,
Parker v. Brown, 317 u.s. 341, 363-367 (1943), and
of efforts to 'protect and enhance the reputation'
of a domestic industry so that it might g0mpete
more effectively in the interstate market, ~ ike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 u.s. 137, 143 (1970). California's effort on behalf of its domestic insurance industry is no less legitimate." Id., at 671.
The only question for the present case ,__
is what
the legitimate
-=-.
state purpose

in Western

&

Southern was.

If

it was

mere

"promotion of domestic industry," the state purposes supporting the Ala. tax preference are legitimate.

A~ s unabashed ~ ~ '$'

ai~is ~romote the domestic insurance industry and ~n- J ~
courage capital investment within the State.
er hand,

If, on the oth-

the legitimate state purpose was "promotion • • . Qy_

I .

deterring barr1ers to interstate business," the Ala. purposes
/

may well be illegitimate.

r

Basing the Western

&

Southern holding on either of

these purposes creates problems.

On the one hand, the cita-

tions to Parker v. Brown and Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. suggest

that

purpose.
state's

simply
In

promoting

these

interest

in

two

business

cases,

promotion

the
was

is

a

Court

legitimate
found

legitimate

state

that

and

the

strong

enough to justify the burdens placed on interstate commerce.

And, in general, though domestic promotion may be a parochial
interest, can it fairly be called an illegitimate one?
On the other hand, allowing mere promotion to justi-

l

fy

~is~rimin~~gn

businesses means that such

discrimination will nearly always be justified.

To justify

any domestic preference, a State would have only to say that
it wanted to benefit its own businesses--even if it planned
to benefit them only by harming outsiders.
promotion

as

a

legitimate purpose,

protection analysis

then,

into a semantic game.

scheme would stand or

Recognizing mere
would

turn

equal

A discriminatory

fall according to how one styled its

-

purpose: to benefit one group or to harm the others.

This is

a distinction without a difference, which this Court has rejected

ports,
more,

----'---

in analogous Commerce Clause analysis.

·
Ltd.

~-

Bacchus

Im- ·

·--------------........._,___~

v.

if one

Dias, 104 S.Ct.

3049, 3057

truly believes that

discriminatory,

(1984).

Further-

"a classification,

is not arbitrary or violative of

though

the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if any state of
facts

reasonably

Allied

can

be

Stores of Ohio v.

(emphasis added)
the beginning.

conceived
Bowers,

that
358

would

u.s.

sustain

522,

528

it,"

(1959)

(citations omitted), the game is rigged from
Since a court can always conceive of promo-

tion as a purpose for discriminating against outsiders,

the

State wins whether it actually raises promotion as a defense
or not.

Does the Court really intend such cynical standards?

____

None
of this Court's other cases help much in decid..,____
ing whether promotion of a State's businesses or encourage-

.. '· ·.

l

1.,_

,·

..

.•

""-

ment of investment within the State is legitimate for equal
....,__
pr~__:urposes.
Appe ~veral old tax cases

-"'"

in

which

this

Court

~n10k

Elewn;t various

statutes on equal protection grounds.
Corp. v. Glander, 337

u.s.

ance Co. v.

292

Illinois,

v. Greene, 216
with

u.s.

The

fact

course,

that

535

u.s.

400 (1910).

either possible

~'

Wheeling Steel

(1934); Hanover Fire In-

494 (1926); Southern Railway
Each, however, is consistent

interpretation of Western

~

the

preference

562 (1949); Concordia Fire Insur-

u.s.

surance Co. v. Harding, 272

state

Court st.Eu-e k= sown
A

the

&

Southern.

taxes at all,

of

suggests that a purpose merely to benefit a State's

own businesses is not legitimate.

Otherwise, since this pur-

pose is always obviously present, the tax schemes should have
withstood
cases,

scrutiny.

On

the

other

in

each

of

these

the State does not appear to have explicitly brought

forward promotion as a defense for
Thus,

hand,

its domestic preference.

these cases could be read as saying only that if the

State wants to invoke the obvious it has to say so.
The

a~~veral

cases in which they claim

this Court has held that promotion of domestic industries and
similar

aims are

legitimate state purposes.

~'

Bacchus

Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, supra; Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397

u.s.
522
v.

137

(1970);

Allied Stores of Ohio v.

Bowers,

358

u.s.

u.s. 341 (1943); Carmichael
Coal & Coke Co., 301 u.s. 495 (1937); Board of
Illinois, 203 u.s. 553 (1906).
The difficulty

(1959); Parker v. Brown, 317
Southern

Education v.

with some of these cases is that they analyze the legitimacy

,..

•
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III. Summary

The only question presented by this case is whether
promotion of
investment

a

State's own businesses and encouragement of

within

the

State

~~~

are

legitimate

purposes

for

a

'--

~ di's crimina t~gainst foreign corporations.
The
...-1
ca~e~ aw does not give a clear answer. Upholding these pur-

State

poses,

however,

analysis a game.
reason

i~

would

make

this

kind

equal

protection

A state could always invoke promotion as a

support of discrimination against the businesses of

others.

I

would

hold

that

any purpose

__________ ------------..-----------

directly

discriminating

........

The

of

other

stated

against

purpose

others

simply does

to

benefit only by

is

not

not

J

legitimate •

justify the dis-

crimination here even if the purpose itself can be legitimate
under some circumstances.

Recommendation

I

would

consideration of

reverse
the

the

judgment below and remand

legitimacy of

for

the other purposes that

the State put forward but the courts below did not reach.

·'

'·
~·:
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

November 13, 1984

83-1274 -

Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward

Dear Chief,
I

first voted

the above case,
now

but after the discuss ion, I
be

more

consistent with prior cases to reverse.

That

passed.

I

tentatively to affirm in

think

it

would

is my vote.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

ilu.prtmt <lfonri of tJrt~~ .itatts-

Jfas-ftinghtn. ~. <If.

21l~J!.~

CHAMI!IERS Of<

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

November 14, 1984

Re:

v

83-1274 - Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Ward

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
At Conference this case was "up in the air." All agreed
it was a close case, and I voted to affirm but said I could
"join 4 or 5" to reverse to get the issue settled. Byron passed
but later voted to reverse. Harry changed f~ affirm to
reverse. Lewis voted to reverse, tentatively; but since has
become firm.
After further contemplation and study, my vote is to reverse
and, hence, I assigned the case to Lewis who was "reverse" on
equal protection grounds.
Regards,

Jnvrttttt <qonrt .ttf tqt 'Jifuittb Jtalt.&'
'Jlht~ft'ittgt.tttt, ~. <q. 2llbf~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

November 30, 1984

No. 83-1274

Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward

Dear Lewis,
I shall be circulating a dissent in this
case as soon as I can get around to it.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

;inpum~

<!fltttrl o-f tlr~ 'Jlinittb' ;imt~g

..ag4Utgto-u. ~. <If.

2llgt'!~

C HAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

November 30, 1984

Re:

83-1274 - Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company v. ward

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

;~
Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
From:

Justice O'Connor

Recirculated:-------1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-1274

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
ET AL., APPELLANTS v. W. G. WARD, JR.,
ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF

ALABAMA

[February - , 1985]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting.
This case presents a simple question: Is it legitimate for a
state to use its taxing power to promote a domestic insurance
industry and to encourage capital investment within its borders? In a holding that can only be characterized as astonishing, the Court determines that these purposes are illegitimate. This holding is unsupported by precedent and subtly
distorts the constitutional balance, threatening the freedom
of both State and Federal legislative bodies to fashion appropriate classifications in ecQ.DQIDi~. Because I disagree with both the Co~-of analysis and its conclusion, I respectfully dissent.
Alabama's legislature has chosen to impose a higher tax on
out-of-state insurance companies and insurance companies incorporated in Alabama that do not maintain their principal ]
place of business or invest assets within the State. Ala. \
Code §§ 27-4-4 et seq. This tax seeks to promote both a
domestic insurance industry and capital investment in Alabama. App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company, joined by many other out-of-state
insurers, alleges that this discrimination violates its rights
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that a State shall not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
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Appellants rely on the Equal Protection Clause because, as
corporations, they are not "citizens" protected by the privileges and immunities clauses of the Constitution. Hemphill
v. Orloff, 277 U. S. 537, 548-550 (1928). Similarly, they cannot claim Commerce Clause protection because Congress in
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33, 15 U. S. C. § 1011
et seq., explicitly suspended Commerce Clause restraints on
state taxation of insurance and placed insurance regulation
finnly within the purview of the several States. Western &
Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451

u. s. 648, 655 (1981).

Our precedents impose a heavy burden on those who chali-

lenge local economic
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the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state
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purpose. Yet the Court evades this careful framework for
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analysis, melding the proper two-step inquiry regarding the \ "f---Vo.i~,_ ·
State's purpose and the classification's relationship to that ~- ~
purpose into a single unarticulated judgment. This tactic ~ '
enables the Court to characterize obviously legitimate State
.
goals as improper solely because it disagrees with the c~nced~ 5 -#..R Fs.f.;¢"'
edly rational means of differential taxation selected by the
legislature. This unorthodox approach leads to further
error. The Court gives only the most cursory attention to
the factual and legal bases supporting the State's purposes
and ignores both precedent and significant evidence in the
record establishing their legitimacy. Most troubling, the
· Court discovers in the Equal Protection Clause an implied
prohibition against classifications whose purpose is to give
the "home team" an advantage over interstate competitors.
Ante, at 8.
The Court overlooks the unequivocal language of our prior
decisions. "Unless a classification trammels fundamental
personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions pre-
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sume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations
and require only that the classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest." New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976). See, e. g. Lehnhausen v.
Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356 (1973). Judicial
deference is strongest where a tax classification is alleged to
infringe the right to equal protection. "[l]n taxation, even
more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest
freedom of classification." Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S.
83, 88 (1940). "Where the public interest is served one business may be left untaxed and another taxed, in order to promote the one or to restrict or suppress the other." Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 512 (1937)
(citations omitted). As the Court emphatically noted in
Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers:
"[l]t has repeatedly been held and appears to be en. ~ ~
~ tirely settled that a statute which encourages the loca~ ,~ ,..cJ4~ ~ ~
tion within the State of needed and useful industries by
~ (>·~.,...(...!>If~ v.--- ~
e3empting them, though not also others, from its taxes
~ -\-c ~ ·...., oJ.o is not arbitrary and does not violate the Equal Protec~.
~ ~~
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Similarly,
b~ ~ f("c
it has long been settled that a classification, though dis(..4'f"f<1"o:l'~ ~ ·
criminatory, is not arbitrary or violative of the Equal
~~
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if any
state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain it." 358 U. S. 522, 528 (1959) (citations
omitted).
See also Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of
Equalization, 451 U. S., at 674; Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981).
Appellants waived their right to an evidentiary hearing
and conceded that Alabama's classification was rationally related to its purposes of encouraging the formation of domestic
insurance companies and bringing needed services and capital to the State. Thus the only issue in dispute is the legiti-

.(
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macy of these purposes. Yet it is obviously legitimate for a
State to seek to promote local business and attract' capital
investment, and surely those purposes animate a wide range
of legislation in all 50 States.
The ~ority evades the obvious by refusing to acknowledge the factual background bearing on the legitimacy of the
State's purpose or to address the many collateral public benefits advanced by Alabama. Instead, the Court dismisses the
State's arguments stating merely that they were not "addressed by the courts below." Ante, at 12, n. 10. In point
of fact, the full range of purposes documented before this
Court was also argued and documented before the Alabama
Supreme Court. See Record, Vols. VI, VII, VIII. That
court found "at least two purposes, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the formation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) encouraging capital investment by
foreign insurance companies in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth in the statute." App. to Juris.
Statement 20a-21a (emphasis added). Moreover, it is settled law that the appellee may assert any argument in support of the judgment in his favor, regardless of whether it
was relied upon by the court below. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 475, n. 6 (1970). The Court's failure
actually to resolve whether Alabama may continue to collect
its tax, see ante, at 12, n. 10, is all the more baffling, since
appellants took the exceptional step of conceding the factual
issues to assure a speedy resolution of numerous pending
lawsuits disruptive of industry stability. See Brief of Amici
Curiae Alaska, et al. 1-2. Our precedents do not condone
such a miserly approach to review of statutes adjusting economic burdens. See, e. g. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v.
Bowers, 358 U.S., at 528-529; McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U. S. 420, 425 (1961); United States v. Carolene Products,
304 U. S. 144, 152-153 (1938); Borden's Co. v. Baldwin, 293
U. S. 194, 209 (1934). The Court has consistently reviewed
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the validity of such statutes based on whatever "may reasonably have been the purpose and policy of the State Legislature, in adopting the proviso." Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v.
Bowers, supra, at 528-529. It is to that inquiry that I now

turn.
Alabama claims that its insurance tax, in addition to raising revenue and promoting investment, promotes the formation of new domestic insurance companies and enables them
to compete with the many large multistate insurers that currently occupy some 75% to 85% of the Alabama insurance
market. App. 80. Economic studies submitted by the
State document differences between the two classes of insurers that are directly relevant to the well-being of Alabama's
citizens. See id. 46-130. Foreign insurers typically concentrate on affluent, high volume, urban markets and offer standardized national policies. In contrast, domestic insurers
such as intervenors American Educators Life Insurance
Company and Booker T. Washington Life Insurance Company are more likely to serve Alabama's rural areas, and to
write low-cost industrial and burial policies not offered by the
larger national companies. 1 Additionally, Alabama argues
persuasively that it can more readily regulate domestic insurers and more effectively safeguard their solvency than that of
insurers domiciled and having their principal places of business in other states.
Ignoring these policy considerations, the Court insists that
Alabama seeks only to benefit local business, a purpose the
Court labels invidious. Yet if the classification chosen by
the State can be shown actually to promote the public wei1
"Industrial insurance" is the trade tenn for a low face-value policy typically sold door-to-door and maintained through home collection of monthly
or weekly premiums. Alabama currently has more industrial insurance in
force than any other State. Burial insurance is another fonn of insurance
popular in rural Alabama that is offered exclusively by local insurers. By
contrast, Metropolitan Life, like many multistate insurers, has discontinued writing even whole-life policies with face values below $15,000. App.
173-176.
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fare, this is strong evidence of a legitimate State purpose.
See Note, Taxing Out-of-State Corporations After Western &
Southern: An Equal Protection Analysis, 34 Stan. L. Rev.
877, 896 (1982). In this regard, Justice Frankfurter wisely
observed that:
"[T]he great divide in the [equal protection] decisions lies
in the difference between emphasizing the actualities or
the abstractions of legislation. . . . To recognize marked
differences that exist in fact is living law; to disregard
practical differences and concentrate on some abstract
identities is lifeless logic." Morey v. Doud, 354 U. S.
457, 472 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
A thoughtful look at the "actualities of [this] legislation" compels the conclusion that the State's goals are legitimate by
any test.
II
Insurance is a uniquely local concern. We have often prudently conceded that "Justices of this Court lack both the
expertise and the familiarity with local problems . . . necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the raising . . . of public revenues" and the formulation of tax policy
in areas traditionally relegated to state or local control. San
Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 41 (1973).
The policy of favoring local concerns in State regulation and
taxation of insurance, which the majority condemns as illegitimate, is not merely a recent invention of the States. The
States initiated regulation of the business of insurance as
early as 1851. See Issues and Needed Improvements in
State Regulation of Taxation, GAO Report B-192813, p.5
(Oct. 9, 1979) ("GAO Report"). In 1944, however, this
Court overruled a long line of cases holding that the business
of insurance was an intrastate activity beyond the scope of
the Commerce Clause. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U. S. 533 (1944). "The deci-
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sion provoked widespread concern that the States would no
longer be able to engage in taxation and effective regulation
of the insurance industry. Congress moved quickly, enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act within a year of the decision
in South-Eastern Underwriters." St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. v. Barry, 438 U. S. 531, 539 (1978). See
H. R. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1945); 91 Cong.
Rec. 8479-8480 (Jan. 25, 1945) (remarks of Sen. Ferguson);
id., at 8487 (remarks of Sen. Ellender). The drafters of the
Act were sensitive to the same concerns Alabama now vainly
seeks to bring to this Court's attention: the greater responsiveness of local insurance companies to local conditions, the
different insurance needs of rural and industrial states, the
special advantages and constraints of state-by-state regulation, and the importance of insurance license fees and taxes
as a major source of State revenues. See, e. g., Hearings on
S132 Before Senate Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 78th Cong.,
1st Sess., 3, 10, 16-17 (letter of Gov. Sharpe of S. Dakota
stressing role of domestic insurers that provide "poor man"
and rural policies adapted to farming concerns); 90 Cong.
Rec. H6564 (June 22, 1944) (remarks of Rep. Vorys). "As
this Court observed shortly afterward, '[o]bviously Congress'
purpose was broadly to give support to the existing and
future state systems for regulating and taxing the business of
insurance.' Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328
U. S. 408, 429 (1946)." St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co. v. Barry, supra, at 539.
The majority opinion correctly notes that Congress did not
intend the McCarran-Ferguson Act to give the States any
power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than
they already possessed. But the legislative history cited by
the majority, ante, at 10, n. 7, relates not to differential taxation but to decisions of this Court that had invalidated State
taxes on contracts of insurance entered into outside the
State's jurisdiction. See H. R. Rep. No. 143, 9th Cong., 1st
Sess., 3 (1945). The Court fails to mention that at time the
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Act was under consideration the taxing schemes of Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin all incorporated tax differentials favoring domestic insurers. See App.
377-379.

Any doubt that Congress' intent encompassed taxes that
discriminate in favor of local insurers was dispelled in
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin. Cf. Note, Congressional Consent to Discriminatory State Legislation, 45
Colum. L. Rev. 927 (1945) (discussing the issues of constitutional power posed by the Act). There a foreign insurer
challenged a tax on annual gross premiums imposed on foreign but not domestic insurers as a condition for renewal of
its license to do business. Congress, the foreign insurer
argued, was powerless to sanction the tax at issue because
''the commerce clause 'by its own force' forbids discriminatory state taxation." Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S., at 426. A unanimous Court rejected the argument that exacting a 3% gross premium tax from foreign
insurers was invalid as "somehow technically of an inherently
discriminatory character." Id., at 432. The Court concluded that the McCarran-Ferguson Act's effect was "clearly
to sustain the exaction and that this can be done without
violating any constitutional provision." Id., at 427 (emphasis added). Benjamin expressly noted that nothing in the
Equal Protection Clause forbade the State to enact a law
such as the tax at issue. I d., at 508, 511. In this regard the
Court relied in part on Hanover Fire Insurance Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S. 494 (1926), a decision that explicitly recognized that differential taxation of revenues of foreign corporations may not be arbitrary or without reasonable basis.
See Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of
Equalization, 451 U. S., at 664, n. 17. The Commerce
Clause, Benjamin emphasized, is not a "one way street" but
encompasses congressional power ''to discriminate against
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interstate commerce and in favor oflocal trade," ... "subject
only to the restrictions placed on its authority by other constitutional provisions." 328 U. S., at 434. Where the States
and Congress have acted in concert to effect a policy favoring
local concerns, their action must be upheld unless it unequivocally exceeds "some explicit and compelling limitation
imposed by a constitutional provision or provisions designed
and intended to outlaw the action taken entirely from our
constitutional framework." I d., at 435-436.
Our more recent decision in Western & Southern in no way
undermines the force of the analysis in Benjamin. Western
& Southern confirms that differential premium taxes are not
immune from review as ''privilege" taxes, but it also teaches
that the Constitution requires only that discrimination between domestic and foreign corporations bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Benjamin clearly
recognized that differentially taxing foreign insurers to promote a local insurance industry was a legitimate State purpose completely consonant with Congress' purpose in the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.
The contemporary realities of insurance regulation and
taxation continue to justify a uniquely local perspective. Insurance regulation and taxation must serve local social policies including assuring the solvency and reliability of companies doing business in the State and providing special protection for those who might be denied insurance in a free
market, such as the urban poor, small businesses and family
farms. GAO Report 10-13; State Insurance Regulation,
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly and
Business Rights of the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 96th Cong.,
1st Sess., 19-21 (1979) (hereinafter Insurance Regulation).
Currently at least 28 of the 50 states employ a combination of
investment incentives and differential premium taxes favoring domestic insurers to encourage local investment of policyholders' premiums and to partially shelter smaller domestic
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insurers from competition with the large multistate companies. App. 66.
State insurance commissions vary widely in manpower and
expertise."GAO Report 14. In practice, the State of incorporation exercises primary oversight of the solvency of its
insurers. GAO Report 36-38. See generally Dunne, Risk,
Reality, and Reason in Financial Services Deregulation: A
State Legislative Perspective, 2 J . Ins. Reg. 342 (1984) (prepared by the Conference of Insurance Legislators). See,
e. g., Ala. Code §27-2-21; Ill. Rev. Stat,ch. 73 §§745; (power
to examine books of domestic insurers); Ala. Code § 27-32-1
et seq.; Ill. Rev. Stat. §§ 799, 800 (commissioner's authority to
assume control to prevent insolvency); see generally Wise.
Stat. Anno. Ch. 620, Prefatory Committee Comment-1971,
536, 546 (noting lesser control over nondomestic's financial
operations). Even the State-of-incorporation's efforts to
regulate a multistate insurer may be seriously hampered by
the difficulty of gaining access to records and assets in fortynine other States. Dunne, supra, at 356. ]bus the security
of Alabama's citizens who purchase insurance from out-ofstate companies may depend in part on the diligence of
another State's insurance commissioner, over whom Alabama
has no authority and limited influence. In the event of financial failure of a foreign insurer the State may have difficulty
levying on out-of-state assets. See, e. g., Phoenix Insurance Co. v. McMaster, 237 U. S. 63, 73 (1915). Since each
State maintains its own insurance guarantee fund, the
domestic insurers of the States where a multistate insurer is
admitted to do business may ultimately be forced to absorb
local policyholders' losses. I d., at 372-372.
Many have sharply criticized this piecemeal system, see,
e. g., GAO Report i-iii; Schmalz, The Insurance Exemption:
Can it be Modified Successfully, 48 ABA Antitrust L. J. 579
(1979), but Congress has resisted suggestions that it modify
the McCarran-Ferguson Act to permit greater federal intervention. See GAO Report 1; Insurance Regulation, supra.

Q
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This Court cannot ignore the exigencies of contemporary
insurance regulation outlined above simply because it might
prefer uniform federal regulation. Given the distinctions in
ease of regulation and services rendered by foreign and
domestic insurers, we cannot dismiss as illegitimate the
State's goal of promoting a healthy local insurance industry
sensitive to regional differences and composed of companies
that agree to subordinate themselves to the Alabama Commissioner's control and to maintain a principal place of business within Alabama's borders. Though economists might
dispute the efficacy of Alabama's tax, "[p]arties challenging
legislation under the Equal Protection Clause cannot prevail
so long as 'it is evident from all the considerations presented
to [the legislature], and those of which we may take judicial
notice, that the question is at least debatable.'" Western &
Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451
U. S., at 64, quoting United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U. S. 144, 154 (1938). Moreover, appellants waived
their right to challenge the tax measure's effectiveness.

III
Despite abundant evidence of a legitimate state purpose,
the majority condemns Alabama's tax as ''purely and completely discriminatory'' and "the very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to
prevent." Ante, at 7. Apparently, the majority views any
favoritism of domestic commercial entities as inherently suspect. The majority ignores a long line of our decisions. In
the past this Court has not hesitated to apply the rational
basis test to regulatory classifications that distinguish
between domestic and out-of-state corporations or burden
foreign interests to protect local concerns. The Court has
always recognized that there are certain legitimate restrictions or policies in which, "[b]y definition, discrimination
against nonresidents would inhere." Arlington County
Board v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5, 7 (per curiam) (1977). For
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example, where state of incorporation or principal place of
business affect the State's ability to regulate or exercise its
jurisdiction, a State may validly discriminate between foreign and domestic entities. See G.D. Searle v. Cohn, 455
U. S. 404 (1982) (difficulty of obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident corporation provides a rational basis for excepting
such corporations from statute of limitations); Metropolitan
Casualty Insurance Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S. 580 (1935)
(domicile of insurer relevant to statute of limitations as foreign insurers offices and funds generally located outside
state); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 U. S. 553, 562
(1906) (State's greater control over domestic than foreign
nonprofit corporations justifies discriminatory tax).
There is no doubt that a State may provide subsidies or rebates to domestic but not to foreign enterprises if it rationally
believes that the former contribute to the State's welfare in
ways that the latter do not. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 426 U. S. 794, 810-814 (1976). A State may use its
taxing power to entice useful foreign industry, see Allied
Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S., at 528, or to make
residence within its boundaries more attractive, see Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U. S. 55, 67-68 (1982) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Though such measures might run afoul of the Commerce Clause, "[n]o one disputes that a State may enact laws
pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and effect
of encouraging domestic industry." Bacchus Imports Ltd.
v. Dias, U. S. (1984); Western & Southern Life
Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, supra, at.668. Cf.
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 45 U. S. 624, 646 (1982) (POWELL, J.
concurring) (noting State's interest in protecting regionally
based corporations from acquisition by foreign corporations).
Equal protection does not bar Congress from enacting or
authorizing States to enact legislation to protect industry in
one State ''from disadvantageous competition" with less
stringently regulated businesses in other States. Hodel v.
Indiana, 452 U. S. 314, 329 (1981). In short, the Equal Pro-
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tection Clause does not presume such classifications or purposes invidious, but requires only that they be rationally
related.
The majority's attempts to distinguish these precedents
are unconvincing. First the majority suggests that a State
purpose might be legitimate for purposes of the Commerce
Clause but somehow illegitimate for purposes of the Equal
Protection Clause. No basis is advanced for this theory
because no basis exists. The test of a legitmate State purpose must be whether it addresses valid State concerns. To
suggest that the purpose's legitimacy, chameleon-like,
changes according to the constitutional clause cited in the
complaint is merely another pretext to escape the clear message of this Court's precedents.
Next the majority asserts that "a State may not constitutionally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at a higher rate solely because of their residence," citing
cases that rejected discriminatory ad valorem property
taxes, defended as taxes on the "privilege" of doing business.
Ante,AB. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117
(1968); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562
(1949); Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S. 494
(1926); Southern R . Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400 (1910).
These decisions were addressed in Western & Southern, and
the classifications were characterized as impermissibly discriminatory because they did not "'rest on differences pertinent to the subject in respect of which the classification is
made."' 451 U. S., at 668, quoting Power Manufacturing
Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490, 494 (1927). As the majority
concedes, none of these decisions intimates that the tax statutes at issue in the decisions rested on relevant differences
between domestic and foreign corporations or had purposes
other than the raising of revenue at the out-of-state corporations' expense. In fact, the Court noted in several of these
opinions that foreign corporations may validly be taxed at a
higher rate if the classification is based on some relevant dis-
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tinction. No such distinction, however, had been demonstrated or even alleged. See WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro,
supra, at 120 ("This is not a case in which the exemption was
withheld by reason of the foreign corporation's failure or
inability to benefit the State in the same measure as do domestic nonprofit corporations"); Wheeling Steel Corp. v.
Glander, 337 U. S., at 572 (''the inequality is not because of
the slightest difference in Ohio's relation to the decisive
transaction"); Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S., at
416-17 (parties conceded that the business of the foreign and
domestic corporations was precisely the same). 2 Lacking the
threshhold requirement of an articulated distinction relevant
to an asserted purpose, the classifications at issue in these
decisions could never have survived rational basis scrutiny
and no such analysis was even attempted. These precedents
do not answer the question posed by this case: whether a legislature may adopt differential tax treatment of domestic and
foreign insurers not simply to raise additional revenue but
with the purpose of affecting the market as an "instrument of
economic and social engineering"? P. Hartman, Federal
Limitations on State and Local Taxation, § 3:2 (1981). The
majority's suggestion that these cases necessarily decided
the issue before us, as promotion of domestic business is "log1
The only cited authority that arguably addressed the issue raised in the
instant case is a per curiam reversal and remand without opinion of a decision upholding a discriminatory ad valorem tax on a foreign insurer's fixtures and other tangible property. See Reserve Life Insurance Co. v.
Bowers, 380 U.S. 285 (1965). A reversal and remand is more enigmatic
even than a summary affirmance, which has precedential value only as
to "the precise issues necessarily presented and decided." Mandel v.
Bradley, 432 U. S. 173, 176 (1977). Decisions without opinion may not be
equated with "an opinion by this Court treating the question on the merits." See Edelman v. JcmJ.an, 415 U. S. 651, 670-671 (1975). "Indeed,
upon fuller consideration of an issue under plenary review, the Court has
not hesitated to discard a rule which a line of summary affirrnances may
appear to have established." Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 392
(BURGER, C. J., concurring) (1975).
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ically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes
such as those at issue [in the cited cases]," is mere speculation. See ante, at 8, n. 6.
In treating these cases as apposite authority, the majority
again closes its eyes to the facts. Alabama does not tax at a
higher rate solely on the basis of residence; it taxes insurers,
domestic as well as foreign, who do not maintain a principal
place of business or substantial assets in Alabama, based on
conceded distinctions in the contributions of these insurers as
a class to the State's insurance objectives. The majority
obscures the issue by observing that a given "foreign insurance company doing the same type and volume of business in
Alabama as a domestic company'' will pay a higher tax.
Ante, at -"-. Under our precedents, tax classifications
need merely ''rest[] upon some reasonable consideration of
difference or policy." Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers,
supra, at 527. Rational basis scrutiny does not require that
the classification be mathematically precise or that every foreign insurer or every domestic company fit to perfection the
general profile on which the classification is based. "[T]he
Equal Protection Clause does not demand a surveyor's precision" in fashioning classifications. Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 814 (1976).

IV
Because Alabama's classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate purpose, our precedents demand that it
be sustained. The Court avoids this clear directive by a
remarkable evasive tactic. It simply declares that the ends
of promoting a domestic insurance industry and attracting
investments to the State when accomplished through the
means of discriminatory taxation are not legitimate state
purposes. This bold assertion marks a drastic and unfortunate departure from established equal protection theory.
By collapsing the two prongs of the rational basis test into
one, the Court arrives at the ultimate issue-whether the

..

~
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means are constitutional-without ever engaging in the deferential inquiry we have adopted as a brake on judicial
impeachment of legislative policy choices. In addition to
unleashing an undisciplined fonn of Equal Protection Clause
scrutiny, the Court's approach today has serious implications
for the authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause.
Groping for some basis for this radical departure from equal
protection analysis, the Court perceives an implied constitutional prohibition against economic parochialism emanating
from the the Equal Protection Clause itself. This theory
forces the Equal Protection Clause into an unaccustomed role
that it cannot sustain without grave damage to the constitutional balance. Nor can this analysis be reconciled with the
McCarran-Ferguson Act and our decisions in Western &
Southern and Benjamin.
Western & Southern established that a state may validly
tax out-of-state corporations at a higher rate if its goal is to
promote the ability of its domestic businesses to compete in
interstate markets. Nevertheless, the Court today concludes that the converse policy is forbidden, striking down
legisl2.tion whose purpose is to encourage the intrastate
activities of local business concerns by permitting them to
compete effectively on their home turf. In essence, the
Court declares ''We will excuse an unequal burden on foreign
insurers if the State's purpose is to foster its domestic insurers activities in other States, but the same unequal burden
will be unconstitutional when employed to further a policy
that places a higher social value on the domestic insurer's
home-state than interstate activities." This conclusion is not
drawn from the Commerce Clause, the textual source of constitutional restrictions on State interference with interstate
competition. Reliance on the Commerce Clause would, of
course, be unavailing here in view of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. Instead the Court engrafts its own economic values on
the Equal Protection Clause. Beyond guarding against arbitrary or irrational discrimination, as interpreted by the Court
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today this Clause now prohibits the effectuation of economic
policies that elevate local concerns over interstate competition. Ante, at 7. "But a constitution is not intended to
embody a particular economic theory . . . . It is made for
people of fundamentally differing views." Lochner v. N w
York, 198 U. S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
In the heyday of economic due process, Justice Holmes
warned:
"Courts should be careful not to extend [the express]
prohibitions [of the Constitution] beyond their obvious
meaning by reading into them conceptions of public policy that the particular Court may happen to entertain."
Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 445-446
(1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting, joined by Brandeis, J.)
(emphasis added).
Ignoring the wisdom of this observation, the Court fashions
its own brand of economic equal protection. In so doing, it
supplants a legislative policy endorsed by both Congress and
the individual States that explicitly sanctioned the very parochialism in regulation and taxation of insurance that the
Court'3 decision holds illegitimate. This newly unveiled
power of the Equal Protection Clause would come as a surprise to the Congress that passed the McCarran-Ferguson
Act and the Court that sustained the Act against constitutional attack. In the McCarran-Ferguson Act, Congress expressly sanctioned such economic parochialism in the context
of state regulation and taxation of insurance.
=MoNO'Iet, !_he doctrine adopted by the majority threatens
the freedom not only of the States but also of the Federal
government to formulate economic policy. The dangers in
importing Commerce Clause values to the Equal Protection
Clause should be self-evident: the Commerce Clause is a flexible tool that Congress may invoke or leave dormant as it
sees fit; the Equal Protection Clause is not so malleable.
Doctrines of equal protection constrain the acts of federal and
state legislatures alike. See, e. g., Califano v. Webster, 430
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U. S. 313 (1977); Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate
Unconstitutional State Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old
Enigma, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 400-413 (1983). Contrary to the
reasoning in Benjamin, the Court today indicates the Equal
Protection Clause stands as an independent barrier if courts
should determine that either Congress or a State has ventured the ''wrong" direction down what has become, by judicial fiat, the one-way street of the Commerce Clause. Nothing in the Constitution or our past decisions supports forcing
such an economic straight-jacket on the federal system.

IV
Today's opinion charts an ominous course. I can only hope
this unfortunate adventure away from the safety of our precedents will be an isolated episode. I had thought the Court
had finally accepted that
''the judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge
the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental
rights nor proceed along suspect lines; in the local economic sphere, it is only the invidious discrimination, the
wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand consistently
with the Fourteenth Amendment. New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303-304 (1976) (citations omitted).
Because I believe that the Alabama law at issue here serves
legitimate State purposes through concededly rational
means, and thus is neither invidious nor arbitrary, I would
affirm the court below. I respectfully dissent.

lgs February 18, 1985

MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

~u.41.J,...~.,

Lynda
No. 83-1274

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward

We have received Justice O'Connor's dissent in this
case.

I have read it over and believe that we need do relatively

little to respond to it.

The entire dissent is premised on the

assumption that all of the purposes advanced by the State for its
domestic preference tax statute are before the Court.

Thus, on

p. 4, Justice O'Connor takes us to task for dismissing the
arguments as not addressed by the courts below.

She also

contends that our failure to resolve whether Alabama may continue
to collect its tax is "baffling, since appellants took the
exceptional step of conceding the factual issues to assure a
speedy resolution [of the case]

.

characterizes as "obviously legitimate"

II

!d.

Thus, she

the State's goals, among

others, of benefitting Alabama citizens by promoting domestic
insurers (i) who will write policies not offered by larger
multistate companies;

(ii) who are more readily regulated than

foreign companies; and (iii) whose solvency can be more
effectively safeguarded.

Id., p. 5.

In fact, of course, we did not address any of the
State's other 15 purposes because the lower courts did not rule

on their legitimacy.

.,

Even though these other purposes had been

presented to the courts below, the circuit court specifically
ruled only that the two

of

~

domestic insurance companies an
Alabama were

promoting capital investment in

.,

App. to Juris. St., at 20a-2la •

Likewise, on appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals noted the two
purposes that had been found to be legitimate, id., at 8a, and
referred to them also by saying that the foreign insurers
contended that "neither of the purposes found by the court are
constitutionally legitimate."

Neither the circuit court nor the

appellate court purported to rule on any of the other purposes on
-

7

which Justice O'Connor relies.

Indeed, the appellate court did

not invoke any of the reasons asserted by Justice O'Connor for
why favoring domestic industry is legitimate:

it ruled simply

that "[t]he Supreme Court has said that the location or promotion
of a needed or useful industry within the state is a legitimate
state purpose, as well as efforts to maintain the profit level of
a domestic industry.

See Parker v. Brown, . • • ; Pike v. Bruce

Church, Inc • • . • " (citations omitted).

It seems plain to me

that the appellate court was ruling, as was the circuit court, on
the legitimacy of promoting domestic industry for its own sake.
Moreover, the dissent's statement that appellants
conceded the factual issues is inaccurate.

The appellate court's

per curiam opinion on rehearing quotes the parties• stipulation,
which says that appellants waived "any right to an evidentiary
hearing or trial on the second, factual issue, to-wit:

Whether

the Legislature could have reasonably believed that the premium

..
tax statute's use of the classification of insurance companies as
foreign and domestic would promote any of the purposes which the
lower courts have determined to be legitimate."
St., at 2a (emphasis added).

App. to Juris.

Thus, I read the waiver as

effective only as to the two purposes ruled to be legitimate by
the circuit court and the Court of Civil Appeals.
It is also noteworthy that the case arose on
judgment

motio ~ .

~~ry

The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the circuit

court's judgment on the rational relationship issue and remanded
for trial because it found there was a genuine issue as to the
facts involved.

For this Court to rule on any of the other

purposes advanced by the State, it would not only have to make a
legitimacy determination not ruled on by the courts below, but it
would have to conduct its own inquiry as to rational relationship
for these other State purposes, on a record that the appellate
court has intimated is inadequate.
As you will see from my marks on the dissent draft,

I

have other minor disagreements with the dissent's
characterization of our opinion in some places.
however.

that any of th

I do not believe
I would

recommend that we simply add a footnote clarifying the procedural
posture of the case and pointing out why the purposes on which
the dissent relies are not properly before us.

-

take this opportunity to emphasize just
~ -that

-~---

~o

....

Perhaps if we

-

it deals only with the promotion of domestic industry

for its own sake and not for all the other reasons advanced by
the State and the dissent--the Chief will be more comfortable

;

.

about joining.

Also, Dan suggested, and I agree, that we might

at some point add a line in the text to the effect that if this
discrimination is permitted to stand for the reason approved by
the lower court, virtually any discrimination that promotes
domestic industry at the expense of foreign will hereafter pass
muster.

)
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.u!ring~ ~. <If. 20p~~
CHAMI!!ERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

February 19, 1985
Re:

No. 83-1274

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Ward

Dear Sandra,
Please join me.
Sincerely~

Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference

lgs March 7, 1985

From: Lynda
Re:

Status Report on No. 83-1274 -- Metropolitan Life v. Ward
Our draft responding to Justice O'Connor's dissent has

been out for nearly two weeks now, and everyone has voted except
Justice Brennan and the Chief.

Dan tells me that he understands

from Justice Brennan's clerk that Justice Brennan plans to vote
with the dissent.

We have heard nothing from the Chief, however.

By my count, we still need his vote for a majority.

The Chief

has been casting his vote in quite a few other cases lately.

Is

it time to inquire as to his decision on ours, or is it better to
leave well enough alone?

There have been no responses to the

changes we made in our opinion, and it's hard to understand what
the Chief is waiting for at this point.
Let me know if there is something I should be doing to
move things along .

.
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

Lynda
No. 83-1274 -- Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.Ward
we have just received the second draft of Justice

O'Connor's dissent in this case.

I have to say that I am

somewhat mystified as to the import of most of the changes she
has made.

---

However, they seem

--- "

p~ de~ i gn~g

~ say

~

that the
.1).

local favoritism that was the goal of the Alabama legislature
been affirmatively

~

Her point, I think,

cJ:>

is that such local favoritism would be permissible under the

~

Commerce Clause, and therefore, it is improper for the Court to

~:):;-:

invalidate it under the Equal Protection Clause.

~~ never

~

The ~nt

quite identifies, however, what it sees as Congress's

~authorization here.

Perhaps it is the McCarran-Ferguson Act,

~
~h

that is certainly

~ ~
~

The case to which the opinion now repeatedly cites is

QV~ v.
u.s.

Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, 460

204 (1983).

That case involved an executive order

the Mayor of Boston requiring that all construction
funded by city money, or by funds that the city had t
to administer

(certain types of federal funds),

ssued by

~f

performed by a work force at least half of whom wereresidents
Boston.

The Court upheld the order under the Commerce Clause,
________.:;

ruling that the city was a market participant, not a market
regulator, and there was no indication that the Commerce Clause
was supposed to limit the power of States to operate freely in
the market.

As to the fact that federal funds were involved in

some projects, the Court noted that Congress, in regulations
relating to use of federal money in city construction projects,
had authorized the city's action, and thus was not subject to the
Commerce Clause.
All of this is well and good, but completely irrelevant,
in my view, to our case.

As I noted, I fail to see where

dissent ever identifies explicitly the congressional
authorization for Alabama's actions here.

Moreover, as we hav.e

already pointed out in our opinion, cases under the Equal
Protection Clause need not necessarily be governed by Commerce
Cla~~ce.

Indeed, some of the Commerce Clause cases,

such as Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, actually support our view
that a State's ability to promote domestic industry for its own
sake is not unlimited.

See p.7, n.6 of our opinion.

I would therefore recommend that we make no

in

response to the new draft, unless of course someone in our camp
expresses a wish that we do so.

If you are of a different view,

however, I would be happy to draft whatever you like.

Dan has

read Justice O'Connor's new draft, and agrees with my assessment.

"

.

.i'n:pt"tUU Qfltlttt of tirt ~b .i'bdts

'8aslfingbm. ~.Of. 2llc5ll-~
CHAMISI!:RS OF

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

February 28, 1985

Re:

No. 83-1274-Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v.
w. G. Ward, Jr.

Dear Sandra:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

~.

T.M.

Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference

.ittpt"ttttt Qf~url

.n tirt ~h .ihdt.s'

Jlufringhtn. ). <!J.

2ll~ll~

CHAMI!IERS OF"

.JUSTICE

w .. .

.J . BRENNAN , .JR .

March 20, 1985

No. 83-1274
Metropolitan Life Insuranqe Co.
v. Ward

Dear Sandra,
Please join me in your second draft
of the above.
Sincerely,
I

"
I

.
•

)~ \

Ju~tice

·O'Connor

Copies to the Conference

,·,

l
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2n~~~

CHAM6ERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

!-1arch 21, 1985

RE:

No. 83-1274 - !1-ietropolitan Life Insurance
Co. v. W.G. Ward, Jr.

:!)ear Lewis:
This "not easy" case has had a somewhat tortured
course since November but I am now satisfied with your
Draft V and I join.

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

lgs March 22, 1985

No. 83-1274

aLa

v

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward

C ~· ""'" ~ 0);1.. ~~aL ~ /-lr.L.,
~1 G-1-. Jr
T~ z see~presents the question;fwhether an Alabama

domestic preference tax

statute,~imposing

higher gross premiums

.
~~~
d
.
taxes on out-of-state 1nsurance
compan1es)
t~1
o6 domest1c
~·~
A
insurers, / violates the Equal Protection Clause.
For the reasons

stated in an opinion filed with the Clerk today,j we hold that it

-

does.

-

The decision of the Alabama Supreme Court

~

therefore

~

reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
Justice

~cavv

O'Connor~ filed

a dissenting opinion, in which

Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Rehnquist joined .

.'

83-1274 Metropolitan Life v. Ward (Dan)
LFP for the Court 11/9/84
1st draft 11/30/84
2nd draft 12/6/84
3rd draft 12/14/84
4th draft 2/22/85
5th draft 2/27/85
Joined by JPS 11/30/84
Joined by BRW 12/6/84
Joined by HAB 12/12/84
CJ 3/21/85
SOC dissent
1st draft 2/16/85
3rd draft 3/25/85
Joined by WHR 2/19/85
TM 2j28j85
WJB 3/20/85
SOC will dissent 11/30/84
1M awaiting dissent 12/6/84
Copy to Mr. Lind 12/12/84
CJ awaiting dissent, may join judgment 12/28/84
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To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor

11/28

From:

Justice Powell

Circulated: _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __
Recirculated: _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _

1st CHAMBERS DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-1274

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, ET
AL., APPELLANTS v. W. G. WARD, JR.,
ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
[December - -, 1984]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether Alabama's domestic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-5,
which taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Protection Clause.
I
Since 1955, ''the State of Alabama has granted a preference
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substantially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-ofstate (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory
'The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing
business in the state was limited to companies not chartered by the state.
Act No. 1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
Act No. 156 [1945] Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated,
Act No. 77 [1955] Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amendments, has remained in effect until the present.
2
For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic insurer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its principal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code
§ 27-4-1(3). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is
characterized as a foreign insurer. I d., § 27-4- 1(2).
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on
their gross premiums received from business conducted in
Alabama at a rate of three percent, and foreign companies
selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent.
Ala. Code§ 27-4-4(a). All domestic insurance companies, in
contrast, pay at a rate of only one percent on all types of insurance premiums. I d., § 27-4-5(a). 3 As a result, a foreign
insurance company doing the same type and volume of business in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its
domestic competitor.
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their
worldwide assets in specified investments in Alabama. I d.,
§ 27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign life insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to
two percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its tax rate from four to three percent.
Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of
smaller percentages of a company's assets. I d. Regardless
of how much of its total assets a foreign company invests in
Alabama investments, however, it can never reduce its gross
premiums tax,rate to the same level paid by comparable domestic companies, which are entitled to the one percent tax
rate even if they have no investments in the State. Thus,
the investment provision permits foreign insurance companies to reduce, but never to eliminate, the discrimination inherent in the domestic preference tax statute.
' There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates
of taxation of insurance companies. They are that for annuities, the tax
rate is one percent for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code
§ 27-4-4(a), and for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is
three-quarters of one percent for both foreign and domestic insurance companies, id. , § 27- 4-6(a).
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II
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Alabama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commissioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981.
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be unconstitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the
appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies intervened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting
two claims as lead cases 4 to be tried and binding on all claimants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court
ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional.
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life
Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648 (1981),
the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two purposes, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the formation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) encouraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies
in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth
in the statute.." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The
court also found that the distinction the statute created between foreign and domestic companies was rationally related
to those purposes and that the Alabama legislature could reasonably have believed that the classification would have promoted those purposes. I d., at 21a.
After their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the cir' Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, was
chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property
and Casualty Company, a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as representative of the non-life claimants. See App. 314-315.

'•
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cuit court's findings as to the existence of legitimate state
purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of rational relationship, ruling that summary judgment
was inappropriate on that question because the evidence was
in conflict. Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for certiorari on the affirmance of the legitimate state
purpose issue, and the State and the intervenors petitioned
for review of the remand order. Appellants then waived
their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether
the statute's classification bore a rational relationship to the
two purposes found by the circuit court to be legitimate, and
they requested a final determination of the legal issues with
respect to their equal protection challenge to the statute.
The supreme court denied certiorari on all claims. Appellants again waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing on
the rational relationship issue and filed a joint motion with
the other parties seeking rehearing and entry of a final judgment. The motion was granted, and judgment was entered
for the State and the intervenors. This appeal followed, and
we noted probable jurisdiction.
U. S. - - (1984).
We now reverse.
III
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co.
v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the jurisprudence of
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discriminatory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945),
held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a
foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do business within a state, were immune from equal protection challenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the
Court's prior decisions in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272
U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the
Court had recognized that the Equal Protection Clause
placed limits on other forms of discriminatory taxation im-

,.,

'•

83-1274-0PINION
METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WARD

5

posed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their residence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117
(1968); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522
(1959); Wheeling Steel Corp . v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562
(1949).
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal
protection challenge to a California statute imposing a retaliatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business
within the State, when the home states of those companies
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a
surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a domestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been granted
only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered
discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected the
longstanding but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and explicitly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits
upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign corporation to do business within its borders. We held that
"(w ]e consider it now established that, whatever the extent
of a State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from doing business Within its boundaries, that authority does not
justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other burdens on
foreign corporations than those imposed on domestic corporations, unless the discrimination between foreign 'and domestic
corporations bears a rational relation to a legitimate state
purpose." Id., at 667-668.
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary
hearing on the issue of whether the classification in the Alabama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational relation to the two purposes sought to be accomplished, the only
question before us is whether those purposes found by the
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trial court 5 are legitimate.

A
The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the formation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama.
The State contends that this Court has long held that the promotion of domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate
state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In
so contending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western
& Southern, that have upheld discriminatory taxes. See
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, - - U. S. - - (1984); Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Allied Stores,
Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S.
341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301
U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 U. S.
553 (1906).
The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's contention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied
upon, we did not hold that promotion of domestic industry is
always a legitimate state purpose under equal protection
analysis. 6 Rather, we held that California's purpose in enAltogether, the State and the intervenors have compiled a list of 17
state purposes they contend are served by the statute and are legitimate
under equal protection analysis. See App. 27-33. We decline to review
any of those except the two found by the circuit court to be legitimate, as
they are not before us, but remand to that court for a determination of
whether any of them is legitimate and rationally related to the classification set forth in the statute.
6
We find the other cases relied on by the State also to be inapposite to
this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is integrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or national interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned
with whether a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry
5

•.
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acting the retaliatory tax-to promote the interstate business
of domestic insurers by deterring other States from enacting
discriminatory or excessive taxes-was a legitimate one.
451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks us to approve
its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic insurers
in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers who also want to
do business in the State. Alabama has made no attempt, as
California did, to influence the policies of other States in
order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to operate
interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to foreign companies who wish to do interstate business in order to improve
its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home.
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the
fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its validity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at - -.
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to promote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause.
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and
effect of promoting domestic industry,"-- U. S. - - , - - (1984), we
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discriminatory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and promote local business, id., a t - -. Accord Armco Inc. v. Hardesty,-U. S. - - , --U984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must "regulate evenhandedly." 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970).
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the validity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Education deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate.
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of residence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, however, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonresidents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within
the State. See infra, at - -.
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purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there.
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his coneurrence in
Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, this Court always has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a
State to discriminate in favor of its own residents soley by
burdening "the residents of other state members of our federation." 358 U. S., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax involved in Western & Southern, which only burdens residents
of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on outsiders, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team" an
advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking to
do business within the State, no matter what they or their
States do.
The validity of the view that a State may not constitutionally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v.
Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v.
Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S., at 417~ See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380
U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hanover Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on
business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing business within the State solely because of their residence, presumably to promote domestic industry within the State. 7
7
Although the promotion of domestic industry was not a purpose advanced by the states in support of their taxes in these cases , such promo-
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Our reliance on them and our rejection of Lincoln in Western
& Southern demonstrates the continuing viability of the
Equal Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute
that seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only
by burdening foreign competitors.
The State contends that Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers,
supra, shows that this principle has not always held true. In
that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign corporations from a tax on the value of merchandise held for
storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, finding
that .the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to build
warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The
State contends that this case shows that promotion of domestic industry is a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis.
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied
Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other
cases on which we rely. Allied Stores does not hold that promotion of domestic industry is a legitimate state purpose.
Rather, instead of being concerned with promotion of domestic industry, it involves a statute that encourages nonresidents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within the State. Moreover, the discriminatory
taxing scheme.. involved did not favor residents by burdening
outsiders; rather, it granted the nonresident businesses an
exemption that residents did not share. Since the foreign
and domestic companies involved were not competing to provide warehousing services, granting the former an exemption
did not directly affect adversely the domestic companies subject to the tax. On its facts, then, Allied Stores is not inconsistent with our holding here that promotion of domestic industry within a State, by discriminating against foreign
corporations that wish to do business there, is not a legitition is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such
as those at issue there.
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mate state purpose. See 358 U. S., at 532-533 (JUSTICE
BRENNAN, concurring).
B
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to
view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it contends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward,
p. 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015,
intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden interstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue
here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental
than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarranFerguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Commerce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As
noted above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly
reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on discriminatory taxes in the insurance context. 8
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences between Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional
proviSions serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the
State's intere&_t, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden
the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the
Bin fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress's response
only to the South-Eastern Underwriters case, and that Congress did not
intend thereby to give the States any power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than what they had previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed this Court's decisions holding that the
Equal Protection Clause places limits on a State's ability to tax out-of-state
corporations. See 451 U. S., at 655 n. 6.

·.
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burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that purpose, a test that is not difficult to pass. See Western &
Southern, 451 U. S., at 674 (equal protection challenge may
not prevail so long as the question of rational relationship is
"'at least debatable'" (quoting United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 154 (1938)).
The two constitutional provisions perform different functions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's
power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other protects persons 9 from unconstitutional discrimination by the
States. The effect of the statute at issue here is to place a
discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who desire to
do business within the State, thereby also incidentally placing a burden on interstate commerce. Simply because the
effect of the discrimination in this case is similar to the type of
burden with which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned does not mean that the statute is not subject to equal
protection restraints. We reaffirmed the importance of the
Equal Protection Clause in the insurance context in Western
& Southern and see no reason now for reassessing that view.
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a
legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context.
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer
domestic busihess over foreign. If we accept the State's
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the
State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit domestic business. A discriminatory tax would stand or fall
depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose.
This is a distinction without a difference, and one that werejected last term in an analogous context arising under the
Commerce Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, - 9
It is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. E . g., Western & Southern, 451
U. S., at 660 n. 12.

83-1274-0PINION
METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WARD

12

U. S., at - - . See n. 6 supra. We hold that under the circumstances of this case, promotion of domestic business by
discriminating against nonresidents is not a legitimate state
purpose.
IV
The second purpose found by the courts below to be legitimate was the encouragement of capital investment in the Alabama assets and governmental securities specified in the
statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state purpose. The investment incentive provision of the Alabama
statute does not enable foreign insurance companies to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No matter how
much of their assets they invest in Alabama, foreign insurance companies are still required to pay a higher gross premiums tax than domestic companies. 10 Moreover, domestic insurers remain entitled to the more favorable rate of tax
regardless of whether they invest in Alabama assets. The
State's investment incentive provision therefore does not
cure, but reaffirms, the statute's impermissible classification
based solely on residence. We hold that encouraging investment in Alabama assets and securities in this plainly discriminatory manner serves no legitimate state purpose. 11

v
We conclude that the Alabama domestic preference tax
statute violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to apSection 27-4-4(b) of the Alabama Code provides that by investing ten
percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, a foreign life
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to two percent,
and a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its rate from four
to three percent. Domestic insurers of all types, on the other hand, are
required to pay tax at a rate of one percent, regardless of whether they
invest in the specified Alabama investments. See id., § 27-4-5.
11
We note that Hanover Fire Ins . Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S. 494,
508-509 (1926), in holding that foreign companies are entitled to equal tax
treatment even if they have very little permanent investment in the State,
also casts some doubt on the legitimacy of Alabama's investment incentive
provision.
10
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pellants. The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether Alabama's domestic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-5,
~ taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Protection Clause.
I
Since 1955, ''the State of Alabama has granted a preference
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substantially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-ofstate (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory
'The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing
business in the state was limited to companies not chartered by the state.
Act No. 1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
Act No. 156 [1945] Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated,
Act No. 77 [1955] Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amendments, has remained in effect until the present.
2
For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic insurer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its principal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code
§ 27-4-1(3). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is
characterized as a foreign insurer. I d., § 27-4-1(2).
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on
their gross premiums received from business conducted in
Alabama at a rate of three percent, and foreign companies
selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent.
Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a). All domestic insurance companies, in
contrast, pay at a rate of only one percent on all types of insurance premiums. I d., § 27-4-5(a). 3 As a result, a foreign
insurance company doing the same type and volume of business in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its
domestic competitor.
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their
. worldwide assets in specified ffi¥sstments i~ Alabam:J.: I d.,
§ 27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign life insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to
two percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its tax rate from four to three percent.
Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of
smaller percentages of a company's assets. ~ Regardless
of how much of its total assets a foreign companY. mv8Sts in
Alabama investme~ RQW~it can never redu~e its gross
premiums tax,_rate o tiD:! s me level aid b comparable domestic companies
are entitled to the one percen ax
ra e even 1 ey have no investments in the State. Thus,
the investment provision permits foreign insurance companies to reduce, but never to eliminate, the discrimination inherent in the domestic preference tax statute.

/-:\ o-

\_;,/

3
There are two exceptions to thes~ general rules concerning the rates
of taxation of insurance companies. ~ey aPe u~~ J:or annuities, the tax
rate is one percent for both foreign and domestic- insurers , Ala. Code
§ 27-4-4(a), and for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is
three-quarters of one percent for both foreign and domestic insurance companies, i d., § 27-4-6(a).

J
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II

Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorpor~ted
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Alabama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commissioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981.
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be unconstitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the
appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies intervened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting
two claims as lead cases 4 to be tried and binding on all claimants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court
ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional.
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life
Ins . Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648 (1981),
the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two purposes, in addition to raising revenue:()') encouraging the for~
mation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and ¢ encouraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies
in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth
in the statuta" App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The
court also found that the distinction the statute created between foreign and domestic companies was rationally re~
to those purposes and that the Alabama legislature ~a- v
sonably)lave believed that the classification would have promoted those purposes. I d., at 21a.
After their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the cir• Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, was
chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property
and Casualty Company, a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as representative of the non-life claimants. See App. 314-315.

..
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cuit court's findings as to the existence of legitimate state
purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of rational relationship, ruling that summary judgment
was inappropriate on that question because the evidence was
in conflict. Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for certiorari on the affirmance of the legitimate state
purpose issue, and the State and the intervenors petitioned
for review of the remand order. Appellants th~~ed __ / '
their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issu~
the statute's classification bore a rational relationship to the
two purposes found by the circuit court to be legitimate, and
they requested a final determination of the legal issues with
respect to their equal protection challenge to the statute.
The supreme court denied certiorari on all claims. Appellants again waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing on
the rational relationship issue and filed a joint motion with
the other parties seeking rehearing and entry of a final judgment. The motion was granted, and judgment was entered
for the State and the in~rvenors. This appeal followed, and
we noted probable jurisdiction.
U. S. - - (1984).
We now reverse.
III
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co.
v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the jurisprudence of
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discriminatory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945),
held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a
foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do business within a state, were immune from equal protection challenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the
Court's prior decisions in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272
U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the
Court had recognized that the Equal Protection Clause
placed limits on other forms of discriminatory taxation im-
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posed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their residence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117
(1968); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522
(1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562
(1949).
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal
protection challenge to a[ California statute imposing a retaliatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business
within the State, when the home states of those companies
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a
surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a domestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been granted
only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered
discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected the
longstanding but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and explicitly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits
upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign corporation to do business within its borders. l We held that
"[w ]e consider it now established that, whatever the extent
of a State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from doing business Within its boundaries, that authority does not
justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other burdens on
foreign corporations than those imposed on domestic corporations, unless the discrimination between foreign and domestic
corporations bears a rational relation to a legitimate state
purpose." Id., at 667-668.
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary
hearing on the issue 9f whether the classification in the Alabama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational relation to the two purposes sought to be accomplished, the only
question before us is whether those purposes found by the

g ') a.:t
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~ court 5 are legitimate.

A

The first of the purposes fo~md by the trial court to be a
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the formation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama.
The State contends that this Court has long held that the promotion of domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate
state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In
so contending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western
& Southern, that[!1ave upheld discriminatory taxes. See
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, - - U. S. - - (1984); Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Allied Stores,
Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S.
341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301
U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 U. S.
553 (1906).
The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's contention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied
upon, we did not hol<~that promotion of domestic industry is
alwayt' a legitimate state purpose under equal protection
analysis. 6 Rather, we held that California's purpose in en• Altogether, the State and the intervenors have compiled a list of 17
state purposes they contend are served by the statute and are legitimate "1i/.
under equal protection analysis. See~App. 27-33. We decline to review
any of those except the two found b;the circuit court to be legitimate, ~0w£~~·~;h---;:------"jfCJ;:::;
~ are ¥ ' before u~ ~ remand)~ that court ~ determin~·~~·
fu ~ p~ 0 ~(Ci> CH-/.t
whether any o~ is legitimate and rationally related to the classificaM~ /: e
tion set forth in the ~tatute.
6
We find the other cases ~ on
the StateLalso to be inapposite to
wki~ / reM.t-4-this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is integrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or national interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned
with whether a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry

V!/
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acting the retaliatory tax-to promote the interstate business
of domestic insurers by deterring other States from enacting
discriminatory · or excessive taxes-was a legitimate one.
451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks us to approve
its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic insurers
in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers who also want to
do business in the State. Alabama has made no attempt, as
California did, to influence the policies of other States in
order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to operate
interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to foreign companies who wish to do interstate business in order to improve
its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home.
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the
fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its validity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at --J::2':'
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to promote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause.
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and
effect of promoting domestic industry,"-- U. S. - - , - - (1984) , we
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discriminatory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and promote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc. v. Hardesty , - U. S. - -, --'(1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must "regula~levenhand
edly." 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970).
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the validity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Education deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate.
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of residence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, however, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonresidents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within
the State. See infra, at ~

I0-11-=
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purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there.
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in
Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, this Court always has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a
State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solw by
burdening "the residents of other state members of our federation." 358 U. S., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax involved in Western & Southern, ~ only burdens residents
of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on outsiders, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team" an
advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking to
do business within the State, no matter what they or their
States do.
The validity of the view that a State may not constitutionally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v.
Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v.
Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S., at 417~ See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380
U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hanover Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on
business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing business within the State solely because of their residence, presumably to promote domestic industry within the State. 7

'0
·l. '.
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Although the promotion of domestic industry was not a purpose advanced by the ~tates in support of their taxes in these cases, such promo-
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in Western
Southern
the continuing viability of the
Equal Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute
that seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only
by burdening foreign competitors.
The State contends that Allied Storesl of Ohio v. Bowers,
supra, shows that this principle has not always held true. In
that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign corporations from a tax on the value of merchandise held for
storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, finding
that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to build
warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The
State contends that this case shows that promotion of domestic industry is a legitima~e state purpose under equal protection analysis.
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied
Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other
cases on which we rely. Allied Stores does not hold that promotion of domestic iHElJtsb=;'j is a legitimate state purpose.
Rather, instead of being concerned with promotion of domestic iflg 1 ~trf , it involves a statute that encourages nonresidents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within the State. Moreover, the discriminatory
taxbtg 11 e.b&zltl involved did not favor residents by burdening
outsiders; rather, it granted the nonresident businesses an
exemption that residents did not share. Since the foreign
and domestic companies involved were not competing to provide warehousing services, granting the former an exemption
did notldirectly affect adversely the domestic companies subject to the tax. On its facts, then, Allied Stores is not inconsistent with our holding here that promotion of domestic ~
~ within a State, by discriminating against foreign
corporations that wish to do business there, is not a legitition is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such
as those at issue there.
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mate state purpose. See 358 U. S., at 532-533 (JUSTICE
BRENNAN, concurring).
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to
view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it contends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward,
p. 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015,
intended to authorize States to impose taxeJ- that burden interstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue
here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental
than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarranFerguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Commerce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As
noted above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly
reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on discriminatory taxes in the insurance context. 8
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences between Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional
proviSIOns serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the
State's intere!it, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden
the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the

~

In fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress's response
only to ~ South-Eastern Underwriters;-+a nd that Congress dfd not U11ifd States
intend thereby to give the States any power to tax or regulate the insur,3.;2.~ -ti.S. 533,
ance industry other than what they had previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed this Court's decisions holding that the
Equal Protection Clause places limits on a State's ability to tax out-of-state
corporations. See 451 U. S., at 655 n. 6.
8
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burden it imposes is found to be rationally
ed to that pur~ pose, a ~ that is not difficult to
. See Western &
Southern,~! U. 8.a at 674 ~qual protection challenge may
not prevail so long as the question of rational relationship is
"'at least debatable'" (quoting United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 154 (1938)).
The two constitutional provisions perform different functions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's
power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other proBe~~~m Mo\or!. Co . v .
tects persons 9 from unconstitutional discrimination by the
States.k The effect of the statute at issue here is to place a See. t ~'-u.s.L!~I,~d-~ -<.ll-'1611;~.
discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who desire to 1-lx~ ,
do business within the State, thereby also incidentall lac- - : "'l
~ ti 0 ~s{ tO..iiA~'
ing a burden on interstate commerce. Si-mP,
the [~-v~~· pvo·C~ ~ ~
effect of the discrimination in this case is similar to the type of
()._r£ C\.pflA U'burden with which the Commerce Clause also would be con~l.t '1 h
Q
cerne~dees Jl.Gt meaR_Jkst tke statt~te is Rot subjeet to eqn*
' " t c ...rto
proti cbollo restraillot~ We reaffirmed the importance of the /
Equal Protection Clause in the insurance context in Western
& Southern and see no reason now for reassessing that view.
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a
legitimate state purpose · under equal protection analysis
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context.
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer
domestic busilless over foreign. If we accept the State's
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the
State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit do-----mestic business. A discriminatory tax would stand or fall _ _ as ben~f.'tti ~ oV~e ~fDvJ
depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose
or t;~~ h::tv.-ni"'j A.~-tolt.af" .
This is a distinction without a difference, and one that werejected last term in an analogous context arising under the
Commerce Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias{ - 9 It is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. E. g., Western & Southern, / ~
~ at 660 n. 12.
A..
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U. S., at - - . See n. 6 supra. We hold that under the circumstances of this case, promotion of domestic business by
discriminating against nonresidents is not a legitimate state
purpose.

~

The second purpose found by the courts below to be legitimate was the encouragement of capital investment in the Alabama assets and governmental securities specified in the
statute. ore~e do not agree that this is a legitimate state purpose. \The fnvestment incentive provision of the Alabama
statute does not enable foreign insurance companies to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No matter how
much of their assets they invest in Alabama, foreign insurance companies are still required to pay a higher oss premiums tax than domestic companies. 10 MeF e ev8~ £!-omestic insurers remain entitled to the more favorable r ate of tax
re ardless of
in Alabama assets. The
State's investment incen.tive provision therefore does not
cure, but reaffirms, the statute's impermissible classification
based solely on residence. We hold that encouraging investment in Alabama assets and securities in this plainly discriminatory manner serves no legitimate state purpose. ,p.

t

We conclude that the Alabama domestic preference tax
statute violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to ap10

Section 27-4-4(b) of the Alabama Code provides that by investing ten
percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, a foreign life
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to two percent,
and a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its rate from four
to three percent. Domestic insurers of all types, on the other hand , are
required to pay tax at a rate of one percent, regardless of whether they
invest in the specified Alabama investments. See id. , § 27-4-5.

.

.

8
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pellants. The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.

E
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Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-1274

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
ET AL., APPELLANTS v. W. G. WARD, JR.,
ETAL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
[December - , 1984]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether Alabama's domestic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-5,
that taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Protection Clause.
I
1
Since 1955, the State of Alabama has granted a preference
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substantially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-ofstate (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory
The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing
business in the state was limited to companies not chartered by the state.
Act No. 1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
Act No. 156 [1945] Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated,
Act No. 77 [1955] Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amendments, has remained in effect until the present.
' For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic insurer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its principal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code
§ 27-4-1(3). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is
characterized as a foreign insurer. Id., § 27-4-1(2).
1

;~

!5
<
~
~

N

0

0\

,(I)

c:c:
CD,

r-~

-t'Tl~

(")3:,..,

~,..,n

-n!:!:!

oo<:
Zc:rn

(.1)::00
C:;-1

~c:
-i~

83-1274-0PINION
METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WARD

2

provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on
their gross premiums received from business conducted in
Alabama at a rate of three percent, and foreign companies
selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent.
Ala. Code§ 27-4-4(a). All domestic insurance companies, in
contrast, pay at a rate of only one percent on all types of insurance premiums. I d., § 27-4-5(a). 3 As a result, a foreign
insurance company doing the same type and volume of business in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its
domestic competitor.
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their
worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities.
Id., §27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign life
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to
two percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its tax rate from four to three percent.
Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of
smaller percentages of a company's assets. Ibid. Regardless of how much of its total assets a foreign company places
in Alabama investments, it can never reduce its gross premiums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable domestic
companies. These are entitled to the one percent tax rate
even if they have no investments in the State. Thus, the investment provision permits foreign insurance companies to
reduce, but never to eliminate, the discrimination inherent in
the domestic preference tax statute.
There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates of
taxation of insurance companies. For annuities , the tax rate is one percent for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a), and for
wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is three-quarters of one
percent for both foreign and domestic insurance companies, i d. ,
§ 27-4-6(a).
3

/)
L - - - " " !·

.e:-

,(_ooSA
~

\.c.::::-/

83-1274-0PINION
METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WARD

3

II

Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Alabama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commissioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981.
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be unconstitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the
appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies intervened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting
two claims as lead cases 4 to be tried and binding on all claimants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court
ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional.
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life
Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648 (1981),
the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two purposes, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the formation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) encouraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies
in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth
in the statute." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The
court also found that the distinction the statute created between foreign and domestic companies was rationally related
to those purposes and that the Alabama legislature reasonably could have believed that the classification would have
promoted those purposes. I d., at 21a.
After their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the cir• Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, was
chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property
and Casualty Company, a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as representative of the non-life clailJlants. See App. 314-315.
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cuit court's findings as to the existence of legitimate state
purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of rational relationship, ruling that summary judgment
was inappropriate on that question because the evidence was
in conflict. Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for certiorari on the affirmance of the legitimate state
purpose issue, and the State and the intervenors petitioned
for review of the remand order. Appellants then waived
their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue whether the
statute's classification bore a rational relationship to the two
purposes found by the circuit court to be legitimate, and they
requested a final determination of the legal issues with respect to their equal protection challenge to the statute. The
supreme court denied certiorari on all claims. Appellants
again waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing on the rational relationship issue and filed a joint motion with the
other parties seeking rehearing and entry of a final judgment. The motion was granted, and judgment was entered
for the State and the intervenors. This appeal followed, and
we noted probable jurisdiction. - - AU. S. - - (1984).
We now reverse.
III
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins . Co.
v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the jurisprudence of
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discriminatory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945),
held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a
foreign corporation before' it would be permitted to do business within a state, were immune from equal protection challenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the
Court's prior decisions in Southern R . Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272
U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the
Court had recognized that the Equal Protection Clause
placed limits on other forms of discriminatory taxation im-
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posed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their residence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117
(1968); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522
(1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562
(1949).

In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal
protection challenge to a California statute imposing a retaliatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business
within the State, when the home states of those companies
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a
surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a domestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been granted
only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered
discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected the
longstanding but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and explicitly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits
upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign corporation to do business within its borders. I d., at 667. We
held that "[w]e consider it now established that, whatever
the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from doing business within its boundaries, that authority does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on domestic corporations, unless the discrimination between foreign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a
legitimate state purpose." Id., at 667-668.
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary
hearing on the issue whether the classification in the Alabama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational relation to the two purposes sought to be accomplished, the only
question before us is whether those purposes found by the
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circuit court 5 are legitimate.
A
(1)

The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the formation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama.
The State contends that this Court has long held that the promotion of domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate
state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In
so contending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western
& Southern, that are said to have upheld discriminatory
taxes. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, - - U. S. - (1984); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown,
317 U. S. 341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke
Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203

u. s. 553 (1906).

The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's contention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied
upon, we did not hold as a general rule that promotion of domestic industry i~ legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis. 6 Rather, we held that California's purpose
5
Altogether, the State and the intervenors have compiled a list of 17
state purposes they contend are served by the statute and are legitimate
under equal protection analysis. See App. 27-33. We decline to review
any of those except the two found by the circuit court to be legitimate,
which are the only purposes before us. On remand, that court may determine whether any of the other purposes is legitimate and rationally related
to the classification set forth in the statute.
•we find the other cases on which the State relies also to be inapposite
to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether
promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is integrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or national interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned
with whether a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the
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in enacting the retaliatory tax-to promote the interstate
business of domestic insurers by deterring other States from
enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes-was a legitimate
one. 451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks us to approve its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic
insurers in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers who also
want to do business in the State. Alabama has made no attempt, as California did, to influence the policies of other
States in order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to
operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to foreign
companies who wish to do interstate business in order to improve its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home.
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its validity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at 10-11.
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to promote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause.
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and
effect of promoting domestic industry,"-- U. S. - - , - - (1984), we
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discriminatory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and promote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, - U. S. - -, - - (1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must "regulat[e] evenhandedly." 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970).
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the validity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Education deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate.
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of residence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, however, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonresidents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within
the State. See infra, at 9.
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fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is
purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there.
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in
Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, this Court always has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a
State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely by
burdening "the residents of other state members of our federation." 358 U. S., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax involved in Western & Southern, which only burdens residents
of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on outsiders, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team" an
advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking to
do business within the State, no matter what they or their
States do.
The validity of the view that a State may not constitutionally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v.
Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v.
Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S., at 417. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers , 380
U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hanover Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on
business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing business within the State solely because of their residence, pre-
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sumably to promote domestic industry within the State. 7 In
rel 'ng on these cases, and rejecting Lincoln in Western &
Southern, we affirmed the continuing viability of the Equal
Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that
seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only by
burdening foreign competitors.
The State contends that Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, shows that this principle has not always held true.
In that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal
protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign
corporations from a tax on the value of merchandise held for
storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, finding
that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to build
warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The
State contends that this case shows that promotion of domes~---lli
ic~:fW~"'~~' is a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis.
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied
Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other
cases on which we rely. Allied Stores does not hold that promotion of domestic business is a legitimate state purpose.
Rather, instead of being concerned with promotion of domestic business, it involves a statute that encourages nonresidents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within the State. Moreover, the discriminatory tax
involved did not favor residents by burdening outsiders;
rather, it granted the nonresident businesses an exemption
that residents did not share. Since the foreign and domestic
companies involved were not competing to provide
ware ousing services, granting the former an exemption did
not even directly affect adversely the domestic companies
subject to the tax. On its facts, then, Allied Stores is not
Although the promotion of domestic ·
was not a purpose advanced by the States in support of their taxes in these cases, such promotion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such
as those at issue there.
7

" '
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inconsistent with our holding here that promotion of domestic
business within a State, by discriminating against foreign
corporations that wish to do business there, is not a legitimate state purpose. See 358 U. S., at 532-533 (JUSTICE
BRENNAN, concurring).

(2)
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to
view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it contends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward,
p. 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015,
intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden interstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue
here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental
than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarranFerguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Commerce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As
noted above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly
reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on discriminatory taxes in the insurance context. 8
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences between Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional
provisiOns serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the
State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden
8Jn fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Con ess's res onse
only to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriter , supra, 322 U. S.
533, and that Congress did not intend thereby to give t e States any power
to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than what they had previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed this Court's
decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause places limits on a
State's ability to tax out-of-state corporations. See 451 U. S., at 655 n. 6.
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the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the
burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that purpose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. See
Western & Southern, supra, at 674 (if purpose is legitimate,
equal protection challenge may not prevail so long as the
question of rational relationship is "'at least debatable'"
(quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co. , 304 U. S.
144, 154 (1938)).

The two constitutional provisions perform different functions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's
power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other protects persons 9 from unconstitutional discrimination by the
States. See Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421,
423-424 (1921). The effect of the statute at issue here is to
place a discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who desire to do business within the State, thereby also incidentally
placing a burden on interstate commerce. Equal protection
restraints are applicable even though the effect of the discrimination in this case is similar to the type of burden with
which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned. We
reaffirmed the importance of the Equal Protection Clause in
the insurance context in Western & Southern and see no reason now for reassessing that view.
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a
legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context.
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer
domestic business over foreign. If we accept the State's
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the
State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit do9
lt is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. E . g., Western & Southern, supra, at
660 n. 12.
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mestic business. A discriminatory tax would stand or fall
depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose
This is a distinction without a difference, and one that we rejected last term in an analogous context arising under the
Commerce Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, supra,
- - U. S., at - - . See n. 6 supra. We hold that under
the circumstances of this case, promotion of domestic business by discriminating against nonresidents is not a legitimate state purpose.
B
The second purpose found by the courts below to be legitimate was the encouragement of capital investment in the Alabama assets and governmental securities specified in the
statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state purpose. Domestic insurers remain entitled to the more favorable rate of tax regardless of whether they invest in Alabama
- - - -a-ss_e_t_s._.., the investment incentive provision of the Alabama
statute oes not enable foreign insu_rance companies to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No matter how
much of their assets they invest in Alabama, foreign insurance companies are still required to pay a higher gross premiums tax than domestic companies. 10 The State's investment
incentive provision therefore does not cure, but reaffirms,
the statute's impermissible classification based solely on residence. We hold that encouraging investment in Alabama assets and securities in this plainly discriminatory manner
serves no legitimate state purpose.
10
Section 27-4-4(b) of the Alabama Code provides that by investing ten
percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, a foreign life
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to two percent,
and a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its rate from four
to three percent. Domestic insurers of all types, on the other hand, are
required to pay tax at a rate of one percent, regardless of whether they
invest in the specified Alabama investments. See i d., § 27-4-5.
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IV
We conclude that the Alabama domestic preference tax
statute violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to appellants. The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice .White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether Alabama's domestic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-5,
that taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Protection Clause.
I
1
Since 1955, the State of Alabama has granted a preference
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substantially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-ofstate (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory
1
The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing
business in the state was limited to companies not chartered by the state.
Act No. 1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn. , 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
Act No. 156 [1945] Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated,
Act No. 77 [1955] Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amendments, has remained in effect until the present.
2
For domestk preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic insurer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its principal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code
§ 27-4-1(3). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is
characterized as a foreign insurer. !d., § 27-4-1(2).
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on
their gross premiums received from business conducted in
Alabama at a rate of three percent, and foreign companies
selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent.
Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a). All domestic insurance companies, in
contrast, pay at a rate of only one percent on all types of insurance premiums. I d., § 27-4-5(a). 3 As a result, a foreign
insurance company doing the same type and volume of business in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its
domestic competitor.
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their
worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities.
!d., §27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign life
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to
two percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its tax rate from four to three percent.
Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of
smaller percentages of a company's assets. Ibid. Regardless of how much of its total assets a foreign company places
in Alabama investments, it can never reduce its gross premiums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable domestic
companies. These are entitled to the one percent tax rate
even if they have no investments in the State. Thus, the investment provision permits foreign insurance companies to
reduce, but never to eliminate, the discrimination inherent in
the domestic preference tax statute.
3
There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates
of taxation of insurance companies. For annuities, the tax rate is one
percent for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a), and
for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is three-quarters of
one percent for both foreign and domestic insurance companies, id.,
§ 27-4-6(a).
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II

Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Alabama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commissioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981.
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be unconstitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the
appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies intervened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting
two claims as lead cases 4 to be tried and binding on all claimants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court
ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional.
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life
Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648 (1981),
the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two purposes, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the formation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) encouraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies
in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth
in the statute." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The
court also found that the distinction the statute created between foreign and domestic companies was rationally related
to those purposes and that the Alabama legislature reasonably could have believed that the classification would have
promoted those purposes. I d., at 21a.
After their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the cir' Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, was
chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property
and Casualty Company, a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as representative of the non-life claimants. See App. 314-315.

'.

..
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cuit court's findings as to the existence of legitimate state
purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of rational relationship, ruling that summary judgment
was inappropriate on that question because the evidence was
in conflict. Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for certiorari on the affirmance of the legitimate state
purpose issue, and the State and the intervenors petitioned
for review of the remand order. Appellants then waived
their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue whether the
statute's classification bore a rational relationship to the two
purposes found by the circuit court to be legitimate, and they
requested a final determination of the legal issues with respect to their equal protection challenge to the statute. The
supreme court denied certiorari on all claims. Appellants
again waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing on the
rational relationship issue and filed a joint motion with the
other parties seeking rehearing and entry of a final judgment. The motion was granted, and judgment was entered
for the State and the intervenors. This appeal followed, and
we noted probable jurisdiction. - - U. S. - - (1984). We
now reverse:
III
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co.
v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the jurisprudence of
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discriminatory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945),
held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a
foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do business within a state, were immune from equal protection challenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the
Court's prior decisions in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272
U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the
Court had recognized that the Equal Protection Clause
placed limits on other forms of discriminatory taxation im-
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posed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their residence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117
(1968); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522
(1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562
(1949).
In Western & Southern, supra, .we reviewed all of these
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal
protection challenge to a California statute imposing a retaliatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business
within the State, when the home states of those companies
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a
surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a domestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been granted
only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered
discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected the
longstanding but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and explicitly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits
upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign corporation to do business within its borders. Id., at 667. We
held that "( w]e consider it now established that, whatever
the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from doing business within its boundaries, that authority does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on domestic corporations, unless the discrimination between foreign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a
legitimate state purpose." Id., at 667-668.
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary
hearing on the issue whether the classification in the Alabama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational relation to the two purposes sought to be accomplished, the only
question before us is whether those purposes found by the

•.
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circuit court G.re legitimate.
A
(1)

The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between
foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the
formation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama.
The State contends that this Court has long held that the promotion of domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate
state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In
so contending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western
& Southern, that are said to have upheld discriminatory
taxes. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, --U.S.-(1984); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown,
317 U. S. 341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke
Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203

u. s.

553 (1906).

The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's contention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied
upon, we did not hold as a general rule that promotion of domestic industry·is a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis.'- Rather, we held that California's purpose
5
Altogether, the State and the intervenors have compiled a list of 17
state purposes they contend are served by the statute and are legitimate
under equal protection analysis. See App. 27-33. We decline to review
any of those except the two found by the circuit court to be legitimate,
which are the only purposes before us. On remand, that court may determine whether any of the other purposes is legitimate and rationally related
to the classi a i n set forth in the statute.
J..We find the other cases on which the State relies also to be inapposite
to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether
promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is integrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or national interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned
with whether a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the

s

s

83-1274--0PINION
METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WARD

7

in enacting the retaliatory tax-to promote the interstate
business of domestic insurers by deterring other States from
enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes....:...,_was a legitimate
one. 451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks us to approve its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic
insurers in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers who also
want to do business in the State. Alabama has made no attempt, as California did, to influence the policies of other
States in order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to
operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to foreign
companies who wish to do interstate business in order to improve its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home.
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its validity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at 10-11.
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to promote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause.
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State
·may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and
effect of promoting domestic industry,"-- U. S. - - , - - (1984), we
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discriminatory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and promote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc. v. Hardesty,-U. S. - - , - - (1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must "regulat[e] evenhandedly." 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970).
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the validity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Education deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate.
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of residence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, however, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonresidents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within
the State. See infra, at 9.

...
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fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is
purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there.
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to prevent. As JusTICE BRENNAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in
Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, this Court always has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a
State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely by
burdening "the residents of other state members of our federation." 358 U. S., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax involved in Western & Southern, which only burdens residents
of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on outsiders, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team" an
advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking to
do business within the State, no matter what they or their
States do.
The validity of the view that a State may not constitutionally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v.
Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v.
Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S., at 417. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380
U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hanover Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on
business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing business within the State solely because of their residence, pre-
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sumably to promote domestic industry within the State.~ In
relying on these casesr and rejecting Lincoln in Western &
Southern, we reaffirmed the continuing viability of the Equal
Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that
seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only by
burdening foreign competitors.
The State contends that Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, shows that this principle has not always held true.
In that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal
protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign
corporations from a tax on the value of merchandise held for
storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, finding
that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to build
warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The
State contends that this case shows that promotion of domestic business is a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis.
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied
Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other
cases on which we rely. Allied Stores does not hold that promotion of domestic business is a legitimate state purpose.
Rather, instead of being concerned with promotion of domestic business, it involves a statute that encourages nonresidents-who are not competitors of residents-to build
warehouses within the State. Moreover, the discriminatory
tax involved did not favor residents by burdening outsiders;
rather, it granted the nonresident businesses an exemption
that residents did not share. Since the foreign and domestic
companies involved were not competing to provide warehousing services, granting the former an exemption did not
even directly affect adversely the domestic companies subject to the tax. On its facts, then, Allied Stores is not inAAlthough the promotion of domestic business was not a purpose advanced by the States in support of their taxes in these cases, such promotion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such
as those at issue there.

.,.

y
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consistent with our holding here that promotion of domestic
business within a State, by discriminating against foreign
corporations that wish to do business there, is not a legitimate state purpose. See 358 U. S., at 532-533 (JUSTICE
BRENNAN, concurring).

(2)
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to
view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it contends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward,
p. 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015,
intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden interstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue
here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental
than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarranFerguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Commerce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As
noted above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly
reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on discriminatory taxes in the insurance context..#..
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences between Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional
provisiOns serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the
State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden
Ain fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress's response only to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., supra,
322 U. S. 533, and that Congress did not intend thereby to give the States
any power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than what they
had previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed this
Court's decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause places limits on
a State's ability to tax out-of-state corporations. See 451 U. S., at 655
n. 6.

7

7
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the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the
burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that purpose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. See
Western & Southern, supra, at 674 (if purpose is legitimate,
equal protection challenge may not prevail so long as the
question of rational relationship is "'at least debatable'"
(quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S.
144, 154 (1938)).

The two constitutional provisions perform different functions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's
power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other protects persons k from unconstitutional discrimination by the
States. See Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421,
423-424 (1921). The effect of the statute at issue here is to
place a discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who desire to do business within the State, thereby also incidentally
placing a burden on interstate commerce. Equal protection
restraints are applicable even though the effect of the discrimination in this case is similar to the type of burden with
which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned. We
reaffirmed the importance of the Equal Protection Clause in
the insurance context in Western & Southern and see no reason now for reassessing that view.
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a
legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context.
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer
domestic business over foreign. If we accept the State's
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the
State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit do~ It is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. E. g., Western & Southern, supra, at
660 n. 12.

..
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mestic business. A discriminatory tax would stand or fall
depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose-as
benefitting one group or as harming another. This is a distinction without a difference, and one that we rejected last
term in an analogous context arising under the Commerce
Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, supra,-- U. S.,
at - - . See n. 6 supra. We hold that under the circumstances of this case, promotion of domestic business by discriminating against nonresidents is not a legitimate state
purpose.
B

The second purpose found by the courts below to be legitimate was the encouragement of capital investment in the Alabama assets and governmental securities specified in the
statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state purpose. Domestic insurers remain entitled to the more favorable rate of tax regardless of whether they invest in Alabama
assets. Moreover, the investment incentive provision of the
Alabama statute does not enable foreign insurance companies
to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No
matter how much of their assets they invest in Alabama, foreign insurance companies are still required to pay a higher
gross premiums tax than domestic companies. ~ The State's
investment incentive provision therefore does not cure, but
reaffirms, the statute's impermissible classification based
solely on residence. We hold that encouraging investment in
Alabama assets and securities in this plainly discriminatory
manner serves no legitimate state purpose.
t section 27-4-4(b) of the Alabama Code provides that by investing ten
percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, a foreign life
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to two percent,
and a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its rate from four
to three percent. Domestic insurers of all types, on the other hand, are
required to pay tax at a rate of one percent, regardless of whether they
invest in the specified Alabama investments. See id., § 27-4-5.
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IV

We conclude that the Alabama domestic preference tax
statute violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to
appellants. The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.
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[December - - , 1984]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether Alabama's domestic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-5,
that taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Protection Clause.
I
1
Since 1955, the State of Alabama has granted a preference
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substantially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-ofstate (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory
'The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing
business in the state was limited to companies not chartered by the state.
Act No. 1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn. , 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
Act No. 156 [1945] Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated,
Act No. 77 [1955] Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amendments, has remained in effect until the present.
2
For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic insurer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its principal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code
§ 27-4-1(3). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is
characterized as a foreign insurer. Id., §27-4-1(2).
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on
their gross premiums received from business conducted in
Alabama at a rate of three percent, and foreign companies
selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent.
Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a). All domestic insurance companies, in
contrast, pay at a rate of only one percent on all types of insurance premiums. I d., § 27-4-5(a). 3 As a result, a foreign
insurance company doing the same type and volume of business in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its
domestic competitor.
·
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their
worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities.
!d., §27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign life
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to
two percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its tax rate from four to three percent.
Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of
smaller percentages of a company's assets. Ibid. Regardless of how much of its total assets a foreign company places
in Alabama investments, it can never reduce its gross premiums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable domestic
companies. These are entitled to the one percent tax rate
even if they have no investments in the State. Thus, the investment provision permits foreign insurance companies to
reduce, but never to eliminate, the discrimination inherent in
the domestic preference tax statute.
' There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates
of taxation of insurance companies. For annuities, the tax rate is one
percent for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code§ 27-4-4(a), and
for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is three-quarters of
one percent for both foreign and domestic insurance companies, id.,
§ 27-4- 6(a).

..

'
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II
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Alabama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commissioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981.
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be unconstitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the
appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies intervened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting
two claims as lead cases 4 to be tried and binding on all claimants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court
ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional.
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life
Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648 (1981),
the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two purposes, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the formation of new insurance companies in Alabama,· and (2) encouraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies
in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth
in the statute." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The
court also found that the distinction the statute created between foreign and domestic companies was rationally related
to those purposes and that the Alabama legislature reasonably could have believed that the classification would have
promoted those purposes. I d., at 21a.
After their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the cir' Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, was
chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property
and Casualty Company, a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as representative of the non-life claimants. See App. 314-315.
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cuit court's findings as to the existence of legitimate state
purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of rational relationship, ruling that summary judgment
was inappropriate on that question because the evidence was
in conflict. Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for certiorari on the affirmance of the legitimate state
purpose issue, and the State and the intervenors petitioned
for review of the remand order. Appellants then waived
their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue whether the
statute's classification bore a rational relationship to the two
purposes found by the circuit court to be legitimate, and they
requested a final determination of the legal issues with respect to their equal protection challenge to the statute. The
supreme court denied certiorari on all claims. Appellants
again waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing on the
rational relationship issue and filed a joint motion with the
other parties seeking rehearing and entry of a final judgment. The motion was granted, and judgment was entered
for the State and the intervenors. This appeal followed, and
we noted probable jurisdiction. - - U. S. - - (1984). We
now reverse.
III
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co.
v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the jurisprudence of
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discriminatory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945),
held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a
foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do business within a state, were immune from equal protection challenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the
Court's prior decisions in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272
U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the
Court had recognized that the Equal Protection Clause
placed limits on other forms of discriminatory taxation im-
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posed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their residence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117
(1968); Allied Stores, Inc . of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522
(1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562
(1949).
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal
protection challenge to a California statute imposing a retaliatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business
within the State, when the home states of those companies
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a
surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a do. mestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been granted
only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered
discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected the
longstanding but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and explicitly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits
upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign corporation to do business within its borders. Id., at 667. We
held that "[w]e consider it now established that, whatever
the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from doing business within its boundaries, that authority does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on domestic corporations, unless the discrimination between foreign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a
legitimate state purpose." I d., at 667-668.
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary
hearing on the issue whether the classification in the Alabama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational relation to the two purposes sought to be accomplished, the only
question before us is whether those purposes found by the
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circuit court 5 are legitimate.
A
(1)

The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between
foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the
formation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama.
The State contends that this Court has long held that the promotion of domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate
state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In
so contending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western
& Southern, that are said to have upheld discriminatory
taxes. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, - - U. S. - (1984); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown,
317 U. S. 341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke
Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203

u. s. 553 (1906).

The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's contention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied
upon, we did not hold as a general rule that promotion of domestic industry is a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis. 6 Rather, we held that California's purpose
6
Altogether, the State and the intervenors have compiled a list of 17
state purposes they contend are served by the statute and are legitimate
under equal protection analysis. See App. 27-33. We decline to review
any of those except the two found by the circuit court to be legitimate,
which are the only purposes before us. On remand, that court may determine whether any of the other purposes is legitimate and rationally related
to the classification set forth in the statute.
6
We find the other cases on which the State relies also to be inapposite
to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether
promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is integrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or national interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned
with whether a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the
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in enacting the retaliatory tax-to promote the interstate
business of domestic insurers by deterring other States from
enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes-was a legitimate
one. 451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks us to approve its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic
insurers in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers who also
want to do business in the State. Alabama has made no attempt, as California did, to influence the policies of other
States in order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to
operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to foreign
companies who wish to do interstate business in order to improve its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home.
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its validity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at 10-11.
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to promote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause.
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and
effect of promoting domestic industry,"-- U. S. - - , - - (1984), we
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discriminatory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and promote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc . v. Hardesty, - U. S. - - , - - (1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must "regulat[e] evenhandedly." 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970).
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the validity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Education deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate.
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of residence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, however, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonresidents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within
the State. See infra, at 9.
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fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is
purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there.
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in
Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, this Court always has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a
State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely by
burdening "the residents of other state members of our federation." 358 U. S., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax involved in Western & Southern, which only burdens residents
of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on outsiders, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team" an
advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking to
do business within the State, no matter what they or their
States do.
The validity of the view that a State may not constitutionally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v.
Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v.
Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S., at 417. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380
U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hanover Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on
business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing business within the State solely because of their residence, pre-

83-1274-0PINION
METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WARD

9

sumably to promote domestic industry within the State. 7 In
relying on these cases1 and rejecting Lincoln in Western &
Southern, we reaffirmed the continuing viability of the Equal
Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that
seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only by
burdening foreign competitors.
The State contends that Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, shows that this principle has not always held true.
In that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal
protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign
corporations ·from a tax on the value of merchandise held for
storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, finding
that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to build
warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The
State contends that this case shows that promotion of domestic business is a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis.
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied
Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other
cases on which we rely. Allied Stores does not hold that promotion of domestic business is a legitimate state purpose.
Rather, instead of being concerned with promotion of domestic business, it involves a statute that encourages nonresidents-who are not competitors of residents-to build
warehouses within the State. Moreover, the discriminatory
tax involved did not favor residents by burdening outsiders;
rather, it granted the nonresident businesses an exemption
that residents did not share. Since the foreign and domestic
companies involved were not competing to provide warehousing services, granting the former an exemption did not
even directly affect adversely the domestic companies subject to the tax. On its facts, then, Allied Stores is not in7
Although the promotion of domestic business was not a purpose advanced by the States in support of their taxes in these cases, such promotion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such
as those at issue there.
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consistent with our holding here that promotion of domestic
business within a State, by discriminating against foreign
corporations that wish to do business there, is not a legitimate state purpose. See 358 U. S., at 532-533 (JUSTICE
BRENNAN, concurring).

(2)
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to
view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it contends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward,
p. 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015,
intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden interstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue
here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental
than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarranFerguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Commerce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As
noted above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly
reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on discriminatory taxes in the insurance context. 8
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences between Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional
prov1s10ns serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the
State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden
8
In fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress's response only to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., supra,
322 U. S. 533, and that Congress did not intend thereby to give the States
any power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than what they
had previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed this
Court's decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause places limits on
a State's ability to tax out-of-state corporations. See 451 U. S., at 655

n. 6.

:h;
....

r-
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the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the
burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that purpose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. See
Western & Southern, supra, at 674 (if purpose is legitimate,
equal protection challenge may not prevail so long as the
question of rational relationship is "'at least debatable'"
(quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S.
144, 154 (1938)).

The two constitutional provisions perform different functions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's
power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other protects persons 9 from unconstitutional discrimination by the
States. See Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421,
423-424 (1921). The effect of the statute at issue here is to
place a discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who desire to do business within the State, thereby also incidentally
placing a burden on interstate commerce. Equal protection
restraints are applicable even though the effect of the discrimination in this case is similar to the type of burden with
which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned. We
reaffirmed the importance of the Equal Protection Clause in
the insurance context in Western & Southern and see no reason now for reassessing that view.
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a
legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context.
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer
domestic business over foreign. If we accept the State's
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the
State. could show it reasonably was intended to benefit do9
1t is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. E. g., Western & Southern, supra, at
660 n. 12.
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mestic business. A discriminatory tax would stand or fall
depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose-as
benefitting one group or as harming another. This is a distinction without a difference, and one that we rejected last
term in an analogous context arising under the Commerce
Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, supra,-- U. S.,
at - - . See n. 6 supra. We hold that under the circumstances of this case, promotion of domestic business by discriminating against nonresidents is not a legitimate state
purpose.
B

The second purpose found by the courts below to be legitimate was the encouragement of capital investment in the Alabama assets and governmental securities specified in the
statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state purpose. Domestic insurers remain entitled to the more favorable rate of tax regardless of whether they invest in Alabama
assets. Moreover, the investment incentive provision of the
Alabama statute does not enable foreign insurance companies
to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No
matter how much of their assets they invest in Alabama, foreign insurance companies are still required to pay a higher
gross premiums tax than domestic ,companies. 10 The State's
investment incentive provision therefore does not cure, but
reaffirms, the statute's impermissible classification based
solely on residence. We hold that encouraging investment in
Alabama assets and securities in this plainly discriminatory
manner serves no legitimate state purpose.
Section 27-4-4(b) of the Alabama Code provides that by investing ten
percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, a foreign life
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to two percent,
and a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its rate from four
to three percent. Domestic insurers of all types, on the other hand, are
required to pay tax at a rate of one percent, regardless of whether they
invest in the specified Alabama investments. See id., § 27-4-5.
10

, r•
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IV

We conclude that the Alabama domestic preference tax
statute violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to
appellants. The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.

.•..
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JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether Alabama's domestic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-5,
that taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Protection Clause.
I
1
Since 1955, the State of Alabama has granted a preference
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substantially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-ofstate (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory
The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing
business in the state was limited to companies not chartered by the state.
Act No. 1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 u:s. 533 (1944).
Act No. 156 [1945] Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated,
Act No. 77 [1955] Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amendments, has remained in effect until the present.
'For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic
insurer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its principal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code
§ 27-4-1(3). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is
characterized as a foreign insurer. I d., § 27-4-1(2).
1

1984
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on
their gross premiums received froni business conducted in
Alabama at a rate of three percent, and foreign companies
selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent.
Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a). All domestic insurance companies, in
contrast, pay at a rate of only one percent on all types of insurance premiums. I d., § 27-4-5(a). 3 As a result, a foreign
insurance company doing the same type and volume of business in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its
domestic competitor.
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their
worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities.
I d., § 27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign life
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to
two percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its tax rate from four to three percent.
Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of
smaller percentages of a company's assets. Ibid. Regardless of how much of its total assets a foreign company places
in Alabama investments, it can never reduce its gross premiums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable domestic
companies. These are entitled to the one percent tax rate
even if they have no investments in the State. Thus, the investment provision permits foreign insurance companies to
reduce, but never to eliminate, the discrimination inherent in
the domestic preference tax statute.
3

There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates
of taxation of insurance companies. For annuities, the tax rate is one
percent for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a), and
for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is three-quarters of
one percent for both foreign and domestic insurance companies, id., § 274-6(a).
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II

Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Alabama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commissioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981.
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be unconstitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the
appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies intervened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting
two claims as lead cases 4 to be tried and binding on all claimants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court
ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional.
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life
Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648 (1981),
the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the·
Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two purposes, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the formation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) encouraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies
in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth
in the statute." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The
court also found that the distinction the statute created between foreign and domestic companies was rationally related
to those purposes and that the Alabama legislature reasonably could have believed that the classification would have
promoted those purposes. I d., at 21a.
After their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the cir• Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, was
chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property
and Casualty Company, a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as representative of the non-life claimants. See App. 314-315.
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cuit court's findings as to the existence of legitimate state
purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of rational relationship, ruling that summary judgment
was inappropriate on that question because the evidence was
in conflict. Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for certiorari on the affirmance of the legitimate state
purpose issue, and the State and the intervenors petitioned
for review of the remand order. Appellants then waived
their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue whether the
statute's classification bore a rational relationship to the two
purposes found by the circuit court to be legitimate, and they
requested a final determination of the legal issues with respect to their equal protection challenge to the statute. The
supreme court denied certiorari on all claims. Appellants
,again waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing on the
rational relationship issue and filed a joint motion with the
other parties seeking rehearing and entry of a final judgment. The motion was granted, and judgment was entered
for the State and the intervenors. This appeal followed, and
we noted probable jurisdiction. - - U. S. - - (1984). We
now reverse.
III
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co.
v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the jurisprudence of
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discriminatory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945),
held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a
foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do business within a state, were immune from equal protection challenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the
Court's prior decisions in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272
U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the
Court had recognized that the Equal Protection Clause
placed limits on other forms of discriminatory taxation im-

-
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posed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their residence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117
(1968); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522
(1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562
(1949).
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these

cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal
protection challenge to a California statute imposing a retaliatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business
within the State, when the home states of those companies
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a
surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a domestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been granted
only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered
discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected the
longstanding but "anachronis[ticr' rule of Lincoln and explicitly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits
upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign corporation to do business within its borders. Id., at 667. We
held that "[w]e consider it now established that, whatever
the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from doing business within its boundaries, that authority does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on domestic corporations, unless the discrimination between foreign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a
legitimate state purpose." Id., at 667-668.
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary
hearing on the issue whether the classification in the Alabama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational relation to the two purposes sought to be accomplished, the only
question before us is whether those purposes found by the
circuit court are legitimate.
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A
(1)

The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between
foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the
formation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama.
The State contends that this Court has long held that the promotion of domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate
state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In
~o contending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western
'& Southern, that are said to have upheld discriminatory
taxes. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, - - U. S. - (1984); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown,
317 U. S. 341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke
Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203

u. s.

553 (1906).

The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's contention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied
upon, we did not hold as a general rule that promotion of domestic industry is a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis. 5 Rather, we held that California's purpose
6

We find the other cases on which the State relies also to be inapposite
to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether
promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is integrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or national interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned
with whether a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its validity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at 10-11.
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to promote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause.
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and

>,
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in enacting the retaliatory tax-to promote the interstate
business of domestic insurers by deterring other States from
enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes-was a legitimate
one. 451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks us to approve its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic
insurers in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers who also
want to do business in the State. Alabama has made no attempt, as California did, to influence the policies of other
States in order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to
operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to foreign
companies who wish to do interstate business in order to improve its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home.
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the
fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is
purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there.
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BRENeffect of promoting domestic industry,"-- U. S. - - , - - (1984), we
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discriminatory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and promote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc . v. Hardesty, - U. S. - - , - - (1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must "regulat[e] evenhandedly." 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970).
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the validity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Education deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate.
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of residence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, however, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonresidents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within
the State. See infra, at 9.

83-1274-0PINION
8

METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WARD

NAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in
Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, this Court always has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a
State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely by
burdening "the residents of other state members of our federation." 358 U. S., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax involved in Western & Southern, which only burdens residents
of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on outsiders, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team" an
advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking to
do business within the State, no matter what they or their
States do.
The validity of the view that a State may not constitutiol).ally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v.
Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v.
Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S., at 417. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380
U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hanover Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on
business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing business within the State solely because of their residence, presumably to promote domestic industry within the State. 6 In
relying on these cases and rejecting Lincoln in Western & ~
Southern, we reaffirmed the continuing viability of the Equal
Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that
6
Although the promotion of domestic business was not a purpose advanced by the States in support of their taxes in these cases, such promotion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such
as those at issue there.

'·
·'
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seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only by
burdening foreign competitors.
The State contends that Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, shows that this principle has not always held true.
In that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal
protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign
corporations from a tax on the value of merchandise held for
storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, finding
that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to build
warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The
State contends that this case shows that promotion of domestic business is a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis.
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied
Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other
cases on which we rely. Allied Stores does not hold that promotion of domestic business is a legitimate state purpose.
Rather, instead of being concerned with promotion of domestic business, it involves a statute that encourages nonresidents-who are not competitors of residents-to build
warehouses within the State. Moreover, the discriminatory
tax involved did not favor residents by burdening outsiders;
rather, it granted the nonresident businesses an exemption
that residents did not share. Since the foreign and domestic
companies involved were not competing to provide warehousing services, granting the former an exemption did not
even directly affect adversely the domestic companies subject to the tax. On its facts, then, Allied Stores is not inconsistent with our holding here that promotion of domestic
business within a State, by discriminating against foreign
corporations that wish to do business there, is not a legitimate state purpose. See 358 U. S., at 532-533 (JUSTICE
BRENNAN, concurring).

(2)
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to
view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as vio-
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lative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it contends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward,
p. 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015,
intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden interstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue
here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental
than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarranFerguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Commerce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As
noted above, our opinion in We§tern & Southern expressly
reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on discriminatory taxes in the insurance context. 7
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences between Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional
provisiOns serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the
State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden
the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the
burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that purpose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. See
Western & Southern, supra, at 674 (if purpose is legitimate,
equal protection challenge may not prevail so long as the
question of rational relationship is "'at least debatable'"
7
In fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress's response only to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., supra,
322 U. S. 533, and that Congress did not intend thereby to give the States
any power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than what they
had previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed this
Court's decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause places limits on
a State's ability to tax out-of-state corporations. See 451 U. S., at 655
n. 6.

'.
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(quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S.
144, 154 (1938)).

The two constitutional provisions perform different functions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's
power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other protects persons 8 from unconstitutional discrimination by the
States. See Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421,
423-424 (1921). The effect of the statute at issue here is to
place a discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who desire to do business within the State, thereby also incidentally
placing a burden on interstate commerce. Equal protection
restraints are applicable even though the effect of the discrimination in this case is similar to the type of burden with
which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned. We
reaffirmed the importance of the Equal Protection Clause in
the insurance context in Western & Southern and see no reason now for reassessing that view.
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a
legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context.
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer
domestic business over foreign. If we accept the State's
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the
State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit domestic business. A discriminatory tax would stand or fall
depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose-as
benefitting one group or as harming another. This is a distinction without a difference, and one that we rejected last
term in an analogous context arising under the Commerce
Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, supra,-- U. S.,
at - - . See n. 6 supra. We hold that under the circumstances of this case, promotion of domestic business by dis8

It is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. E . g., Western & Southern, supra, at
660, n. 12.
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criminating against nonresidents is not a legitimate state
purpose.
B
The second purpose found by the courts below to be legitimate was the encouragement of capital investment in the Alabama assets and governmental securities specified in the
statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state purpose. Domestic insurers remain entitled to the more favorable rate of tax regardless of whether they invest in Alabama
assets. Moreover, the investment incentive provision of the
Alabama statute does not enable foreign insurance companies
to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No
matter how much of their assets they invest in Alabama, foreign insurance companies are still required to pay a higher
gross premiums tax than domestic companies. 9 The State's
investment incentive provision therefore does not cure, but
reaffirms, the statute's impermissible classification based
solely on residence. We hold that encouraging investment in
Alabama assets and securities in this plainly discriminatory
manner serves no legitimate state purpose.
IV
We conclude that the Alabama domestic preference tax
statute violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to
appellants. The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.

9

Section 27-4-4(b) of the Alabama Code provides that by investing ten
percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, a foreign life
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to two percent,
and a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its rate from four
to three percent. Domestic insurers of all types, on the other hand, are
required to pay tax at a rate of one percent, regardless of whether they
invest in the specified Alabama investments. See id. , § 27-4-5.
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This case presents the question whether Alabama's domestic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-5,
that taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Protection Clause.
I
1
Since 1955, the State of Alabama has granted a preference
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substantially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-ofstate (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory
1
The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing
business in the state was limited to companies not chartered by the state.
Act No. 1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
Act No. 156 [1945] Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated,
· Act No. 77 [1955] Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amendments, has remained in effect until the present.
2
For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic
insurer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its principal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code
§ 27-4-1(3). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is
characterized as a foreign insurer. I d., § 27-4-1(2).
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on
their gross premiums received from business conducted in
Alabama at a rate of three percent, and foreign companies
selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent.
Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a). All domestic insurance companies, in
contrast, pay at a rate of only one percent on all types of insurance premiums. I d., § 27-4-5(a). 3 As a result, a foreign
insurance company doing the same type and volume of business in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its
domestic competitor.
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their
worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities.
!d., §27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign life
insurer may reduce its gr~ss premiums tax rate from three to
two percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its tax rate from four to three percent.
Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of
smaller percentages of a company's assets. Ibid. Regardless of how much of its total assets a foreign company places
in Alabama investments, it can never reduce its gross premiums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable domestic
companies. These are entitled to the one percent tax rate
even if they have no investments in the State. Thus, the investment provision permits foreign insurance companies to
reduce, but never to eliminate, the discrimination inherent in
the domestic preference tax statute.
3

There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates
of taxation of insurance companies. For annuities, the tax rate is one
percent for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a), and
for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is three-quarters of
one percent for both foreign and domestic insurance companies, id., § 274-6(a).
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II

Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Alabama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commissioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981.
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be unconstitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the
appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies intervened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting
two claims as lead cases 4 to be tried and binding on all claimants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court
ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional.
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life
Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, .451 U. S. 648 (1981),
the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two purposes, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the formation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) encouraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies
in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth
in the statute." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The
court also found that the distinction the statute created between foreign and domestic companies was rationally related
to those purposes and that the Alabama legislature reasonably could have believed that the classification would have
promoted those purposes. I d., at 21a.
Mter their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the cir• Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, was
chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property
and Casualty Company, a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as representative of the non-life claimants. See App. 314-315.
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cuit court's findings as to the existence of legitimate state
purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of rational relationship, ruling that summary judgment
was inappropriate on that question because the evidence was
in conflict. Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for certiorari on the affirmance of the legitimate state
purpose issue, and the State and the intervenors petitioned
for review of the remand order. Appellants then waived
their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue whether the
statute's classification bore a rational relationship to the two
purposes found by the circuit court to be legitimate, and they
requested a final determination of the legal issues with respect to their equal protection challenge to the statute. The
supreme court denied certiorari on all claims. Appellants
again waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing on the
rational relationship issue and filed a joint motion with the
other parties seeking rehearing and entry of a final judgment. The motion was granted, and judgment was entered
for the State and the intervenors. This appeal followed, and
we noted probable jurisdiction. - - U. S. - - (1984). We
now reverse.
III
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co.
v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the jurisprudence of
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discriminatory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lincoln National Life Ins . Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945),
held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a
foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do business within a state, were immune from equal protection challenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the
Court's prior decisions in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272
U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the
Court had recognized that the Equal Protection Clause
placed limits on other forms of discriminatory taxation im-

'.
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posed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their residence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117
(1968); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522
(1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562
(1949).
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal
protection challenge to a California statute imposing a retaliatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business
within the State, when the home states of those companies
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a
surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a domestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been granted
only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered
discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected the
longstanding. but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and explicitly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits
upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign corporation to do business within its borders. Id., at 667. We
held that "[w]e consider it now established that, whatever
the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from doing business within its boundaries, that authority does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on domestic c'orporations, unless the discrimination between foreign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a
legitimate state purpose." Id., at 667-668.
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary
hearing on the issue whether the classification in the Alabama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational relation to the two purposes sought to be accomplished, the only
question before us is whether those purposes found by the_f
circuit court are legitimate.
""

·.
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A

(1)
The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the
formation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama.
The State contends that this Court has long held that the promotion of domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate
state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In
.so contending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western
& Southern, that are said to have upheld discriminatory
taxes. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, - - U. S. - (1984); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown,
317 U. S. 341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke
Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203

u. s. 553 (1906).

The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's contention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied
U:pon, we did not hold as a general rule that promotion of domestic industry is a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis. 5 Rather, we held that California's purpose
5
We find the other cases on which the State relies also to be inapposite
to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether
promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is integrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or national interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned
with whether a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its validity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at 10-11.
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to promote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause.
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and
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in enacting the retaliatory tax-to promote the interstate
business of domestic insurers by deterring other States from
enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes-was a legitimate
one. 451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks us to approve its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic
insurers in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers who also
want to do business in the State. Alabama has made no attempt, as California did, to influence the policies of other
States in order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to
operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to foreign
companies who wish to do interstate business in order to improve its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home.
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the
fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is
purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there.
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to prevent. As JusTICE BRENeffect of promoting domestic industry,"-- U. S. - - , - - (1984), we
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discriminatory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and promote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc. v. Hardesty,-U. S. - - , - - (1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must "regulat[e] evenhandedly." 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970).
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the validity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Education deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate.
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of resi- ·
dence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, however, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonresidents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within
the State. See irifra, at 9.
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NAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in
Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, this Court always has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a
State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely by
burdening "the residents of other state members of our federation." 358 U. S., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax involved in Western & Southern, which only burdens residents
of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on outsiders, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team" an
advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking to
do business within the State, no matter what they or their
States do.
The validity of the view that a State may not constitutionally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v.
Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v.
Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S., at 417. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380
U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hanover Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on
business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing business within the State solely because of their residence, presumably to promote domestic industry within the State. 6 In
relying on these cases and rejecting Lincoln in Western & \
Southern, we reaffirmed the continuing viability of the Equal
Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that
Although the promotion of domestic business was not a purpose advanced by the States in support of their taxes in these cases, such promotion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such
as those at issue there.
6
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seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only by
burdening foreign competitors.
The State contends that Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, shows that this principle has not always held true.
In that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal
protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign
corporations from a tax on the value of merchandise held for
storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, finding
that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to build
warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The
State contends that this case shows that promotion of domestic business is a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis.
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied
Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other
cases on which we rely. Allied Stores does not hold that promotion of domestic business is a legitimate state purpose.
Rather, instead of being concerned with promotion of domestic business, it involves a statute that encourages nonresidents-who are not competitors of residents-to build
warehouses within the State. Moreover, the discriminatory
tax involved did not favor residents by burdening outsiders;
rather, it granted the nonresident businesses an exemption
that residents did not share. Since the foreign and domestic
companies involved were not competing to provide warehousing services, granting the former an exemption did not
even directly affect adversely the domestic companies subject to the tax. On its facts, then, Allied Stores is not inconsistent with our holding here that promotion of domestic
business within a State, by discriminating against foreign
corporations that wish to do business there, is not a legitimate state purpose. See 358 U. S., at 532-533 (JUSTICE
BRENNAN, concurring).

(2)
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to
view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as vio-
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lative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it contends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward,
p. 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015,
intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden interstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue
here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental
than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarranFerguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Commerce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As
noted above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly
reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on discriminatory taxes in the insurance context. 7
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences between Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional
provisions serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the
State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden
the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the
burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that purpose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. See
Western & Southern, supra, at 674 (if purpose is legitimate,
equal protection challenge may not prevail so long as the
question of rational relationship is "'at least debatable'"
In fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress's response only to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., supra,
322 U. S. 533, and that Congress did not intend thereby to give the States
any power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than what they
had previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed this
Court's decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause places limits on
a State's ability to tax out-of-state corporations. See 451 U. S., at 655
7

n. 6.
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(quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S.
144, 154 (1938)).

The two constitutional provisions perform different functions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's
power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other protects persons 8 from unconstitutional discrimination by the
States. See Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421,
423-424 (1921). The effect of the statute at issue here is to
place a discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who desire to do business within the State, thereby also incidentally
placing a burden on interstate commerce. Equal protection
restraints are applicable even though the effect of the discrimination in this case is similar to the type of burden with
which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned. We
reaffirmed the importance of the Equal Protection Clause in
the insurance context in Western & Southern and see no reason now for reassessing that view.
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a
legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context.
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer
domestic business over foreign. If we accept the State's
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the
State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit domestic business. A discriminatory tax would stand or fall
depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose-as
benefitting one group or as harming another. This is a distinction without a difference, and one that we rejected last
term in an analogous context arising under the Commerce
Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, supra,-- U. S.,
at - - . See n. 6 supra. We hold that under the circumstances· of this case, promotion of domestic business by dislt is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. E . g. , Western & Southern, supra, at
660, n. 12.
8
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criminating against nonresidents is not a legitimate state
purpose.
B
The second purpose found by the courts below to be legitimate was the encouragement of capital investment in the Alabama assets and governmental securities specified in the
statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state purpose. Domestic insurers remain entitled to the more favorable rate of tax regardless of whether they invest in Alabama
assets. Moreover, the investment incentive provision of the
Alabama statute does not enable foreign insurance companies
to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No
matter how much of their assets they invest in Alabama, foreign insurance companies are still required to pay a higher
gross premiums tax than domestic companies. 9 The State's
investment incentive provision therefore does not cure, but
reaffirms, the statute's impermissible classification based
solely on residence. We hold that encouraging investment in
Alabama assets and securities in this plainly discriminatory
manner serves no legitimate state purpose.
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JUSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
. This case presents the question whether Alabama's domestic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-5,
that taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Protection Clause.
I
1
Since 1955, the State of Alabama has granted a preference
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substantially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-ofstate (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory
1
The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing
business in the state was limited to companies not chartered by the state.
Act No. 1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
Act No. 156 [1945] Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated ,
Act No. 77 [1955] Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amendments, has remained in effect until the present.
2
For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic
insurer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its principal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code
§ 27-4-1(3). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is
characterized as a foreign insurer. !d., § 27-4-1(2).
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on
their gross premiums received from business conducted in
Alabama at a rate of three percent, and foreign companies
selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent.
Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a). All domestic insurance companies, in
contrast, pay at a rate of only one percent on all types of insurance premiums. I d., § 27-4-5(a). 3 As a result, a foreign
insurance company doing the same type and volume of business in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its
domestic competitor.
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their
worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities.
I d., § 27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign life
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to
two percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its tax rate from four to three percent.
Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of
smaller percentages of a company's assets. Ibid. Regardless of how much of its total assets a foreign company places
in Alabama investments, it can never reduce its gross premiums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable domestic
companies. These are entitled to the one percent tax rate
even if they have no investments in the State. Thus, the investment provision permits foreign insurance companies to
reduce, but never to eliminate, the discrimination inherent in
the domestic preference tax statute.
3
There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates
of taxation of insurance companies. For annuities, the tax rate is one
percent for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a), and
for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is three-quarters of
one percent for both foreign and domestic insurance companies, id., § 274-6(a).
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II

Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Alabama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commissioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981.
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be unconstitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the
appropriate refunds. Several domestic. companies intervened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting
two claims as lead cases 4 to be tried and binding on all claimants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court
ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional.
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life
Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648 (1981),
the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two purposes, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the formation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) encouraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies
in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth
in the statute." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The
court also found that the distinction the statute created between foreign and domestic companies was rationally related
)----,....._,....---,
to t ose urposes and that the Alabama legislature reasonably could have believed that the classification would have
promoted those purposes. I d., at 21a.
Mter their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the cir'Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, was
chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property
and Casualty Company, a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as representative of the non-life claimants. See App. 314-315.
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cuit court's
as to the existence ofllegitimate state
fwt>
purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary"-bearing on the r;:-.o<VO ~ a _. J.:... ..
issue of rational relationship·, ~ that summary judgment L:' · ~-:)
was inappropriate on that questiOn because the evidence was
in conflict. Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for certiorari on the affirmance of the legitimate state
purpose issue, and the State and the intervenors petitioned
for review of the remand order. Appellants theri waived
their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue whether the
statute's classification bore a rational relationship to the two
purposes found by the circuit court to be legitimate, and they
requested a final determination of the legal issues with respect to their equal protection challenge to the statute. The
supreme court denied certiorari on all claims. Appellants
again waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing on the
rational relationship issue and filed a joint motion with the
other parties seeking rehearing and entry of a final judgment. The motion was granted, and judgment was entered
for the State and the intervenors. This appeal followed, and
we noted probable jurisdiction. - - U. S. - - (1984). We
now reverse.
III
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co.
v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the jurisprudence of
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discriminatory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945),
held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a
foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do business within a state, were immune from equal protection challenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the
Court's prior decisions in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co .' v. Harding, 272
U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the
Court had recognized· that the Equal Protection Clause
placed limits on other forms of discriminatory taxation im-

-
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posed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their residence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117
(1968); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522
(1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562
(1949).
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal
protection challenge to a California statute imposing a retaliatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business
within the State, when the home states of those companies
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a
surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a domestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been granted
only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered
discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected the
longstanding but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and explicitly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits
upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign corporation to do business within its borders. !d., at 667. We
held that "[w]e consider it now established that, whatever
the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from doing business within its boundaries, that authority does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on domestic corporations, unless the discrimination between foreign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a
legitimate state purpose." !d., at 667-668.
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary
hearing on the issue whether the classification in the Alabama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational relae on y
tion to the two purposes
question before us is whether those purposes Fel:iiH~ b' th9-eil'ea:it eea:w are legitimate. ~

No. 83-1274

Metropol:

new footnote 5

fThe State and t!he ntervenors ~ advance? ::.vm'- ..._
purposes in sup~o of the Alabama statute. A, N
. either the Circu~~
Court nor the Go rt of Ciyil Appeals ruled on the legitimacy of
those purposes, hewev.e..J;: ' t af\d 1..V will ·nob do st» ha.F-.e. On remand,
the State will e free to advance those arguments ~ again.
~ ~ the dissent finds our failure to resolve whether
Alabama may continue to collect its tax "baffling," post, at 4,
we
·
reemphasize the procedural posture of the case: it
arose on a motion for summary judgment. The Court of Civil
Appeals, ~~ i.ot upheld the Circuit Court's ruling that the
two purposes identif1ed by it were legitimate,A remanded on the ~
issue of rational relationship as to those putposes because it
found the evidence in conflict.
In order to~ an expedited .
,
ruling, appellants waived their righ.t to an e:vf dentiary 1:=J i~~
only as to the purposes "which the lower court f have determined
to be legitimate." App. to .Juris. St., at 2a. Thus, for this
Court to resolve £~ga~y whether Alabama may continue to collect
the tax ·, · it would have ~~y to decide de novo whether any of
the other purposes was legitimate,~ also whether the statute's
classification bore a rational relat~ onship to any of these
purposes--all this, on a record t~E the Court of Civil Appeals
has deemed inadequate.
,

(
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A
(1)

The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between
foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the
formatio of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama.
The State ontends that this Court has long held that the promotion of omestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate
state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In
.,so contending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western
'& Southern, that are said to have upheld discriminatory
taxes. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, --U.S.-(1984); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown,
317 U. S. 341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke
Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203

u. s. 553 (1906).

The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's contention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied
upon, we did not hold as a general rule that promotion of domestic industry is a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis{ Rather, we held that California's purpose
~ ~We find the other cases on which the State relies also to be inapposite
to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether
promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is integrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or national interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned
with whether a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its validity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at 10-11.
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to promote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause.
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and

..
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in enacting the retaliatory tax-to promote the interstate
business of domestic insurers by deterring other States from
enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes-was a legitimate
one. 451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks us to approve its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic
insurers in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers who also
want to do business in the State. Alabama has made no attempt, as California did, to influence the policies of other
States in order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to
operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to foreign
companies who wish to do interstate business in order to improve its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home.
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the
fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is
purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there.
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BRENeffect of promoting domestic industry,"-- U. S. - - , - - (1984), we
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discriminatory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and promote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc . v. Hardesty, - U. S. - - , - - (1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must "regulat[e] evenhandedly." 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970).
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the validity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Education deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate.
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of residence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, however, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonresidents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within
the State. See infra, at 9.

'·,I
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joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in
Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, this Court always has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a
State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely by
burdening "the residents of other state members of our federation." 358 U. S. , at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax involved in Western & Southern, which only burdens residents
of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on outsiders, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team" an
advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking to
do business within the State, no matter what they or their
States do.
The validity of the view that a State may not constitutionally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v.
Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp . v.
Glander; 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S., at 417. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380
U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hanover Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on
business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing business within the State solely because of their residence, pre- _ 7
sumably to promote domestic industry within the State.J: In
\Y
relying on these cases and rejecting Lincoln in Western &
Southern, we reaffirmed the continuing viability of the Equal
Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that
NAN,

\!,/----:1 Although the promotion of domestic business was not a purpose advanced by the States in support of their taxes in these cases, such promotion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such
as those at issue there.
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seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only by
\ - -1ii:H\llefr.'ffii: foreign competitors.
The State contends that Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, shows that this principle has not always held true.
In that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal
protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign
corporations from a tax on the value of merchandise held for
wi"' ~e..
storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, finding
that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to build ~t~~\\\ed. swres
warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The
~""\ 5jli 0: ~it~
State contends that this case shows that promotion of domesq__ ·~ 1Vl V\euJ
t~c busines~ is a legitimate state purpose under equal protec ~i~~;1j~i41 mt+.e. J
tion analysis.
~
. ' 'wtlole.
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allie a.wl 0 ~•C-V\ tU\~l
•
Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other
cases on which we rely. Allied Stores does no~old that proon o omes 1c usmess is ~ legitimateoslia\ie ~l:if'~98'b
ho~)
~~tefl.\ instead ef beiag eeaeerned vlith J'I omotion of dome~~
-Me easiRe~~. it invel; ee a statute that encourages nonresidents-who are not competitors of residents-to build
warehouses within the State. );hnev-,~e discriminatory
tax involved did not favor residents by burdening outsiders;
rather, it granted the nonresident businesses an exemption
that residents did not share. Since the foreign and domestic
companies involved were not competing to provide warehousing services, granting the former an exemption did not
even directly affect adversely the domestic companies subject to the tax. On its facts, then, Allied Stores is not inconsistent with our holding here that promotion ot domestic
business Wit m a Stat by discriminating againS\ foreign
corporations that wish to ~ business there, is not a legitimate state purpose. Se 358 U. S., at 532-533 (JUSTICE
BRENNAN, concurring).
(2)

l1_\

l

The State argues no etheless that it is impermissible to
view a discriminatory t x such as the one at issue here as vio-

'.
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lative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it contends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward,
p. 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015,
intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden interstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue
here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental
than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarranFerguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Commerce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As
noted above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly
reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on dis- " (l _
criminatory taxes in the insurance context.~
vr
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences between Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional
provisions serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the
State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden
the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the
burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that purpose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. See
Western & Southern, supra, at 674 (if purpose is legitimate,
equal protection challenge may not prevail so long as the
question of rational relationship is "'at least debatable'"
-----Ain fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history
· of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress's response only to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., supra,
322 U. S. 533, and that Congress did not intend thereby to give the States
any power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than what they
had previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed this
Court's decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause places limits on
a State's ability to tax out-of-state corporations. See 451 U. S., at 655
n. 6.
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(quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S.
144, 154 (1938)).

The two constitutional provisions perform different functions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's
power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other protects persons~ from unconstitutional discrimination by the
States. See Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421,
423-424 (1921). The effect of the statute at issue here is to
place a discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who desire to do business within the State, thereby also incidentally
placing a burden on interstate commerce. Equal protection
restraints are applicable even though the effect of the discrimination in this case is similar to the type of burden with
which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned. We
reaffirmed the importance of the Equal Protection Clause in
the insurance context in Western & Southern and see no reason now for reassessing that view.
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a
legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context.
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer
domestic business over foreign. If we accept the State's
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the
State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit domestic businessl A discriminatory tax would stand or fall
depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose--as
benefitting one group or as harming another. This is a distinction without a difference, and one that we rejected last
term in an analogous context arising under the Commerce
Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, supra,-- U. S.,
at - - . See n. 6 supra. We hold that under the circumstances of this case, promotion of domestic business by dis-

0

~It is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the meaning' of the Fourteenth Amendment. E. g., Western & Southern, supra, at
660, n. 12.

~ (tCttAched)

·.

new footnote 10:
1trndeed, under the S~ate's analysis, ~discrimination could be
justified simply on the gound that it favored ~.otl
t
~xpensa oc another.
not here pu~po~t to
prove or
~r
~
rticular bra
of lo~l ecGnomi regul~io ;
rathe
e hold only that such regulation may n t be accomplished
by imposing discriminatorily higher taxes on no resident
corporations solely because they are nonreside ts.
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criminating against nonresident• is not a legitimate state
purpose.
B
The second purpose found ~y the courts below to be legitimate was the encouragement of capital investment in the Alabama assets and governmental securities specified in the
statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state purpo ~ Domestic insurers remain entitled to the more favorable""ate of tax regardless of whether they invest in Alabama
assets. Moreover, the investment incentive provision of the
Alabama statute does not enable foreign insurance companies
to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No
matter how much of their assets they invest in Alabama, foreign insurance companies are still required to pay a higher
gross premiums tax than domestic companies.~ The State's
investment incentive provision therefore does not cure, but
reaffirms, the statute's impermissible classification based
solely on residence. We hold that encouraging investment in
Alabama assets and securities in this plainly discriminatory
manner serves no legitimate state purpose.

~

IV
We conclude that neither of the two purposes furthered by
the Alabama domestic preference tax statute and addressed
by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, see su~r..:a:.z..•...:a;;.:.t~---::?-tb ~~-h· h.. -1-h~
3, is legitimate under the Equal Protection Clause
The
' ~(J d-m-c...
,J>
si-tio~"' o
judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court accordingly is re.
. ,
'r1-i ~

, 11 ~

V

_u
~
at ; ~~ ~
utM.t.

----1Section 27-4-4(b) of the Alabama Code provides that by investing ten
percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, a foreign life
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to two percent,
and a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its rate from four
to three percent. Domestic insurers of all types, on the other hand, are
required to pay tax at a rate of one percent, regardless of whether they
invest in the s ecified Alabama investments. See id. § 27-4-5.
10
Some 15 additional purposes have been advanced by the State an
the intervenors in support of the statute. As none of these was addressed
by the courts below, we express no view as to their legitimacy.

.
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versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

J
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METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
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[December - - , 1984]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether Alabama's domestic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-5,
that taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Protection Clause.
I
1
Since 1955, the State of Alabama has granted a preference
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substantially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-ofstate (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory
The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing
business in the state was limited to companies not chartered by the state.
Act No. 1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
Act No. 156 [1945] Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated,
Act No. 77 [1955] Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amendments, has remained in effect until the present.
2
For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic
insurer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its principal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code
§ 27-4-1(3). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is
characterized as a foreign insurer. !d., §27-4-1(2).
1
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on
their gross premiums received from business conducted in
Alabama at a rate of three ·percent, and foreign companies
selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent.
Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a). All domestic insurance companies, in
contrast, pay at a rate of only one percent on all types of insurance premiums. I d., § 27-4-5(a). 3 As a result, a foreign
insurance company doing the same type and volume of business in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its
domestic competitor.
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their
worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities.
Id., §27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign life
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to
two percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its tax rate from four to three percent.
Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of
smaller percentages of a company's assets. Ibid. Regardless of how much of its total assets a foreign company places
in Alabama investments, it can never reduce its gross premiums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable domestic
companies. These are entitled to the one percent tax rate
even if they have no investments in the State. Thus, the in- \
vestment provision permits foreign insurance companies to
reduce, but. never to eliminate, t~ disc;imin: tion inher~n~ in
the domestic preference tax statute:= ._..
There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates
of taxation of insurance companies. For annuities, the tax rate is one
percent for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a), and
for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is three-quarters of
one percent for both foreign and domestic insurance companies, id., § 274-6(a).
3

I
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II
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Alabama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commissioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981.
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be unconstitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the
appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies intervened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting
two claims as lead cases 4 to be tried and binding on all claimants. On cross-motions for ~Il]Jlaryj ud,gn;en1, the court
ruled on May 17, 1982, that tlie"'"'"statute was constitutional.
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life
Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648 (1981),
the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two purposes, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the formation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) encouraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies
in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth
in the statute." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The
court also found that the distinction the statute created between foreign and domestic companies was rationally related
to those purposes and that the Alabama legislature reasonably could have believed that the classification would have
promoted those purposes. I d., at 21a.
Mter their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the cir'Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, was
chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property
and Casualty Company, a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as representative of the non-life claimants. See App. 314-315.
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cuit court's findings as to the existence of kgitimate s~e
but remanded fo:r: an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of rational relationship, ruling that summary judgment
was inappropriate on that question because the evidence was
in conflict. Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for certiorari on the affirmance of the legitimate state
purpose issue, and the State and the intervenors petitioned
for review of the remand order. Appellants~_wai;red
their right to an evidentiary hearing oii'ttie is8uew.b_etlier the
statute"Sclassification bore a rational relationshi to the two
purposes oun y the c1rcm cou o e legitimate, and they
requested a final determination of the legal issues with respect to their equal protection challenge to the statute. The
supreme court denied certiorari on all claims. Appellants
again waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing on the
rational relationship issue and filed a joint motion with the
other parties seeking rehearing and entry of a final judgment. The motion was granted, and judgment was entered
for the State and the intervenors. This appeal followed, and
we noted probable jurisdiction. - - U. S. - - (1984). We
now reverse.
III
m!r~ses,

Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co.
v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the jurisprudence of
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discriminatory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945),
held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a
foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do business within a state, were immune from equal protection challenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the
Court's prior decisions in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272
U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the
Court had recognized that the Equal Protection Clause
placed limits on other forms of discriminatory taxation im-
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posed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their residence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117
(1968); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522
(1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562
(1949).

In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal
protection challenge to a California statute imposing a retaliatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business
within the State, when the home states of those companies
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a
surprising throwback" to the. days before enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a domestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been granted
only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered
discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected the
longstanding but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and explicitly held that the E · ual Protection Clause im oses limits
UQOn a ~ e ~o,;er o con 1 1on e ng t of a ore1gn corporat'Fonio""'trousm~s within its borders. I d., at 667. We
held that "(w]e consider it now established that, whatever
the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from doing business within its boundaries, that authority does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on domestic corporations, unless the discrimination b~tw~e!} foreign and domes icc ~i n be s rifi()riatrel'iit1'0J""fo a
le~ ~a;t,sta~p~r>ose."
d., at 66.
~~~
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary
hearing on the issue whether the classification in the Alabama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational relation to the two purposes sought to be accomplished, the only
question before us is whether those purposes found by the
circuit court are legitimate.
,
• ...

-
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A
. (1)

The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between
foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the
formation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama.
The State contends that this Court has long held that the promotion of domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate
state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In
.so contending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western
& Southern, that are said to have upheld discriminatory
taxes. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, --U.S.-(1984); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown,
317 U. S. 341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke
Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203

u. s. 553 (1906).

The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's contention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied
upon, we did not hold as a general rule that promotion of domestic industry is a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis.5 Rather, we held that California's purpose
6

We find the other cases on which the State relies also to be inapposite
to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports , Pike , and Parker discussed whether
promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is integrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or national interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned
with whether a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its validity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at 10-11.
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to promote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause.
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and
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in enacting the retaliatory tax-to promote the interstate
business of domestic insurer~ by deterring other States from
enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes-was a legitimate
one. 451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks us to approve its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic
insurers in Alabama by penalizing fore~ ~ers who also
want to do business in the State. Xlabama has made no attempt, as California did, to influence the policies of other
States in order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to
operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to foreign
companies who wish to do interstate business in order to improve its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home.
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the
fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is
purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there.
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BRENeffect of promoting domestic industry,"-- U. S. - - , - - (1984), we
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discriminatory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and promote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc . v. Hardesty,-U. S. - -, - - (1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must "regulat[e] evenhandedly. " 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970).
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the validity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Education deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate.
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of residence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, however, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonresidents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within
the State. See infra, at 9.
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NAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in
Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, this Court always has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a
State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely by
burdening "the residents of other state members of our federation." 358 U. S., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax involved in Western & Southern, which only burdens residents
of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on outsiders, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team" an
advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking to
do business within the State, no matter what they or .their
States do.
The validity of the view that a State may not constitutionally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v.
Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v.
Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S., at 417. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380
U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hanover Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on
business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing business within the State solely because of their residence, presumably to promote domestic industry within the State. 6 In
relying on these cases and rejecting Lincoln in Western &
Southern, we reaffirmed the continuing viability of the Equal
Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that
Although the promotion of domestic business was not a purpose advanced by the States in support of their taxes in these cases, such promotion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such
as those at issue there.
6
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seeks to benefit domestic ind t
by
burde ·
ore1
The State contends a Al t d Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, shows that this principle has not always held true.
In that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal
protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign
corporations from a tax on the value of merchandise held for
storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, finding
that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to build
warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The
State contends that this case shows that promotion of domestic business is a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis.
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied
Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other
cases on which we rely. Allied Stores does not hold that promotion of domestic business is a legitimate state purpose.
Rather, instead of being concerned with promotion of domestic business, it involves a statute that encourages nonresidents-who are not competitors of residents-to build
warehouses within the State. Moreover, the discriminatory
tax involved did not favor residents by burdening outsiders;
rather, it granted the nonresident businesses an exemption
that residents did not share. Since the foreign and domestic
companies involved were not competing to provide warehousing services, granting the former an exemption did not
even directly affect adversely the domestic companies subject to the tax. On its facts, then, Allied Stores is not inconsistent with our holding here that promotion of domestic
business within a State, by discriminating against foreign
corporations that wish to do business there, is not a legitimate state purpose. See 358 U. S., at 532-533 (JUSTICE
BRENNAN, concurring).

(2)
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to
view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as vio-
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lative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it contends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward,
p. 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015,
intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden interstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue
here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental
than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarranFerguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Commerce Clause restrictions, it) does not purport to limit in any
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As
noted above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly
reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on discriminatory taxes in the insurance context. 7,
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences between Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional
provisiOns serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the
State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden
the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the
burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that purpose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. See
Western & Southern, supra, at 674 (if purpose is legitimate,
equal protection challenge may not prevail so long as the
question of rational relationship is "'at least debatable'"
7
In fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress's response only to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., supra,
322 U. S. 533, and that Congress did not intend thereby to give the States
any power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than what they
had previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed this
Court's decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause places limits on
a State's ability to tax out-of-state corporations. See 451 U. S., at 655
n. 6.
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(quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S.
144, 154 (1938)).

The two constitutional provisions perform different functions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's
power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other protects persons 8 from unconstitutional discrimination by the
States. See Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421,
423-424 (1921). The effect of the statute at issue here is to
place a discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who desire to do business within the State, thereby also incidentally
placing a burden on interstate commerce. Equal protection
restraints are applicable even though the effect of the discrimination in this case is similar to the type of burden with
which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned. We
reaffirmed the importance of the Equal Protection Clause in
the insurance context in Western & Southern and see no reason now for reassessing that view.
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a
legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context.
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer
domestic business over foreign. If we accept the State's
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the
State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit domestic business. A discriminatory tax would stand or fall
depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose-as
benefitting one group or as harming another. This is a distinction without a difference, and one that we rejected last
term in an analogous context arising under the Commerce
Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, supra,-- U. S.,
at - - . See n. 6 supra. We hold that under the circumstances of this case, promotion of domestic business by disIt is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. E . g., Western & Southern, supra, at
660, n. 12.
8
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criminating against nonresidents is not
purpose.
B

~

The second purpose found by the courts below to be legiti- ~ ~L ~
mate was the encouragement' of capital investment in the Al~~
7
abama assets and governmental securities specified in the ~ ~
statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state purpose. Domestic insurers remain entitled to the more favor- ~
able rate of tax regardless of whether they invest in Alabama ~- . _... .
0
assets. Moreover, the investment incentive provision of the /1
r - -.- 7 ~
Alabama statute does not enable foreign insurance companies ~ ~
to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No
S ~
matter how much of their assets they invest in Alabama, for- -.,.. a. ~ .
ei~ insurance companies are still required to pay a higher ~ ' · .
-~
gross premiums tax than domestic companies. 9 The State's
~ T-_ G.~
in vestment incentive provision therefore does not cure, but ~
1
reaffirms, the statute's impermissible classification based
.r.:l ~~
solely on residence. We hold that encouraging investment in / .L. ,
Alabama assets and securities in this plainly discriminatory ~~ ~
manner serves no legitimate state purpose.
·~ ~
IV

We conclude that neither of the two purposes furthered by
the Alabama domestic preference tax statute and addressed
by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, see supra, at
3, is legitimate under the Equal Protection Clause. 10 The
judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court accordingly is re9
Section 27-4-4(b) of the Alabama Code provides that by investing ten
percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, a foreign life
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to two percent,
and a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its rate from four
to three percent. Domestic insurers of all types, on the other hand, are
required to pay tax at a rate of one percent, regardless of whether they
invest in the specified Alabama investments. See i d., § 27-4- 5.
10
Some 15 additional purposes have been advanced by the State and ]
the intervenors in support of the statute. As none of these was addressed
by the courts below, we express no view as to their legitimacy.

/
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versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether Alabama's domestic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-5,
that taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Protection Clause.
I
1
Since 1955, the State of Alabama has granted a preference
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substantially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-ofstate (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory
'The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing
business in the state was limited to companies not chartered by the state.
Act No. 1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
Act No. 156 [1945] Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated,
Act No. 77 [1955] Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amendments, has remained in effect until the present.
2
For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic
insur~r as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its principal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code
§ 27-4-1(3). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is
characterized as a foreign insurer. !d., § 27-4-1(2).

.c:>
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on
their gross premiums received from business conducted in
Alabama at a rate of three ·percent, and foreign companies
selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent.
Ala. Code§ 27-4-4(a). All domestic insurance companies, in
contrast, pay at a rate of only one percent on all types of insurance premiums. I d., § 27-4-5(a). 3 As a result, a foreign
insurance company doing the same type and volume of business in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its
domestic competitor.
)
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their
worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities.
!d., §27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign life
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to
two percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its tax rate from four to three percent.
Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of
smaller percentages of a company's assets. Ibid. Regardless of how much of its total assets a foreign company places
in Alabama investments, it can never reduce its gross premiums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable domestic
companies. These are entitled to the one percent tax rate
even if they have no investments in the State. Thus, the investment provision permits foreign insurance companies to
reduce, but never to eliminate, the discrimination inherent in
the domestic preference tax statute.
3
There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates
of taxation of insurance companies. For annuities, the tax rate is one
percent for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a), and
for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is three-quarters of
one percent for both foreign and domestic insurance companies, id., § 274-6(a).
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II
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Alabama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commissioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981.
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be unconstitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the
appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies intervened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting
two claims as lead cases 4 to be tried and binding on all claimants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court
ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional.
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life
Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648 (1981),
the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two purposes, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the formation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) encouraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies
in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth
in the statute." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The
court also found that the distinction the statute created between foreign and domestic companies was rationally related
to t ose purposes and that the Alabama legislature reasonably cou d have believed that the classification would have
promoted those purposes. I d., at 21a.
After their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the cir4
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, was
chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property
and Casualty Company, a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as representative of the non-life claimants. See App. 314-315.
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cuit court's tinfi~ as to the existence o legitimate state
purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of rational relationship,
that summary ju gment
was inappropriate on that question because the evidence was
in conflict. Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for certiorari on the affirmance of the legitimate state
purpose issue, and the State and the intervenors petitioned
for review of the remand order. Appellants then waived
their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue whether the
statute's classification bore a rational relationship to the two
purposes found by the circuit cpurt to be legitimate, and they
requested a final determination of the legal issues with respect to their equal protection challenge to the statute. The
supreme court denied certiorari on all claims. Appellants
again waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing on the
rational relationship issue and filed a joint motion with the
other parties seeking rehearing and entry of a final judgment. The motion was granted, and judgment was entered
for the State and the intervenors. This appeal followed, and
we noted probable jurisdiction. - - U. S. - - (1984). We
now reverse.
III
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co.
v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the jurisprudence of
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discriminatory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945),
held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a
foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do business within a state, were immune from equal protection challenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the
Court's prior decisions in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 .
U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins . Co. v. Harding, 272
U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the
Court had recognized that the Equal Protection Clause
placed limits on other forms of discriminatory taxation im-

-
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posed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their residence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117
(1968); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522
(1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562
(1949).
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal
protection challenge to a California statute imposing a retaliatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business
within the State, when the home states of those companies
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a
surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a domestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been granted
only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered
discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected the
longstanding but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and explicitly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits
upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign corporation to do business within its borders. !d., at 667. We
held that "[w]e consider it now established that, whatever
the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from doing business within its boundaries, that authority does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on domestic corporations, unless the discrimination between foreign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a
legitimate state purpose." !d., at 667-668.
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary
hearing on the issue whether the classification in the Alabama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational relat e on y
tion to the two purposes
question before us is whether those purposes ·feu:Rel by tl~
-ewgw~ eew.~ are legitimate.~
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A
.(1)

The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between
foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the
formati of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama.
The State ontends that this Court has long held that the promotion of domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate
state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In
:So contending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western
'& :Southern, that are said to have upheld discriminatory
taxes. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, - - U. S. - (1984); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown,
317 U. S. 341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke
Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203

u. s. 553 (1906).

The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's contention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied
upon, we did not hold as a general rule that promotion of domestic industry is a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis.~ Rather, we held that California's purpose
\ ~~
'\)

~We find the other cases on which the State relies also to be inapposite
to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether
promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is integrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or national interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned
with whether a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its validity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at 10-11.
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to promote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause.
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and
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in enacting the retaliatory tax-to promote the interstate
business of domestic insurers by deterring other States from
enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes-was a legitimate
one. 451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks us to approve its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic
insurers in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers who also
want to do business in the State. Alabama has made no attempt, as California did, to influence the policies of other
States in order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to
operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to foreign
companies who wish to do interstate business in order to improve its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home.
The crucial distinction between the two cases lie'S in the
fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is
purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there.
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BRENeffect of promoting domestic industry,"-- U. S. - - , - - (1984), we
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discriminatory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and promote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, - U. S. - - , - - (1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must "regulat[e] evenhandedly." 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970).
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the validity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Education deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate.
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of residence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, however, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonresidents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within
the State. See infra, at 9.

•
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NAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in
Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, this Court always has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a
State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely by
burdening "the residents of other state members of our federation." 358 U. S., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax involved in Western & Southern, which only burdens residents
of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on outsiders, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team" an
advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking to
do business within the State, no matter what they or their
States do.
The validity of the view that a State may not constitutionally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v.
Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v.
Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S., at 417. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380
U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hanover Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on
business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing business within the State solely because of their residence, presumably to promote domestic industry within the StateJ In
relying on these cases and rejecting Lincoln in Western &
Southern, we reaffirmed the continuing viability of the Equal
Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that

""1 / ~Although

V

the promotion of domestic business was not a purpose advanced by the States in support of their taxes in these cases, such promotion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such
as those at issue there.
,

o/
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seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only by

-\1

r---4*i~~·tD foreign competitors.
~scvi~iM: ~
T eState contends that Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bow~tV~-Sr
ers, supra, shows that this principle has not always held true.

In that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal
protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign
corporations from a tax on the value of merchandise held for
We ~~e wilh -1-A e.
storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, findin L -l&l·
fUI"ed. 5tDres
that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies
uild rw ·~ D
warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state R ose. The ;Mt (). 51-tJ.t€ S ~oa..l
State contends that this case shows that pr otion of domes- oj bvifV\i~ ·,~ ~ L_
tic business is a legitimate state purp
under equal protec- bu.S\r\(~ tc; ~4-iMtt.Tt:..tion analysis.
o.c.td 0 ft"' o.ct"~iv-Aiofe ·
We disagree with the St e's interpretation of AlliedL--Jl------Stores and find that theca 1s not inconsistent with the other
::1
cases on which we rely. Allied Stores does not.(hold that pro- ~\ll'V'!.J
mo Ion o omes 1c usme s is ;-legitimatEtJiS~ate flllPfl8B8JJ
instea?
flP8M8ti8H sf
~ygiBess, It4Rv-et¥eg a statute that encourages non- ~
residents-who are not competitors of residents-to build
warehouses within the State. MePeave!lS1Pe discriminatory
tax involved did not favor residents by buri:iening outsiders;
rather, it granted the nonresident businesses an exemption
that residents did not share. Since the foreign and domestic
companies involved were not competing to provide warehousing services, granting the former an exemption did not
even directly affect adversely the domestic companies subject to the tax. On its facts, then, Allied Stores is not inconsistent with our holding here that promotion of domestic
business within a State, by discriminatin a ainst foreign
corporations that wish
business there, is not a egi 1mate state purpose. See 358 U. S., at 532-533 (JUSTICE
BRENNAN, concurring).

+ --

b ct\.sd".W\~tf'A\iV\~
o.4t\C!.\- :{«L\t\V\
us fbv-A.+ic:M.s

~~--~
S r--11~~~~~~i5t.
~

~~:AQQPBee w4~H

Q8Hle~ ~

(2)
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to
view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as vio-

.
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lative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it contends, amounts to no more ~han "Commerce Clause rhetoric
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward,
p. 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015,
intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden interstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue
here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental
than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarranFerguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Commerce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As
noted above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly
reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on dis~
criminatory taxes in the insurance contextl
Moreover, the State's view ignores the .differences between Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional
prov1s1ons serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the
State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden
the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the
burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that purpose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. See
Western & Southern, supra, at 674 (if purpose is legitimate,
equal protection challenge may not prevail so long as the
question of rational relationship is "'at least debatable'"
... ~ 1-----L.In fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history
'\1
ofthe McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress's response only to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., supra,
322 U. S. 533, and that Congress did not intend thereby to give the States
any power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than what they
had previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed this
Court's decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause places limits on
a State's ability to tax out-of-state corporations. See 451 U. S., at 655
n. 6.
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(quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S.
144, 154 (1938)).

The two constitutional provisions perform different nmctions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's
ower-one rotects interstate commerce, and the other protects persons from unconstitutional discrimination by the
States. See Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421,
423-424 (1921). The effect of the statute at issue here is to
place a discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who desire to do business within the State, thereby also incidentally
placing a burden on interstate commerce. Equal protection
restraints are applicable even though the effect of the discrimination in this case is similar to the type of burden with
which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned. We
reaffirmed the importance of the Equal Protection Clause in
the insurance context in Western & Southern and see no reason now for reassessing that view.
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a
legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context.
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer
domestic business over foreign. If we accept the State's
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the
State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit domestic business. A. A discriminatory tax would stand or fall
depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose-as
benefitting one group or as harming another. This is a distinction without a difference, and one that we rejected last
term in an analogous context arising under the Commerce
Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, supra,-- U.S.,
at - - . See n. 6 supra. We hold that under the circumstances of this case, promotion of domestic business by dis-

'\Y~It
is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. E. g., Western & Southern, supra, at
660, n. 12.

..
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criminating against
purpose.

not a legitimate state

B
The second purpose found by the courts below to be legitimate was the encouragement' of capital investment in the Alabama assets and governmental securities specified in the
statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state pur"---p-o-se-. Domestic insurers remain entitled to the more favorable rate of tax regardless of whether they invest in Alabama
assets. Moreover, the investment incentive provision of the
Alabama statute does not enable foreign insurance companies
to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No
matter how much of their assets they invest in Alabama, foreign insurance companies are still required to pay a higher
gross premiums tax than domestic companies~ The State's
investment incentive provision therefore does not cure, but
reaffirms, the statute's impermissible classification based
solely on residence. We hold that encouraging investment in
Alabama assets and securities in this plainly discriminatory
manner serves no legitimate state purpose.

IV
We conclude that neither of the two purposes furth ed by
the Alabama domestic preference tax statute and a ressed
by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, see 'R.ra, at
3, is legitimate under the Equal Protection Claus . ;JI/ The
judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court according y is re9
Section 27-4-4(b) of the Alabama Code provides that by investing ten
percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, a foreign life
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to two percent,
and a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its rate from four
to three percent. Domestic insurers of all types, on the other hand, are
required to pay tax at a rate of one percent, regardless of whether they
invest in the s ecified Alabama investments. See id., § 27-4-5.
10
Some 15 additwna purposes have been a vance
by the State and
the intervenors in support of the statute. As none of these was addressed ....__.._by the courts below, we express no view as to their legitimacy.
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versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

~

NCJ.

~

:>-fiJ...:/1-

YYie:tYo~· ~

Ltf<

V. w~

l. S~vv-
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1 The State and the intervenors advanced some 15 additional
purposes in support of the Alabama statute. As neither the
Circuit Court nor the Court of Civil Appeals ruled on the
legitimacy of those purposes, that question is not before us, and
we express no view as to it. On remand, the State will be free
to advance its arguments relating to the legitimacy of those
purposes again.
As the dissent finds our failure to resolve whether Alabama
may continue to collect its tax "baffling," post, at 4, we
reemphasize the procedural posture of the case:
it arose on a
motion for summary judgment. The Court of Civil Appeals upheld
the Circuit Court's ruling that the two purposes identified by it
were legitimate, but it remanded on the issue of rational
relationship as to those purposes because it found the evidence
in conflict.
In order to obtain an expedited ruling, appellants
waived their right to an evidentiary hearing only as to the
purposes "which the lower courts have determined to be
legitimate." App. to Juris. St., at 2a. Thus, for this Court to
resolve whether Alabama may continue to collect the tax, it would
have to decide de novo whether any of the other purposes was
legitimate, and also whether the statute's classification bore a
rational relationship to any of these purposes--all this, on a
record that the Court of Civil Appeals deemed inadequate.

1 rndeed, under the State's analysis, ~discrimination could be
justified simply on the gound that it favored one group at the
expense of another.
This case does not involve or question, as
the dissent suggests, post, at 17, the broad authority of a State
bo promote and regulate its own economy.
we hold only that such
regulation may not be accomplished by imposing discriminatorily
higher taxes on nonresident corporations solely because they are
nonresidents.
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ALABAMA

[February - , 1985]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether Alabama's domestic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-5,
that taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Protection Clause.
I
1
Since 1955, the State of Alabama has granted a preference
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substantially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-ofstate (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory
'The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing

business in the state was limited to companies not chartered by the state.
Act No. 1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
Act No. 156 [1945] Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated,
Act No. 77 [1955] Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amendments, has remained in effect until the present.
1
For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic
insurer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its principal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code
§ 27-4-1(3). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is
characterized as a foreign insurer. /d., § 27-4-1(2).
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on
their gross premiums received from business conducted in
Alabama at a rate of three percent, and foreign companies
selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent.
Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a). All domestic insurance companies, in
contrast, pay at a rate of only one percent on all types of insurance premiums. !d., §27-4-5(a). 8 As a result, a foreign
insurance company doing the same type and volume of business in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its
domestic competitor.
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their
worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities.
Id., §27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or more of its
total assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign
life insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from
three to two percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its tax rate from four to three percent. Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of smaller percentages of a company's assets. Ibid.
Regardless of how much of its total assets a foreign company
places in Alabama investments, it can never reduce its gross
premiums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable domestic companies. These are entitled to the one percent tax
rate even if they have no investments in the State. Thus,
the investment provision permits foreign insurance companies to reduce, but never to eliminate, the discrimination inherent in the domestic preference tax statute.
• There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates
of taxation of insurance companies. For annuities, the tax rate is one
percent for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code§ 27-4-4(a), and
for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is three-quarters of
one percent for both foreign and domestic insurance companies, id., § 274-6(a).

.

'
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II
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Alabama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commissioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981.
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be unconstitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the
appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies intervened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting
two claims as lead cases • to be tried and binding on all claimants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court
ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional.
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life
Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648 (1981),
the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two purposes, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the formation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) encouraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies
in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth
in the statute." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The
court also found that the distinction the statute created
between foreign and domestic companies was rationally related to those two purposes and that the Alabama legislature /
reasonably could have believed that the classification would
have promoted those purposes. I d., at 21a.
After their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the cir4

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, was
chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property
and Casualty Company, a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as representative of the non-life claimants. See App. 314-315.
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cuit court's rulings as to the existence of the two legitimate
state purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on
the issue of rational relationship, concluding that summary
judgment was inappropriate on that question because the evidence was in conflict. Appellants petitioned the Supreme
Court of Alabama for certiorari on the affirmance of the
legitimate state purpose issue, and the State and the intervenors petitioned for review of the remand order. Appellants
then waived their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue
whether the statute's classification bore a rational relationship to the two purposes found by the circuit court to be
legitimate, and they requested a final determination of the
legal issues with respect to their equal protection challenge
to the statute. The supreme court denied certiorari on all
claims. Appellants again waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing on the rational relationship issue and filed a
joint motion with the other parties seeking rehearing and
entry of a final judgment. The motion was granted, and
judgment was entered for the State and the intervenors.
This appeal followed, and we noted probable jurisdiction.
- - U. S. - - (1984). We now reverse.

III
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co.
v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the jurisprudence of
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discriminatory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945),
held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a
foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do business within a state, were immune from equal protection challenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the
Court's prior decisions in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272
U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the
Court had recognized that the Equal Protection Clause

l
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placed limits on other fonns of discriminatory taxation
imposed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their
residence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S.
117 (1968); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S.
522 (1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562
(1949).
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal
protection challenge to a California statute imposing a retaliatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business
within the State, when the home states of those companies
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a
surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a
domestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been
granted only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected
the longstanding but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and explicitly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits
upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign corporation to do business within its borders. I d., at 667. We
held that "[ w]e consider it now established that, whatever
the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from doing business within its boundaries, that authority does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other
. burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on
domestic corporations, unless the discrimination between foreign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a
legitimate state purpose." Id., at 667-668.
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary
hearing on the issue whether the classification in the Alabama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational relation to the two purposes upheld by the Circuit Court, the

I
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only question before us is whether those purposes
legitimate. 5
A
(1)

The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between
foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the
formation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama.
The State, agreeing with the Court of Civil Appeals, con- I
tends that this Court has long held that the promotion of
domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In so contending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western &
Southern, that are said to have upheld discriminatory taxes.
See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, --U.S.-- (1984);
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Allied
Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown, 317
U. S. 341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co.,
1
The State and the intervenors advanced some 15 additional purposes in
support of the Alabama statute. As neither the Circuit Court nor the
Court of Civil Appeals ruled on the legitimacy of those purposes, that question is not before us, and we express no view as to it. On remand, the
State will be ~ ~ts arguments relating to the legitimacy of
those purpose~ -- _ -- ~
As the dissent finds our failure to resolve whether Alabama may continue to collect its tax "baffling," post, at 4, we reemphasize the procedural
posture of the case: it arose on a motion for summary judgment. The
Court of Civil Appeals upheld the Circuit Court's ruling that the two purreman e on t e 1ssue of
poses identified by it were legitimate, but
rational relationship as to those purposes because it found the evidence in
conflict. In order to obtain an expedited ruling, appellants waived their
right to an evidentiary hearing only as to the purposes ''which the lower
courts have determined to be legitimate." App. to Juris. St., at 2a.
Thus, for this Court to resolve whether Alabama may continue to collect
the tax, it would have to decide de novo whether any of the other purposes
was legitimate, and also whether the statute's classification bore a rational
relationship to any of these purposes-all this, on a record that the Court
of Civil Appeals deemed inadequate.
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301 U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203

u. s. 553 (1906).

The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's contention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied
upon, we did not hold as a general rule that promotion of
domestic industry is a legitimate state purpose under equal
protection analysis. 6 Rather, we held that California's pur- J
\

,

• We find the other cases on which the State relies also to be inapposite
to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether
promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is
integrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or
national interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned
with whether a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its validity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at 10-11.
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to promote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause.
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and
effect of promoting domestic industry,"-- U. S. - - , - - (1984), we
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discriminatory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and promote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc. v. Hardesty,-U. S. - - , - - (1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must ''regulat[e] evenhandedly." 397 u. s. 137, 142 (1970).
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the validity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Education deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate.
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of residence of domestic VeT8U8 foreign corporations. That case does little, however, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonresidents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within
the State. See infra, at 9.
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pose in enacting the retaliatory tax-to promote the interstate business of domestic insurers by deterring other States
from enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes-was a legitimate one. 451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks
us to approve its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic insurers in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers
who also want to do business in the State. Alabama has
made no attempt, as California did, to influence the policies of
other States in order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to
foreign companies who wish to do interstate business in order
to improve its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home.
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the
fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is
purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there.
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in
Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, this Court
always has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a
State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely by
burdening "the residents of other state members of our federation." 358 U. S., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax
involved in Western & Southern, which only burdens residents of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on
outsiders, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team"
an advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking
to do business within the State, no matter what they or their
States do.
The validity of the view that a State may not constitutionally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v.
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Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v.
Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Harwver Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S., at 417. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380
U.S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hanover Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on
business, ''the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing business within the State solely because of their residence, presumably to promote domestic industry within the State. 7 In )
relying on these cases and rejecting Lincoln in Western &
Southern, we reaffirmed the continuing viability of the Equal
Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that
seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only by (
grossly discriminating against foreign competitors.
The State contends that Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, shows that this principle has not always held true.
In that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal
protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign
corporations from a tax on the value of merchandise held for
storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, finding
that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to build
warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The
State contends that this case shows that promotion of domestic business is a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis.
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied
Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other
cases on which we rely. We agree with the holding of Allied'
Stores that a State's goal of bringing in new business is legiti1

Although the promotion of domestic business was not a purpose advanced by the States in support of their taxes in these cases, such promotion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such
as those at issue there.
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mate and often admirable. Allied Stores does not, however,
hold that promotion of domestic business by discriminating
against foreign corporations is legitimate. The case involves
instead a statute that encourages nonresidents-who are not
competitors of residents-to build warehouses within the
State. The discriminatory tax involved did not favor residents by burdening outsiders; rather, it granted the nonresident businesses an exemption that residents did not share.
Since the foreign and domestic companies involved were not
competing to provide warehousing services, granting the former an exemption did not even directly affect adversely the
domestic companies subject to the tax. On its facts, then,
Allied Stores is not inconsistent with our holding here that
promotion of domestic business within a State, by discriminating against foreign corporations that wish to compete by \
doing business there, is not a legitimate state purpose. See
358 U. S., at 532-533 (JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring).

(2)
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to
view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it contends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward,
p. 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015,
intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden
interstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue
here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental
than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarranFerguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Commerce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As
noted above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly
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reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on dis- I
criminatory taxes in the insurance context. 8
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences between Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional
proVIsions serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the
State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden
the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the
burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that purpose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. See
Western & Southern, supra, at 674 (if purpose is legitimate,
equal protection challenge may not prevail so long as the
question of rational relationship is " 'at least debatable' "
(quoting United States v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U. S.
144, 154 (1938)).
The two constitutional provisions perform different functions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's
power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other protects persons 9 from unconstitutional discrimination by the \
States. See Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421,
423-424 (1921). The effect of the statute at issue here is to
place a discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who
desire to do business within the State, thereby also incidenIn fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress's response only to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., supra,
322 U. S. 533, and that Congress did not intend thereby to give the States
any power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than what they
had previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed this
Court's decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause places limits on
a State's ability to tax out-of-state corporations. See 451 U. S., at 655
n. 6.
{ • It is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. E. g., Western & Southern, supra, at
660, n. 12.
8
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tally placing a burden on interstate commerce. Equal protection restraints are applicable even though the effect of the
discrimination in this case is similar to the type of burden
with which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned.
We reaffirmed the importance of the Equal Protection Clause
in the insurance context in Western & Southern and see no
reason now for reassessing that view.
.,
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a
legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context.
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer
domestic business over foreign. If we accept the State's
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the
State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit
domestic business. 10 A discriminatory tax would stand or (
fall depending primarily on how a State framed its purposeas benefitting one group or as harming another. This is a
distinction without a difference, and one that we rejected last
term in an analogous context arising under the Commerce
Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, supra,-- U. S.,
at - - . See n. 6 supra. We hold that under the circumstances of this case, promotion of domestic business by discriminating against nonresident competitors is not a legitimate state purpose.
B
The second purpose found by the courts below to be legitimate was the encouragement of capital investment in the
Alabama assets and governmental securities specified in the
10

Indeed, under the State's analysis, any discrimination could be justified simply on the ~und that it favored one group at the xpense of another. This case oes not mvolve or question, as the dissent suggests,
post, at 17, the broad authority of a State to promote and regulate its own
economy. We hold only that such regulation may not be accomplished by
imposing discriminatorily higher taxes on nonresident corporations solely
because they are nonresidents .

..

\,

,
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statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state purpose when furthered by discrimination. Domestic insurers
remain entitled to the more favorable rate of tax regardless
of whether they invest in Alabama assets. Moreover, the
investment incentive provision of the Alabama statute does
not enable foreign insurance companies to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No matter how much of
their assets they invest in Alabama, foreign insurance companies are still required to pay a higher gross premiums tax
than domestic companies. The State's investment incentive
provision therefore does not cure, but reaffirms, the statute's
impermissible classification based solely on residence. We
hold that encouraging investment in Alabama assets and securities in this plainly discriminatory manner serves no legitimate state purpose.
IV
We conclude that neither of the two purposes furthered by
the Alabama domestic preference tax statute and addressed
by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, see supra, at
3, is legitimate under the Equal Protection Clause to justify
the imposition of the discriminatory tax at issue here. The
judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court accordingly is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
·
It is so ordered.
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ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
[FeeNar, - , 1985]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether Alabama's domes)
7
tic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-~ ( JC( 5' 1
that taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Protection Clause.
I
1
Since 1955, the State of Alabama has granted a preference
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substantially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-ofstate (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory
The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing
~ business in the ~tate was limited to companies not chartered by the /tate. ~
Act No. 1(!ll849J Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
Act No. 156(DL945YAla. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated,
Act No. 77 (01.9551 Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amendments, has remained in effect until the present.
2
For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic
insurer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its principal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code
§ 27-4-1(3)0 A corporation that d@Jot meet both of these criteria is
characterized as a foreign insurer. I d., §27-4-1(2).
~{
1
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on
their gross premiums received from business conducted in
Alabama at a rate of thre percent, and foreigl! companies
selling other types of insurance pay at a rate o our. percent. ~(
Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a):;:! All domestic insurance companies, in
contrast, pay at a ra~ only @percent on all types of insurance premiums. t/.!!.0§ 27-4-5(a). 3 As a result, a foreign
insurance company domg the same type and volume of business in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its
domestic competitor.
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their
worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities.
@ §27-4-4(b). By investing~ percent or more of its
total assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign
life insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from
~ to@percent. Similarly, a foreign roperty and casualty insurer may reduce its tax rate from ou tot e percent. Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of smaller percentages of a company's assets. Ibid.
Regardless of how much of its total assets a foreign company
places in Alabama investments, it can never reduce its gross
premiums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable do/
mestic companies. These are entitled to the ne ercent tax .i
rate even if they have no investments in the tate. Thus,
the investment provision permits foreign insurance companies to reduce, but never to eliminate, the discrimination inherent in the domestic preference tax statute.

3/

.!/

~I

to/

t+/.3/
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There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates
of taxation of insurance companies. For annuities, the tax rate is one
percent for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code § 27-4-4(al9and
for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is three-quarters of
one percent for both foreign and domestic insurance companies,@ § 274-6(a).
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II

Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Alabama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commissioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981.
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be unconstitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the
appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies intervened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting
two claims as lead cases 4 to be tried and binding on all claimants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court
ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional.
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life
Ins . Co. v. State Board of Equalizatiorlf)451 U. S. 648 (1981),
the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two purposes, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the formation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) encouraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies
in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth
in the statute." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The
court also found that the distinction the statute created
between foreign and domestic companies was rationally related to those two purposes and that the Alabama legislature
reasonably could have believed that the classification would
have promoted those purposes. I d., at 21a.
Mter their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the ~ir• Metropolitan Life Insurance C~ a New York corporation, was
chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property
and Casualty Co§pany0a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as representative of the no life claimants. See App. 314-315.
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cuit Jourt's rulings as to the existence of the two legitimate
state purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on
the issue of rational relationship, concluding that summary
judgment was inappropriate on that question because the evidence was in conflict. I\ Appellants petitioned the Supreme
Court of Alabama for certiorari on the affirmance of the
legitimate state purpose issue, and the State and the intervenors petitioned for review of the remand order. Appellants
then waived their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue
whether the statute's classification bore a rational relation- ~ /:./
ship to the two purposes found by the ¢ircuit ¢ourt to be ¥ .!!
legitimate, and they requested a final determination of the
legal issues with respect to their equal protection challenge
to the statute. The ~upreme
denied certiorari on all
claims. Appellants again waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing on the rational relationship issue and filed a
joint motion with the other parties seeking rehearing and
entry of a final judgment. The motion was granted, and
judgment was entered for the State and the intervenors.
This appeal followed, and we noted probable jurisdiction.
--7\- U. S. - - (1984). We now reverse.

lourt

III
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co.
v. State Board of Equalization~ supra, the jurisprudence of
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discriminatory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945),
held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a
foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do business within a ~tate, were immune from equal protection challenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the
Court's prior decisions in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272
U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the
Court had recognized that the Equal Protection Clause
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placed limits on other forms of discriminatory taxation
imposed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their
residence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S.
117 (1968); Allied Store~ {nc.[Ot Ohiq v. Bowers, 358 U. S.
522 (1959); Wheeling Stee Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562
(1949).

In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal
protection challenge to a California statute imposing a retaliatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business
within the State, when the home 'Jtates of those companies ~
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a
surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a
domestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been
granted only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected
the longstanding but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and explicitly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits
upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign corporation to do business within its borders. ld., at 667. We
held that "[w]e consider it now established that, whatever
the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from doing business within its boundaries, that authority does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on
domestic corporations, unless the discrimination between foreign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a
legitimate state purpose." ld., at 667-668.
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary
hearing on the issue whether the classification in the Alabama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational relation to the two purposes upheld by the Circuit Court, the

I
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only question before us is whether those purposes are \
legitimate. 5
A
(1)

The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between
foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the
formation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama.
The State, agreeing with the Court of Civil Appeals, contends that this Court has long held that the promotion of
domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In so contending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western &
Southern, that are said to have upheld discriminatory taxes.
See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, +- U. S. - - (1984);
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Allied
StoreslJ_ncJofOhi v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown, 317
U. S. 341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co.,

l
.J,_c.j

~o

6

The State and the intervenors advanced some 15 additional purposes in
support of the Alabama statute. As neither the Circuit Court nor the
Court of Civil Appeals ruled on the legitimacy of those purposes, that question is not before us, and we express no view as to it. On remand, the
State will be free to advance 'ts arguments relating to the legitimacy of
those purpose
ain.
As the dissent nds our failure to resolve whether Alabama may continue to collect its tax "baffling," post, at 4, we reemphasize the procedural
posture of the case: it arose on a motion for summary judgment. The
Court of Civil Appeals upheld the Circuit Court's ruling that the two purposes identified by it were legitimate, but · reman e on the issue of
rational relationship as to those purposes because it found the evidence in
conflict. In order to obtain an expedited ruling, appellants waived their
right to an evidentiary hearing only as to the purposes "which the lower
courts have determined to be legitimate." App. to Juris. St., at 2a.
Thus, for this Court to resolve whether Alabama may continue to collect
the tax, it would have to decide de novo whether any of the other purposes
was legitimate, and also whether the statute's classification bore a rational
relationship to any of these purposes-all this, on a record that the Court
of Civil Appeals deemed inadequate.

.Jhe aPf£tl 4

:k_
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301 U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203
u. s. 553 (1906).

The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's contention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied
upon, we did not hold as a general rule that promotion of
domestic industry is a legitimate state purpose under equal
protection analysis. 6 Rather, we held that California's pur8

@I

We find the other cases on which the State relies also to be inapposite
to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether
promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is
integrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or
national interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned
with whether a ~tate purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its validity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at 10-11.
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to promote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause.
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and
effect of(§romotf~domestic industry," -k U.S.--,-- (1984), we
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discriminatory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and promote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, -A::U. S. - - , - - (1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must "regulat[e] evenhandedly." 397 u. s.037J142{f97oD
Other cases citedoY the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the validity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Education deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate.
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of residence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, however, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonresidents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within
the State. See infra, at 9.
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pose in enacting the retaliatory tax-to promote the interstate business of domestic insurers by deterring other States
from enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes-was a legitimate one. 451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks
us to approve its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic insurers in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers
who also want to do business in the State. Alabama has
made no attempt, as California did, to influence the policies of
other States in order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to
foreign companies who wish to do interstate business in order
to improve its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home.
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the
fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is
purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there.
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in
l':q q)
Allied Store , Inc. o hio v. Bowers, ~ this Court '358" U.S. 5~d. ll 5 /1
always has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a
State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely by
burdening "the residents of other state members of our federation." ([58~ at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax
involved in Western & Southern, which only burdens residents of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on
outsiders, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team"
an advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking
to do business within the State, no matter what they or their
States do.
The validity of the view that a State may not constitutionally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v.

j
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Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v.
Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S., at 417. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380
U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hanover Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on
business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing business within the State solely because of their residence, presumably to promote domestic industry within the State. 7 In I
relying on these cases and rejecting Lincoln in Western &
Southern, we reaffirmed the continuing viability of the Equal
Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that
seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only by
J~ J
grossly discriminating against foreign competitor
The State contends that Allied Store , Inc. ofOhi v. Bow- ~~
ers, supra, shows that this principle has not always held true.
In that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal
protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign
corporations from a tax on the value of merchandise held for
storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, finding
that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to build
warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The
State contends that this case shows that promotion of domestic business is a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis.
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied
Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other
cases on which we rely. We agree with the holding of Allied J
Stores that a State's goal of bringing in new business is legiti7
Although the promotion of domestic business was not a purpose advanced by the States in support of their taxes in these cases, such promotion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such
as those at issue there.
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mate and often admirable. Allied Stores does not, however,
hold that promotion of domestic business by discriminating
against foreign corporations is legitimate. The case involves
instead a statute that encourages nonresidents-who are not
competitors of residents-to build warehouses within the
State. The discriminatory tax involved did not favor residents by burdening outsiders; rather, it granted the notfesident businesses an exemption that residents did not slfare.
Since the foreign and domestic companies involved were not
competing to provide warehousing services, granting the former an exemption did not even directly affect adversely the
domestic companies subject to the tax. On its facts, then,
Allied Stores is not inconsistent with our holding here that
promotion of domestic business within a State, by discriminating against foreign corporations that wish to compete by
doing business there, is not a legitimate state purpose. See
358 U. S., at 532-533((.JUSTICE BRENNA~concurring).

I

(2)

~r

The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to
view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it contends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee War<Jo
22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enactmg the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015,
intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden
interstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue
here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental
than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarranFerguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Commerce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As
noted above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly

®

1'1)/

83-1274-0PINION
METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WARD

11

reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on discriminatory taxes in the insurance context. 8
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences between Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional
prov1s1ons serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the
State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden
the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the
burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that purpose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. See
Western & Southern, ~ at 674 (if purpose is legitimate,
equal protection challenge may not prevail so long as the
question of rational relationship is "'at least debatable'"
(quoting United States v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U. S.

I

/
J./-51 ti.S.f-

144, 154 (1938)).

The two constitutional provisions perform different functions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's
power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other protects persons 9 from unconstitutional discrimination by the I
States. See Bethlehem Motors Co~ v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421,
423-424 (1921). The effect of the statute at issue here is to
place a discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who
desire to do business within the State, thereby also inciden8
In fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress's response only to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn.,~
322 U. S. ~and that Congress did not intend thereby to give the States
any power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than what they
had previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed this
Court's decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause places limits on
a State's ability to tax out-of-state corporations. See 451 U. S., at 655A
n. 6.
9
It is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. E. g., Western & Southern, supra, at
660, n. 12.
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tally placing a burden on interstate commerce. Equal protection restraints are applicable even though the effect of the
discrimination in this case is similar to the type of burden
with which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned.
We reaffirmed the importance of the Equal Protection Clause
in the insurance context in Western & Southern and see no
reason now for reassessing that view.
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a
legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context.
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer
domestic business over foreign. If we accept the State's
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the
State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit
domestic business. 10 A discriminatory tax would stand or
fall depending primarily on how a State framed its purposeas benefi~ng one group or as harming another. This is a
distinction without a difference, and one that we rejected last
term in an analogous context arising under the Commerce
Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, ~* U.S., ~) J./-08
at--. Seen. 6~upra. We hold that under the circumstances of this case, promotion of domestic business by discriminating against nonresident competitors is not a legiti- I
mate state purpose.
B
The second purpose found by the courts below to be legitimate was the encouragement of capital investment in the
Alabama assets and governmental securities specified in the

i }

10

Indeed, under the State's analysis, any discrimination could be justified simply on the !und that it favored one group at the expense of another. This case oes not involve or question, as the dissent suggests,
post, at 17, the broad authority of a State to promote and regulate its own
economy. We hold only that such regulation may not be accomplished by
imposing discriminatorily higher taxes on nonresident corporations solely
because they are nonresidents.
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statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state purpose when furthered by discrimination. Domestic insurers
remain entitled to the more favorable rate of tax regardless
of whether they invest in Alabama assets. Moreover, the
investment incentive provision of the Alabama statute does
not enable foreign insurance companies to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No matter how much of
their assets they invest in Alabama, foreign insurance companies are still required to pay a higher gross premiums tax
than domestic companies. The State's investment incentive
provision therefore does not cure, but reaffirms, the statute's
impermissible classification based solely on residence. We
hold that encouraging investment in Alabama assets and securities in this plainly discriminatory manner serves no legitimate state purpose.
IV
We conclude that neither of the two purposes furthered by
the Alabama domestic preference tax statute and addressed
by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, see supra, at
3, is legitimate under the Equal Protection Clause to justify
the imposition of the discriminatory tax at issue here. The
judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court accordingly is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether Alabama's domestic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-5
(1975), that taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a
higher rate than domestic insurance companies, violates the
Equal Protection Clause.
I
Since 1955, the State of Alabama has granted a preference
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substantially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-ofstate (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory
1

1
The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing
business in the State was limited to companies not chartered by the State.
Act No. 1, 1849 Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
Act No. 156, 1945 Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated, Act
No. 77, 1955 Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amendments, has
remained in effect until the present.
2
For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic
insurer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its principal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code
§ 27-4-1(3) (1975). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria
is characterized as a foreign insurer. § 27-4-1(2).
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on
their gross premiums received from business conducted in
Alabama at a rate of 3 percent, and foreign companies selling
other types of insurance pay at a rate of 4 percent. Ala.
Code § 27-4-4(a) (1975). All domestic insurance companies,
in contrast, pay at a rate of only 1 percent on all types of
insurance premiums. § 27-4-5(a). 3 As a result, a foreign
insurance company doing the same type and volume of business in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its
domestic competitor.
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their
worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities.
§ 27-4-4(b). By investing 10 percent or more of its total
assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign life
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from 3 to 2
percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty insurer
may reduce its tax rate from 4 to 3 percent. Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of smaller percentages of a company's assets. Ibid. Regardless of how
much of its total assets a foreign company places in Alabama
investments, it can never reduce its gross premiums tax rate
to the same level paid by comparable domestic companies.
These are entitled to the 1 percent tax rate even if they have
no investments in the State. Thus, the investment provision
permits foreign insurance companies to reduce, but never to
eliminate, the discrimination inherent in the domestic preference tax statute.
3
There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates
of taxation of insurance companies. For annuities, the tax rate is one
percent for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a)
(1975), and for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is threequarters of one percent for both foreign and domestic insurance companies,
§ 27-4-6(a).
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II
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Alabama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commissioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981.
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be unconstitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the
appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies intervened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting
two claims as lead cases 4 to be tried and binding on all claimants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court
ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional.
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life

Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization of California, 451
U. S. 648 (1981), the court ruled that the Alabama statute did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it served "at
least two purposes, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the formation of new insurance companies in Alabama,
and (2) encouraging capital investment by foreign insurance
companies in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth in the statute." App. to Juris. Statement
20a-21a. The court also found that the distinction the statute created between foreign and domestic companies was rationally related to those two purposes and that the Alabama
Legislature reasonably could have believed that the classification would have promoted those purposes. I d., at 21a.
After their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the Cir• Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., a New York corporation, was chosen
to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property and Casualty Co., a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as representative of the
nonlife claimants. See App. 314-315.
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cuit Court's rulings as to the existence of the two legitimate
state purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on
the issue of rational relationship, concluding that summary
judgment was inappropriate on that question because the evidence was in conflict. 437 So. 2d 535 (1983). Appellants
petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for certiorari on
the affirmance of the legitimate state purpose issue, and the
State and the intervenors petitioned for review of the remand order. Appellants then waived their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue whether the statute's classification bore a rational relationship to the two purposes found by
the Circuit Court to be legitimate, and they requested a final
determination of the legal issues with respect to their equal
protection challenge to the statute. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on all claims. Appellants again waived their
rights to an evidentiary hearing on the rational relationship
issue and filed a joint motion with the other parties seeking
rehearing and entry of a final judgment. The motion was
granted, and judgment was entered for the State and the intervenors. This appeal followed, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 466 U. S. - - (1984). We now reverse.

III
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co.
v. State Board of Equalization of California, supra, the jurisprudence of the applicability of the Equal Protection
Clause to discriminatory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325
U. S. 673 (1945), held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a foreign corporation before it would be
permitted to do business within a State, were immune from
equal protection challenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the Court's prior decisions in Southern R.
Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins.
Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the Court had recognized that th~ Equal Pro-
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tection Clause placed limits on other forms of discriminatory
taxation imposed on out-of-state corporations solely because
of their residence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393
U. S. 117 (1968); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358
U. S. 522 (1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S.
562 (1949).

In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal
protection challenge to a California statute imposing a retaliatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business
within the State, when the home States of those companies
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a
surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a domestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been granted
only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered
discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected the
longstanding but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and explicitly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits
upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign corporation to do business within its borders. I d., at 667. ~ We
held that "[w]e consider it now established that, whatever
the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from doing business within its boundaries, that authority does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on
domestic corporations, unless the discrimination between foreign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a
legitimate state purpose." !d., at 667-668.
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary
hearing on the issue whether the classification in the Alabama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational relation to the two purposes upheld by the Circuit Court, the

'

'
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only question before us is whether those purposes are
legitimate. 5
A
(1)

The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between
foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the
formation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama.
The State, agreeing with the Court of Civil Appeals, contends that this Court has long held that the promotion of
domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In so contending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western &
Southern, that are said to have upheld discriminatory taxes.
See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. - - (1984);
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Allied
Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown, 317
U. S. 341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co.,
5
The State and the intervenors advanced some 15 additional purposes in
support of the Alabama statute. As neither the Circuit Court nor the
Court of Civil Appeals ruled on the legitimacy of those purposes, that question is not before us, and we express no view as to it. On remand, the
State will be free to advance again its arguments relating to the legitimacy
of those purposes.
As the dissent finds our failure to resolve whether Alabama may continue to collect its tax "baffling," post, at 4, we reemphasize the procedural
posture of the case: it arose on a motion for summary judgment. The
Court of Civil Appeals upheld the Circuit Court's ruling that the two purposes identified by it were legitimate, but the appellate court remanded on
the issue of rational relationship as to those purposes because it found the
evidence in conflict. In order to obtain an expedited ruling, appellants
waived their right to an evidentiary hearing only as to the purposes "which
the lower courts have determined to be legitimate." App. to Juris. St., at
2a. Thus, for this Court to resolve whether Alabama may continue to collect the tax, it would have to decide de novo whether any of the other purposes was legitimate, and also whether the statute's classification bore a
rational relationship to any of these purposes-all this, on a record that the
Court of Civil Appeals deemed inadequate.

l

.
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301 U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203
u. s. 553 (1906).

The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's contention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied
upon, we did not hold as a general rule that promotion of
domestic industry is a legitimate state purpose under equal
protection analysis. 6 Rather, we held that California's pur6
We find the other cases on which the State relies also to be inapposite
to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether
promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is
integrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or
national interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned
with whether a state purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its validity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at 10-11.
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to promote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause.
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and
effect of encouraging domestic industry," 468 U. S. - - , - - (1984), we
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discriminatory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and promote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467
U. S. - - , - - (1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must "regulat[e] evenhandedly." 397 U. S., at 142.
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the validity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Education deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate.
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of residence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, however, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonresidents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within
the State. See irifra, at 9.

.'
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pose in enacting the retaliatory tax-to promote the interstate business of domestic insurers by deterring other States
from enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes-was a legitimate one. 451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks
us to approve its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic insurers in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers
who also want to do business in the State. Alabama has
made no attempt, as California did, to influence the policies of
other States in order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to
foreign companies who wish to do interstate business in order
to improve its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home.
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the
fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is
purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there.
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in
Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 (1959),
this Court always has held that the Equal Protection Clause
forbids a State to discriminate in favor of its own residents
solely by burdening "the residents of other state members
of our federation." I d., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax
involved in Western & Southern, which only burdens residents of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on
outsiders, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team"
an advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking
to do business within the State, no matter what they or their
States do.
The validity of the view that a State may not constitutionally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v.
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Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v.
Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216
U. S., at 417. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380
U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hanover Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on
business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing business within the State solely because of their residence, presumably to promote domestic industry within the State. 7 In
relying on these cases and rejecting Lincoln in Western &
Southern, we reaffirmed the continuing viability of the Equal
Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that
seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only by
grossly discriminating against foreign competitors.
The State contends that Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v.
Bowers, supra, shows that this principle has not always held
true. In that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on
equal protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign corporations from a tax on the value of merchandise held
for storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax,
finding that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to
build warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose.
The State contends that this case shows that promotion of domestic business is a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis.
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied
Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other
cases on which we rely. We agree with the holding of Allied
Stores that a State's goal of bringing in new business is legiti7
Although the promotion of domestic business was not a purpose advanced by the States in support of their taxes in these cases, such promotion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such
as those at issue there.

l.
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mate and often admirable. Allied Stores does not, however,
hold that promotion of domestic business by discriminating
against foreign corporations is legitimate. The case involves
instead a statute that encourages nonresidents-who are not
competitors of residents-to build warehouses within the
State. The discriminatory tax involved did not favor residents by burdening outsiders; rather, it granted the nonresident businesses an exemption that residents did not
share. Since the foreign and domestic companies involved
were not competing to provide warehousing services, granting the former an exemption did not even directly affect adversely the domestic companies subject to the tax. On its
facts, then, Allied Stores is not inconsistent with our holding
here that promotion of domestic business within a State, by
discriminating against foreign corporations that wish to compete by doing business there, is not a legitimate state purpose. See 358 U. S., at 532-533 (BRENNAN, J., concurring).

(2)
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to
view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it contends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward 22.
The State maintains that because Congress, in enacting the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015, intended
to authorize States to impose taxes that burden interstate
commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue here must
stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental than as
characterized by the State. Although the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Commerce
Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any way
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As noted
above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly reaf-
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firmed the viability of equal protection restraints on discriminatory taxes in the insurance context. 8
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences between Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional
proviSions serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the
State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden
the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the
burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that purpose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. See
Western & Southern, 451 U. S., at 674 (if purpose is legitimate, equal protection challenge may not prevail so long as
the question of rational relationship is "'at least debatable'"
(quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S.
144, 154 (1938)).

The two constitutional provisions perform different functions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's
power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other protects persons 9 from unconstitutional discrimination by the
States. See Bethlehem Motors Corp. v. Flynt, 256 U. S.
421, 423-424 (1921). The effect of the statute at issue here is
to place a discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who
desire to do business within the State, thereby also incidenIn fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress's response only to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322
U. S. 533 (1944), and that Congress did not intend thereby to give the
States any power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than what
they had previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed
this Court's decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause places limits on a State's ability to tax out-of-state corporations. See 451 U. S., at
655, n. 6.
9
1t is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. E. g., Western & Southern, supra, at
660, n. 12.
8

'i.
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tally placing a burden on interstate commerce. Equal protection restraints are applicable even though the effect of the
discrimination in this case is similar to the type of burden
with which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned.
We reaffirmed the importance of the Equal Protection Clause
in the insurance context in Western & Southern and see no
reason now for reassessing that view.
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always
a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context.
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer
domestic business over foreign. If we accept the State's
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if
the State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit
domestic business. 10 A discriminatory tax would stand or
fall depending primarily on how a State framed its purposeas benefiting one group or as harming another. This is a distinction without a difference, and one that we rejected last
term in an analogous context arising under the Commerce
Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S., at--.
See n. 6, supra. We hold that under the circumstances of
this case, promotion of domestic business by discriminating
against nonresident competitors is not a legitimate state
purpose.
B
The second purpose found by the courts below to be legitimate was the encouragement of capital investment in the
10
Indeed, under the State's analysis, any discrimination subject to the
rational relation level of scrutiny could be justified simply on the ground
that it favored one group at the expense of another. This case does not
involve or question, as the dissent suggests, post, at 17, the broad authority of a State to promote and regulate its own economy. We hold only that
such regulation may not be accomplished by imposing discriminatorily
higher taxes on nonresident corporations solely because they are
nonresidents.
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Alabama assets and governmental securities specified in the
statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state purpose when furthered by discrimination. Domestic insurers
remain entitled to the more favorable rate of tax regardless
of whether they invest in Alabama assets. Moreover, the
investment incentive provision of the Alabama statute does
not enable foreign insurance companies to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No matter how much of
their assets they invest in Alabama, foreign insurance companies are still required to pay a higher gross premiums tax
than domestic companies. The State's investment incentive
provision therefore does not cure, but reaffirms, the statute's
impermissible classification based solely on residence. We
hold that encouraging investment in Alabama assets and securities in this plainly discriminatory manner serves no legitimate state purpose.
IV
We conclude that neither of the two purposes furthered by
the Alabama domestic preference tax statute and addressed
by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, see supra, at
3, is legitimate under the Equal Protection Clause to justify
the imposition of the discriminatory tax at issue here. The
judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court accordingly is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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concerning the rates of taxation of insurance companies.
'!hey are that for annuities, the tax rate is one percent
for both foreign and domestic insurers, see Ala. Code §27~4, and for wet marine and transportation insurance, the
rate is three-quarters of one percent for both foreign and
domestic insurance companies, see id., §27-4-6.

·.

4.

competitor.
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide
that

foreign

companies

may

reduce

the

differential

in

gross premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages
of

their

Alabama.
more

of

example,

worldwide
!d.,

assets

§27-4-4(b).

its

total

assets

a

foreign

life

in

specified

By

investing

in

Alabama

insurer

may

investments

in

ten percent or

investments,
reduce

premiums tax rate from three to two percent.

its

for
gross

Similarly, a

foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its tax
rate from four

to three percent.

Smaller tax reductions

are available based on investment of smaller percentages
of a company's assets.
total

assets

investments,

a

!d.

foreign

however,

it

·'

Regardless of how much of its
company
can

invests

never

reduce

in

Alabama

its

gross

·'

:

.......

5.

premiums

tax

rate

domestic companies,

to

the

same

~re

level paid by comparable

entitled to the one percent

tax rate even if they have no investments in the State.
'Ihus,

the

investment provision permits foreign
but

to

reduce,

discrimination

inherent

companies

in

to

never
the

domestic

insurance

eliminate,

the

preference

tax

statute.
II
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated
outside

of

the

State of Alabama,

Alabama Department of

filed

claims with the

Insurance in 1981, contending that

the domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them,
violated the Equal Protection Clause.
of taxes paid for

'·

They sought refunds

the tax years 1977 through 1980.

The

6.

Commissioner of

Insurance denied all of their claims on

July 8' 1981.
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County,

seeking

mconsti tutional
the

appropriate

a

judgment declaring

and

requiring

the

the

Commissioner

Several

refunds.

statute to be

domestic

to make
companies

mtervened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals,
selecting
binding
judgment,
statute

two

claims

as

lead

on all claimants.
the
was

court

ruled

constitutional.

cases

4

to

be

tried

On cross-motions for
on

May

17,

Relying

1982,
on

this

and

summary

that

the

Court's

cpinion in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Board

4Metropolitan
Life
Insurance
Company,
a
New
York
corporation, was chosen to represent the life insurance
claimants, and Prudential Property and Casualty Company, a
New Jersey corporation; was chosen as representative of
the non-life claimants. See Jt. App., at 314-315 •

.·{,···

7.

of Equalization, 451

u.s.

648 (1981), the court ruled that

the Alabama statute did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause

because

it

served

"at

least

two

&')
~
)l> encourag1~

addition to raising revenue:

purposes,

in

the formation

"~')
of new insurance companies in Alabama, and
capital

assets

statute."

found

Ji>encouragift9

investment by foreign insurance companies in the

Alabama
the

~

that

the

and governmental securities set forth
J.

s.

App.,

at

distinction

20a-2la.

the

The

statute

court

created

in

also

between

foreign and domestic companies was rationally related to
those

purposes

reasonably

have

and

that

believed

the
that

tave promoted those purposes.
After

their

motion

Alabama

for

the

legislature

could

classification

would

Id., at 2la.
a

new

trial

was

denied,

J.+-

cppellants appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals., wh i eh

A

- -.
.

.

8.

affirmed the circuit court's findings as to the existence
of

legitimate

state

purposes,

but

remanded

for

an

evidentiary hearing on the issue of rational relationship,
ruling

that

summary

judgment

was

inappropriate

question because the evidence was in conflict.

on

that

Appellants

petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for certiorari on the
affirmance of the legitimate state purpose issue, and the
state

and

the

intervenors

remand order.

Appellants

petitioned

for

review of

then waived their

the

right to an

evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the statute's
classification

bore

a

rational

relationship

to

the

two

purposes found

by the trial court to be legitimate,

and

they requested a final determination of the legal issues

Lv7.J./c. ~-~- k
~g

their equal protection challenge to the statute.

1\
~

The

.. '
I

supreme

court

denied

certiorari

on

all

claims.

.

-.

9.

Appellants

again

hearing

the

on

waived

rational

their

rights

relationship

to

an evidentiary

issue

and

filed

a

joint motion with the other parties seeking rehearing and
entry of a

final

judgment was

judgment.

entered

for

The motion was granted,
the State and the

and

intervenors.

This appeal followed, and we noted probable jurisdiction.

u.s.

(1984>.

w.a... ~ ~ ·.
III

Prior to our decision in Western
Co.

v.

State

Board

&

Southern Life Ins.

Equalization,

of

supra,

the

jurisprudence of the applicability of the Equal Protection
Clause

to

checkered
Read, 325

discriminatory
history.

u.s.

tax

Lincoln

statutes

National

had

Life

a
Ins.

somewhat
Co.

v.

673 (1945), held that so-called "privilege"

taxes, required to be paid by a foreign corporation before

•·

.

"'

• <.

•

10.

it would be permitted to do business within a state, were
inunune from equal protection challenge.

That case stood

in stark contrast, however, to the Court's prior decisions
in Southern R.

Co.

v.

Greene,

u.s.

216

Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272

400

u.s.

(1910),

and

~~~
494 (1926), ~ ~

to later decisions, in which the Court had recognized that
the Equal Protection Clause placed limits on other forms
of

discriminatory

corporations

solely

taxation
because

imposed
of

their

e.g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393
Stores,

Inc.

v.

Bowers,

358

Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337

u.s.

u.s.

u.s.
522

on

out-of-state

residence.

See,

117 (1968); Allied
(1959);

Wheeling

562 (1949).

In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these
cases
equal

for

the

purpose of deciding whether

protection

challenge

to

to permit an

California's

statute

.~

.~

•

11.

imposing a retaliatory tax on foreign insurance companies
doing business within the State, when the home states of
those

companies

insurers

imposed

entering

their

a

similar

borders.

tax
We

on

California

concluded

that

Uncoln was no more than "a surprising throwback" to the
days before enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and in
which incorporation of a domestic corporation or entry of
a

foreign

one

had

been

granted

only

as

a

matter

privilege by the State in its unfettered discretion.

u.s.,

at 665.

We therefore

~~the

of
451

longstanding but

"anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and explicitly held that
the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits upon a State's
power to condition the right of a foreign corporation to
do

business

within

its

borders.

we

held

that

"[w]e

consider it now established that, whatever the extent of a

.. .,

..
12.

State's

authority

to

exclude

foreign

doing business within its boundaries,
not

justify

burdens

on

imposition
foreign

and

more

unless

domestic

than

evidentiary

hearing

bears

classification
statute

bears

in
a

the

the

Alabama

rational

other

imposed

issue

right
of

domestic

relation

to

a

~at

their

waived

on

or

on

the discrimination between

corporations

appellants

taxes

those

relation to a legitimate state purpose."
Because

from

that authority does

onerous

corporations

domestic corporations,
foreign

of

corporations

rational
667-668.
to

an

whether

the

preference

tax

the

two

purposes

sought to be accomplished, the only question before us is
whether

those

purposes

found

by

the

trial

court

5

are

5

Altogether, the State and the intervenors have compiled
a list of 17 state purposes they contend are served by the
Footnote continued on next page.

.•

...
13.

legitimate.
A

The first of the purposes found by the trial court to
be

a

legitimate reason

between

foreign

encourages

the

and

for

domestic

formation

companies in Alabama.

the statute's classification

of

corporations
new

is

domestic

that

it

insurance

The State contends that this Court

has long held that the promotion of domestic industry, in
and of

itself,

is a

legitimate state purpose

survive equal protection scrutiny.

that will

In so contending, it

relies on a series of cases, including Western & Southern,

statute
and
are
legitimate
under
equal
protection
analysis.
See Jt. App., at 27-33.
We decline to review
those here, as they are not before us, but remand to the
. trial court
to determine whether
any of
them ~
legitimate and rationally related to the classification
set forth in the statute •

...

'

•.!{ 1':

.

...
14.

that

have

upheld

discriminatory

.Jmports, Ltd. v. Dias,
Church, Inc., 397
Bowers,

supra;

Carmichael
(1937);

v.

Board

u.s.

Parker
Southern
of

__

taxes.

u.s. __

Bacchus

(1984); Pike v.

Bruce

137 (1970); Allied Stores, Inc. v.
v.

Brown,

v.

u.s.

341

(1943);

Co.,

301

u.s.

495

Illinois,

203

u.s.

553

'<9

k

& Coke

Coal

Education

317

~ ~~~

(1906).

tfl 7l£ c~ U,./<.;(~,<1' aPe
WQ

See

gioag~e-e

lrith /\the State's contention.

In western

&

~~~~~..1
Southern,

we

1

did

not

hold

that

promotion

of

domestic

industry is always a legitimate state purpose under equal
protection analysis. 6

Rather,

we held that California's

6we find the other cases relied on by the State also to
be inapposite to this inquiry.
Bacchus Imports, Pike, and
Parker discussed whether promotion of local industry is a
valid state purpose under the Commerce Clause.
The
Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is
integrally
concerned
with
whether
a
state
purpose
implicates
local or
national
interests.
The
Equal
Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned with whether
Footnote continued on next page.

15.

purpose

in enacting

interstate

business

the
of

retaliatory
domestic

tax--to promote the

insurers

by

deterring

a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory: whether
the discrimination involves local or other interests is
not central to the inquiry to be made.
Thus, the fact
that promotion of local industry is a legitimate state
interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about
its validity under equal protection analysis.
See infra,
cC.
•
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's
chili ty to promote domestic industry was unlimited, even
mder the Commerce Clause.
Thus, in Bacchus, although we
observed as a general matter that "a State may enact laws
pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and
effect of promoting domestic industry," __ u.s., at __
~
[104 s.ct., at 3056], we he~~. that in so doing, a State ~;;;,.
may not constitutionally im~e a discriminatory burden ~·
upon the business of other States, merely to protect and ~~
promote local business, id., at __ [104 s.ct., at 3057] . ..(~~·.
Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state statute .,,.. ~~~
promoting a legitimate local interest must "regulate /
1.
evenhandedly." 397 u.s., at 142.
/,
~.v·
Other 9f .th,. cases cited by the State are simply (lot.l-·
irrelevant: to the legitimacy of promoting local business 'l,fo1P ~'}
at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the validity of a ~
state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of
ffiucation deals with the State's ability to regulate
matters relating to probate.
Bowers is the only one of
the State's cases that involves the validity under the
Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the
msis
of
residence
of
domestic
versus
foreign
corporations.
That case does little to support the
State's contention that promotion of dom stic business is
a legitimate state purpose, ~
·
·~e~ concerned with encouraging non esidents--who are
ot competitors of residents--to bui
warehouses within
the State. See infra, at
•

o. .

)~\

...

16.

other

States

taxes--was
contrast,

from

a

enacting

legitimate

Alabama

asks

discriminatory

u.s.,

one.

451

us

approve

to

or
at

its

excessive
668.

In

purpose

of

promoting the business of its domestic insurers in Alabama
by

penalizing

business

foreign

in the State.

insurers

who

also

want

to

do

Alabama has made no attempt,

as

California did, to influence the policies of other States
in order
operate

to

enhance

interstate:

its

domestic

rather,

foreign companies who wish

ability

to

barriers

to

to do interstate business

in

it

companies'

has

erected

order to improve its domestic insurers' ability to compete
at home.
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in
the fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry
is purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to

'·.

17.

favor domestic industry within the State, no matter what
the

cost

to

foreign

California's,

constitutes

discrimination
intended
Justice

to

that

the

prevent.

Harlan,

As

observed

also

the

very

Equal

his

sort

to

contrary
of

Protection

JUSTICE
in

seeking

purpose,

Alabama's

there.

business

corporations

do
to

parochial
Clause

BRENNAN,

joined

concurrence

in

was
by

Allied

Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, supra, this Court[ ha"'S alway S). held
that

~1 -'l?rotectio~ds

1\~

a State to "discriminate in

favor of its own residents against the residents of other
state

members

of

our

federation."

358

u.s.,

at

533.

Uhlike the retaliatory tax involved in Western & Southern,

k&WT

~h

only burdens residents of a State that imposes its

1

own

discriminatory

~eference

tax

on

outsiders,

the

domestic

tax burdens all foreign corporations seeking to

,.

18.

do business within the State, no matter what they or their
States do, simply to give the "horne team" an advantage.
The

validity

of

the

view

that

a

State

may

not

constitutionally favor its own residents by taxing foreign
corporations

at

residence

confirmed

is

a

by

rate

solely

a

long

Inc.

v.

line

because
of

of

this

their

Court's

CBses

so

u.s.,

at 119-120: Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, supra,

337

u.s.,

272

u.s.,

holding.

higher

WHYY,

Glassboro,

supra,

393

at 571: Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, supra,
at 511:

u.s.,

at 417.

U. S.

2 58

( 19 6 5)

Southern R.

Co. v. Greene, 'supra,

216

See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380
(per

cur i am) •

As

the

Court

stated

in

Hanover Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens
on business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is
to be classified with domestic corporations of the same

19.

kind."

u.s.,

272

discriminatory
corporations
because

of

at

tax

was

doing

their

In

511.

imposed

business

residence,

all
by

our

rejection

demonstrates

the

of

these

7

in

cases,

State on
the

the

foreign

State

presumably

Lincoln

continuing

the

within

<bmestic industry within the State.
md

of

solely

to promote

Our reliance on them
Western

viability

of

&

Southern

the

Equal

Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that
seeks only to benefit domestic industry within the State

The
Bowers,

State
supra,

contends
shows

that

that

Allied

Stores

of

Ohio

v.

this principle has not always

7Although the promotion of domestic industry was not a
stated purpose advanced by the states in support of their
taxes in these cases, such promotion is logically the
primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such as
~ at issue there.

1\

20.

held true.

In that case, a domestic warehouser challenged

on equal protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted
foreign

corporations

from

a

tax

on

merchandise warehoused within the State.
the tax,

finding

the

value

of

The Court upheld

that the purpose of encouraging foreign

companies to build warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate
state purpose.

The

State contends

that

this case shows

that promotion of domestic industry is a legitimate state
purpose under equal protection analysis.
We disagree with
~ores

the State's interpretation of Allied

and find that the case is not inconsistent with the

other cases on which we rely.

Allied Stores does not hold

that promotion of domestic industry is a legitimate state
purpose.

lfi

4~

faet,

instead

of

being

concerned

with

1\
promotion of domestic industry, it involves a statute that

J

encourages

nonresidents--who

residents--to
Moreover,
not

build

the

favor

are

not

warehouses

discriminatory

competitors

within

taxing

scheme

the

by /\ harming

-State.

involved did

~

residents

of

outsiders;

rather,

it

~-~~

granted the otttslders an exemption that residents did not

"

share.
were

Since the foreign and domestic companies involved
not

competing

to

services, granting the
directly

provide

warehousing

~an

or

exemption did not

~£":h~ companies

A

other

~

subject to the tax.

On its facts, then, Allied Stores is not inconsistent with
our

,1/t..J
wish

here

holding

to

do

that

business

promotion

there,

is

domestic

of

not

a

legitimate

state

~

purpose.

See

358

U.S.,

at

532-533

(JUSTICE

BRENNAN,

concurring) •

..
~"

...

.

22.

J3

The State argues nonetheless that it
a discriminatory tax scheme such as the one at issue here
as

violative

of

the

Equal

Protection Clause . because

i:n-~.-....1-d'e--r-+t.,or--+-brcel'l"n~erlf=-iiHt
~...,r,..,e.,...se.-hidM=enn...._.t-s

~ kt?

approach,

it

~

liMe

contends,

BO

(V\...0

mote

•

c.:r. .

it

This

~~

than

reo at rwc ts(

..d"~~~~~),,

(';::tr; ~ ,"::t~~)~:~:.. ::. ~.,~~ ;:t~
com~ ; ~

by virtl:le

af'e iAapplicahle to the insurance itlaustry

a
.It'\~# ~t!~t .,.;~-~ ~

of Congress Is ~e:!l!! ~ e

the_ McCarran-Fer~ ~

•

.L.I -

...._.

~~~~II"-~

Act,

15

u.s.c.

See

§§1011-1015/

western

~~;

& Southern,

cU- ~~SUL
451

supra,

u.s.,

at

655.

Our

concerns

are

~ more ~~-

,;1.C)

fundamental

than as characterized by the State_,
1\

Although the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts the

insurance

.

~fte-

1ndustry

<)UJ./-

from Commerce Clause

restrictions,

it ~ makes

~~-~to~~ ~a--,~

ab-tiUR~~

d.i-spQRee--wi:tft. the

applicability of the Equal

-'\

Protection Clause,

..

a~ l •

As noted above, our

....
23.

in Western

Southern expressly reaffirmed the viability

&

of equal protection restraints on discriminatory taxes in

~e insurance context. 8
~~)
.!AJrthfir-Htece, the State's view

ignores

the differences

"\
between Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional
provisions serve.

~~

Under the Commerce Claus ~, the State's

interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden the
state law would impose on interstate commerce, iR oyder

J.---

de eEr rn-±"ne

law's

OORQtitHtional~y.

In

the

t~

equal

8 rn

fact,
as
we noted
in Western & South
legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Ac
that
the
Act
was
Congress's
response
only
~utheastern Underwriters~ case, and that Congress
intend thereby to give the States any power to tax or
regulate the insurance industry other than what t~ y had
previously possessed.
Thus Congress expressly left
this Court's decisions holding that the Equal Protection
Clause place ~ limits on a State's a .b ili ty to tax out-ofstate corporations.
See 451 u.s., at 655-656 n. 6 •

.,.

'·'

24.

protection context,

however,

found to be legitimate,

if

the

State 1 s

purpose is

the state law stands as long as

the burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to
that purpose,
western

a

test

& Southern,

protection

challenge

question

of

is

that
supra,
may

rational

~ol--pass.
451

not

u.s.,

prevail

at
so

long

is

relationship

debatable" ) • (!!: us , the-. r-e-i-s- Ile- r:e-a s-on-to

674

"at

See
(equal

as

the
least

be-li--e-v-e-th~

7
purpose tha-t is leg--i-t--imate in-e-n-e-GOfl-t.e-x-t-w&ll-±-d- be found
be leg i t i-ma--t=e---i n-t---h-e-ot 11 e r

---

Moreover ~ dhe
different
scope

of

commerce,

two

functions
a

and

constitutional
in

State 1 s
the

3 .-

the

analysis

power--one
other

provisions
of

the permissible

protects

protects

perform

interstate

persons 9

from

Footnote(s) 9 will appear on following pages.

25.

unconstitutional discrimination by the States.
of the

<Ho ~~ ftat~'Y

~~
)}.Qavier

"

tax

burden

The effect

statute at issue here is to place a
on

foreign

insurers who

~o~

'\

business
placing

within
a

the

burden

State,

on

Protection

Clause,

commerce,

but

thereby

interstate

however,

the

also

commerce.

protects

foreign

unconstitutional discrimination.

incidentally

not

corporation

The

Equal

interstate
from

an

Just because the effect

of the discrimination in this case is similar to the type
of

burden

with

which

the

Commerce

Clause

would

be

concerned does not mean that the statute is not subject to
equal protection restraints.

We reaffirmed the importance

9 It is well established that a corporation is a "person"
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
~
~stern & Southern, supra, 451 u.s., at 660-661, n.l2 •

.
. ';
~

26.

of the Equal Protection Clause in the insurance context in
Western
out

&

of

Southern and

the

see no reason now for

Constitution.

We
the

jeopardize

must

be

reading it

careful

viability

not

the

of

to

equal

protection challenge here, even though the discrimination
an

has

effect

of

traditionally the domain of the Commerce Clause,
there

will

be

cases

Protection Clause
types

of

will

in

the

be

future

needed

unconstitutionally

in

are

that

concerns

implicating

which

because

the

Equal

to guard against other

discriminatory

treatment

of

nonresidents.
In

whatever

light

the

State's

position

is

cast,

acceptance of its view that promotion of domestic industry
is

always

a

legitimate

state

purpose

under

equal

protection analysis would eviscerate the Equal Protection

.•

27.

Clause

in

this

A State's

context.

natural

inclination

will always be to prefer domestic business over foreign.
If we accept the State's view here, then in the future, to
legitimate

the enactment of

any discriminatory

tax,

the

State need only say that it intended thereby to benefit
domestic

industries:

this,

discriminatory tax.

however,

will be true of any

A discriminatory

scheme would stand

or fall depending on how a State framed

its purpose--as

benefitting one group or as harming another.

This is a

distinction without a difference, and one that we rejected
just

last

~rpose

term

in

~ ~O"fA..b ~..- ~ ~
ifi 'holding that 4:lte8t:'ate 1 s

liilaee'A~:tl'! 1

of promoting

~omestic

1ndustty by discriminat:ing

agaiRst RORresideRt business was not legitimate

Commerce Clause.

Bacchus

Imports,

$«.

u.s.,

•

at

[104

.Hk..

s.ct.

Ltd.

v.

tmd~r

Dias,

~ J IMr..t.·

3049,

3057]

&,he

the

supra,

Stat~·~ (t

>

. ..

'
·.·I

28.

pays

analy:!!!i s
~aa l

tO

only l 1p se rv 1ce

to

the e xi:!!ltence o f

ttlte

Protecti on Cl ause as a limi tat ion oa a Sta t e ' s ri ght )

cond iti on

. .b.Js ine ss

~

f ote 1gh

witl:lin

i ts

corpora t 1on ' s

bo rder s ,

a b ili ty

to

-justifying

A--

uo
the

.:::

distinction

between

solely on the ground

foreign

and

domestic

corporations

that it promotes domestic industry

within the State means that any discrimination will pass
nuster under the first. prong of Western

&

Southern's test.

Because almost any purpose--once found to be legitimate-will satisfy the rational relation prong of the test, see

u.s.,

at

limitation

on

451

foreign
permit

674,

a

abolished.

heart

State's

corporations
a

the

will

constitutional
Consequently,

power
be

of
to

the

protection

discriminatorily

eliminated.

restraint
we

equal

hold

to

We
be

that

tax

refuse to

so

lightly

under

the

29.

circumstances of this case, promotion of domestic industry
by harming nonresidents is not a legitimate state purpose.

'!he

second

purpose

found

by

the ..t..r:i:a-1

court

to

be

t\ I\

legitimate was the encouragement of capital investment in
the Alabama assets and governmental securities specified
in

the

statute.

We do not agree

that

this

f3 ~ ~ose

is

~,

a.-

1\ legitimate'\ in tbie
Our

p.r.i.max__'\L..

investment

"'a~e.

.re.aso.o

incentive

fer

~o

provision

-i"lol-ding

of

the

is

tsat

Alabama

~e

statute

never permits foreign insurance companies to eliminate the
discriminatory effect of the statute.
of

their

foreign

assets

they

invest

in

No matter how much

Alabama

_.)

investment&7

insurance companies are still required to pay a

J2J
higher gross premiums tax than domestic companies.

~

·'

' 4;. -

'

'

~,

30.

1stinction

base

remains, despite the investment incentive

the

~
~ favorable

invest any of

~··--

rate of tax regardless of whether they

their

assets

in Alabama . investments • .

1 -..........

ZJ./<o....L...s

A~al\

pure

domestic

insurers who do business in the
incentive
cure,

but

reaffirms,

classification
that

the

statute's

based~sidence.

encouraging

"'

investment

provision,Jdoes

in

impermissible

~e£&fg~,
Alabama

not

Uk(

assets

hold
and

~~A-t~

securities A ~

legitimate state

l\ .l&fwe also note that the Court held in Hanover Fire Ins.
Co.

,,J .. ·~"'

••

l

v.

Harding,
272
u.s. 494 (1926), that
Footnote continued on next page.

foreign

31.

conclude

that

the

Alabama domestic preference tax statute violates the Equal
Protection Clause as applied to appellants.

The judgment

of the Alabama Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is
remanded

for

further

proceedings

not

inconsistent

with

this opinion.

companies are entitled to equal tax treatment even if they
have very little permanent investment in the State.
See
id., at 508-509.
Thus, it is possible that encouraging
Investment in state assets may never be a state purpose
that will withstand equal protection scrutiny.

·'

"'r

-

·...---

-..._

5~.e.d..v~
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METROPOLITAN

LIFE

INSURANCE CO.,

et al.,

APPELLANTS,

v.

W.G. WARD, JR., et al.

APPEAL FROM THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT

[November

__,

1984]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

This
domestic

case

presents

the

question

preference . tax statute,

Ala.

whether
Code

Alabama's

§§27-4-4 and

27-4-5, which taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a

2.

higher

rate

than

domestic

insurance

companies,

violates

the Equal Protection Clause.
I

Since

1955,

1

the

State

of

Alabama

has

granted

a

preference to its domestic insurance companies by imposing
a substantially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than .
rn out-of-state

(foreign)

companies.

2

Under

the current

1 The
origins
of
Alabama's
domestic
preference
tax
statute date back to 1849, when the first tax on premiums
earned by insurance companies doing business in the state
was limited to companies not chartered by the state.
Act
No. 1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5.
A domestic preference tax was
imposed on and off throughout the years until 1945, when
the State restored equality in taxation of insurance
oompanies in response to this Court's decision in United
9:ates v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 u.s. 533
(19 4 4) • Act No . lS 6 [ 19 4 5 ) Ala • Acts 19 6 -19 7 • In 19 55 ,
the tax was reinstated, Act No. 77 [ 1955] Ala. Acts 193
(2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amendments, has remained in
effect until the present.
2

For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a
domestic insurer as a company that both is incorporated in
Alabama and has its principal off ice and chief place of
business within the State.
Ala. Code §27-4-1(3).
A
oorporation that does not meet both of these criteria is
maracterized as a foreign insurer.
~ §27-4-1(2).

.,
I

'·

3.

statutory provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay
a

tax

on

conducted

their
in

gross

Alabama

premiums
at

a

received

rate

of

from

three

business

percent,

and

foreign companies selling other types of insurance pay at
a

rate

of

four

Ala.

percent.

domestic insurance companies,

Code

§27-4-5 (a} • 3

company

doing

the

As
same

a

result,

type

All

in contrast, pay at a rate

of only one percent on all types of
Id.'

§27-4-4(a}.

and

a

insurance premiums.
foreign

volume

of

insurance

business

in

Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay three to
four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its domestic

3

There
are
two
exceptions
to
these
general
rules
concerning the rates of taxation of insurance companies.
They are that for annuities, the tax rate is one percent
for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code §27-44(a}, and for wet marine and transportation insurance, the
rate is three-quarters of one percent for both foreign and
domestic insurance companies, id., §27-4-6(a}.

4.

competitor.
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide
that

foreign

companies

may

reduce

the

differential

in

gross premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages
of

their

Alabama.
more

of

example,

worldwide
Id.,

assets

§27-4-4(b).

its

total

assets

a

foreign

life

in

specified

By

investing

in

Alabama

insurer

may

investments

in

ten percent or

investments,
reduce

premiums tax rate from three to two percent.

its

for
gross

Similarly, a

foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its tax
rate from four

Smaller tax reductions

to three percent.

are available based on investment of smaller percentages
of a company's assets.
total

assets

investments,

a

Id.

foreign

however,

it

Regardless of how much of its
company
can

invests

never

reduce

in

Alabama

its

gross

'.

·'

..

5.

premiums

tax

rate

to the

same

level paid by comparable

domestic companies, which are entitled to the one percent
tax rate even if they have no investments in the State.
'lhus,

the

investment provision permits foreign
but

to

reduce,

discrimination

inherent

companies

in

to

never
the

domestic

insurance

eliminate,

the

preference

tax

statute.
II
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated
outside

of

the

State of Alabama,

Alabama Department of

filed

claims with the

Insurance in 1981, contending that

the domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them,
violated the Equal Protection Clause.
of taxes paid for

They sought refunds

the tax years 1977 through 1980.

The

,v

.•

6.

Commissioner of

Insurance denied all of their claims on

July 8, 1981.
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County,

seeking

unconstitutional
the

appropriate

a

judgment declaring

and

requiring

the

the

Commissioner

Several

refunds.

statute

domestic

to be

to make
companies

intervened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals,
selecting
binding
judgment,
statute

two

claims

as

lead

on all claimants.
the
was

court

ruled

constitutional.

cases

4

to

be

On cross-motions
on

May

17,

Relying

tried
for

1982,
on

this

and

summary

that

the

Court's

opinion in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Board

4Metropolitan
Life
Insurance
Company,
a
New
York
corporation, was chosen to represent the life insurance
claimants, and Prudential Property and Casualty Company, a
New Jersey corporation, was chosen as representative of
the non-life claimants. See App. 314-315.

)·.·

'

..

'··

'"

7.

of Equalization, 451

u.s.

648 (1981), the court ruled that

the Alabama statute did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause

because

it

served

addition to raising revenue:

"at

least

two

purposes,

in

(1) encouraging the formation

of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) encouraging
capital

investment by foreign

Alabama

assets

the

insurance companies in the

and governmental

statute."

App.

to

Juris.

securities set
Statement

forth

20a-2la.

in
The

court also found that the distinction the statute created
between

foreign

and

domestic

companies

was

rationally

related to those purposes and that the Alabama legislature
could

reasonably

have

believed

that

would have promoted those purposes.
After
appellants

f' • . . •
\

•

t .•.

<

~

-l

their

motion

appealed

to

for
the

a

classification

Id., at 2la.

new

Court

the

of

trial
Civil

was

denied,

Appeals.

It

8.

affirmed the circuit court's findings as to the existence
of

legitimate

state

purposes,

but

remanded

for

an

evidentiary hearing on the issue of rational relationship,
ruling

that

summary

judgment

was

inappropriate

question because the evidence was in conflict.

on

that

Appellants

petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for certiorari on
the affirmance of the legitimate state purpose issue, and
the State and the intervenors petitioned for review of the
Appellants

remand order.

then waived their right to an

evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the statute's
classification

bore

a

rational

relationship

to

the

two

purposes found by the circuit court to be legitimate, and
they requested a final determination of the legal issues
with respect
statute.

to

The

their
supreme

equal protection challenge to the
court

denied

certiorari

on

all

9.

Appellants

claims.

again

waived

their

rights

to

an

evidentiary hearing on the rational relationship issue and
filed

a

joint

motion

with

the

rehearing and entry of a final
granted,

and

intervenors.

other

parties

judgment.

judgment was entered for

seeking

The motion was

the State and the

This appeal followed, and we noted probable

u.s.

jurisdiction.

(1984).

We now reverse.

III
Prior to our decision in Western
Co.

v.

State

Board

of

&

Southern Life Ins.

Equalization,

supra,

the

jurisprudence of the applicability of the Equal Protection
Clause

to

checkered
Read, 325

discriminatory
history.

u.s.

tax

Lincoln

statutes

National

had

Life

a
Ins.

somewhat
Co.

v.

673 (1945), held that so-called "privilege"

taxes, required to be paid by a foreign corporation before

10.

it would be permitted to do business within a state, were
immune from equal protection challenge.

That case stood

in stark contrast, however, to the Court's prior decisions
in Southern R.

Co.

v.

Greene,

u.s.

216

Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272
well

as

to

later

decisions,

in

400

u.s.

which

(1910),

and

494 (1926), as
the

Court

had

recognized that the Equal Protection Clause placed limits
on other forms of discriminatory taxation imposed on outof-state corporations solely because of their residence.
See, e.g., WHYY,
Allied

Stores,

(1959);

Inc. v. Glassboro,
Inc.

Wheeling

of

Steel

Ohio
Corp.

393

u.s.

117 (1968);

v.

Bowers,

358

u.s.

522

v.

Glander,

337

u.s.

562

(1949).
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these
cases

for

the

purpose of deciding

whether

to permit an

·'

11.

equal

protection

challenge

to

a

California

statute

imposing a retaliatory tax on foreign insurance companies
doing business within the State, when the horne states of
those

companies

insurers

imposed

entering

their

a

similar
borders.

tax
We

on

California

concluded

that

Lincoln was no more than "a surprising throwback" to the
days before enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and in
which incorporation of a domestic corporation or entry of
a

foreign

one

had

been

granted

only

as

a

matter

privilege by the State in its unfettered discretion.

u.s.,

at 665.

of
451

We therefore rejected the longstanding but

"anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and explicitly held that
the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits upon a State's
power to condition the right of a foreign corporation to
do

~·

business

within

its

borders.

We

held

that

"[w]e

12.

consider it now established that, whatever the extent of a
State's

authority

to

exclude

foreign

doing business within its boundaries,
not

justify

burdens

on

imposition
foreign

and

more

unless

domestic

than

the

taxes
those

corporations

evidentiary

appellants
hearing

classification
statute

bears

in
a

waived

on

the

the

Alabama

rational

bears

other

imposed

on

issue

right
of

domestic
to

a

rational

!d., at 667-668.

their

relation

or

discrimination between

relation to a legitimate state purpose."
Because

from

that authority does

onerous

corporations

domestic corporations,
foreign

of

corporations

to

an

whether

the

preference

tax

the

two

purposes

sought to be accomplished, the only question before us is
W:lether

those

purposes

found

by

the

trial

court

5

Footnote(s) 5 will appear on following pages.

are

13.

legitimate.
A

The first of the purposes found by the trial court to
be

a

legitimate

between

foreign

encourages

the

reason for
and

domestic

formation

companies in Alabama.

the statute's classification

of

corporations
new

is

domestic

that

it

insurance

The State contends that this Court

has long held that the promotion of domestic industry, in
and of

itself,

is a

legitimate state purpose

survive equal protection scrutiny.

5

that will

In so contending,

it

Altogether, the State and the intervenors have compiled
a list of 17 state purposes they contend are served by the
statute
and
are
legitimate
under
equal
protection
analysis.
See App. 27-33.
we decline to review any of
those except the two found by the circuit court to be
legitimate, as they are not before us, but remand to that
court for a determination of whether any of them is
legitimate and rationally related to the classification
set forth in the statute.

14.

relies on a series of cases, including Western & Southern,
that

have

upheld

discriminatory

Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, __ U.S.

See

taxes.

Bacchus

__ ( 1984) ; Pike v. Bruce

Church, Inc., 397 u.s. 137 (1970); Allied Stores, Inc. of
Ohio

v.

Bowers,

supra;

(1943) ; Carmichael v.
495

Parker

Brown,

v.

Southern Coal

( 193 7) ; Board of Education v.

&

317

u.s.

341

Coke Co., 301 U.s.

Illinois, 203 U.S.

553

(1906).
The

cases

State's

cited

contention.

lend

little

In

western

or

no

support

& Southern,

to

the

the
case

principally relied upon, we did not hold that promotion of
domestic
tmder

industry

is

always

a

equal · protection analysis.

legitimate
6

Rather,

state purpose
we held

that

Gwe find the other cases relied on by the State also to
~ inapposite to this inquiry.
Bacchus Imports, Pike, and
Footnote continued on next page.

~..,,·to:;~
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:
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,
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15.

California's purpose

in enacting

the retaliatory tax--to

Parker discussed whether promotion of local industry is a
valid state purpose under the Commerce Clause.
The
Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is
integrally
concerned
with
whether
a
state
purpose
implicates
local
or
national
interests.
The
Equal
Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned with whether
a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether
the discrimination involves local or other interests is
not central to the inquiry to be made.
Thus, the fact
that promotion of local industry is a legitimate state
interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about
its validity under equal protection analysis.
See infra,
at
•
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's
chili ty to promote domestic industry was unlimited, even
mder the Commerce Clause.
Thus, in Bacchus, although we
observed as a general matter that "a State may enact laws
p..trsuant to its police powers that have the purpose and
effect of promoting domestic industry," __ u.s. ----l
(1984) ,we held
that
in so doing,
a State may not
constitutionally impose a discriminatory burden upon the
business of other States, merely to protect and promote
local business, id., at
•
Accord Armco Inc. v.
Hardesty, __ U.S.- ,
-rr984).
Likewise, in Pike,
the Court held
that
the state statute promoting a
legitimate local interest must "regulate evenhandedly."
397 u.s. 137, 142 (1970).
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to
the
legitimacy of promoting
local business at all.
Carmichael relates primarily to the validity of a state
unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Education
deals with
the State's ability to regulate matters
relating to probate.
Bowers is the only one of the
State's cases that involves the validity under the Equal
Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis
of residence of domestic versus foreign corporations.
That case does little, however, to support the State's
Footnote continued on next page.

16.

promote

the

deterring

interstate business of domestic

other

States

from

enacting

excessive taxes--was a legitimate one.
In contrast,

Alabama

asks

us

insurers by

discriminatory

u.s.,

451

to approve

or

at 668.

its purpose of

promoting the business of its domestic insurers in Alabama
by

penalizing

foreign

business in the State.

insurers

who

also

want

to

do

Alabama has made no at tempt,

as

California did, to influence the policies of other States
in order
operate

to enhance
interstate;

its

domestic

rather,

foreign companies who wish

ability

to

barriers

to

to do interstate business

in

it

companies'

has

erected

order to improve its domestic insurers' ability to compete

contention that promotion of domestic business is a
concerned
with
legitimate
state
purpose.
It
was
encouraging
nonresidents--who are not competitors of
See
residents--to build warehouses within the State.
infra, at
•

',

17.

at home.
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in
the fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry
is purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to
favor domestic industry within the State, no matter what
the

cost

business

to

foreign

constitutes

discrimination
intended

to

that

the

the

prevent.

Justice

Harlan,

observed

Stores,

Inc. of Ohio v.

very

Equal

As

also

his

Bowers,

sort

to

contrary
of

Protection

JUSTICE
in

seeking

purpose,

Alabama's

there.

California's,

corporations

BRENNAN,

do
to

parochial
Clause
joined

concurrence

in

was
by

Allied

supra, this Court always

has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a State
to

discriminate

burdening

"the

in

favor

residents

of
of

its own residents
other

state

soley by

members

of

our

18.

federation."
tax

involved

u.s.,

358

at

in Western

&

Unlike

533.

Southern,

the

which

retaliatory

only burdens

residents of a State that imposes its own discriminatory
tax on outsiders,

the domestic preference tax gives the

"home

advantage

team"

an

by

burdening

all

foreign

corporations seeking to do business within the State, no
matter what they or their States do.
The

validity

of

the

view

that

a

State

may

not

constitutionally favor its own residents by taxing foreign
corporations

at

residence

confirmed

is

cases so holding.
119-120;

Wheeling

a

higher

WHYY,

by

rate
a

solely

long

line

because
of

this

Inc. v. Glassboro, 393

Steel Corp.

v.

Glander,

571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272
Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216

u.s.,

at 417.

337

u.s.,

of

their

Court's

u.s.,

at

u.s.,

at

at 511;

See Reserve

19.

Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380

u.s.

258 (1965)

(per curiam).

As the Court stated in Hanover Fire Ins. Co., with respect
to

general

corporation
domestic
511.

tax

burdens

stands

equal,

corporations

In all of

imposed

by

business

the

within

of

on
and
the

these cases,
State
the

on
State

"the

business,
is
same

to be

foreign

classified

kind."

272

with

u.s.,

at

the discriminatory tax was
foreign
solely

corporations

doing

because

their

of

residence, presumably to promote domestic industry within
the

State.

7

Our

reliance

on

them

and

our

rejection of

Uncoln in Western & Southern demonstrates the continuing
viability of

the

Equal Protection Clause as

a means of

7Although the promotion of domestic industry was not a
purpose advanced by the states in support of their taxes
in these cases, such promotion is logically the primary
reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such as those at
issue there.

20.

challenging
industry

a

statute

within

the

that

State

seeks
only

to
by

benefit

domestic

burdening

foreign

competitors.
The

State

Bowers,
held

contends

supra,

true.

challenged

shows
In

on

that

that

equal

that

Allied

Stores

of

Ohio

v.

this principle has not always

case,

a

protection

domestic
grounds

an

merchandiser
Ohio statute

that exempted foreign corporations from a tax on the value
of

merchandise

Court

upheld

held
the

for
tax,

storage within
finding

that

the
the

State.
purpose

The
of

encouraging foreign companies to build warehouses within
Ohio was a legitimate state purpose.

The State contends

that this case shows that promotion of domestic industry
is

a

legitimate

state

purpose

under

equal

protection

analysis.

..
''
'.

21.

We disagree with
~ores

the State's interpretation of Allied

and find that the case is not inconsistent with the

other cases on which we rely.

Allied Stores does not hold

that promotion of domestic industry is a legitimate state
purpose.

Rather,

instead

of

being

concerned

with

promotion of domestic industry, it involves a statute that
encourages

nonresidents--who

residents--to

build

Moreover,

the

not

residents

favor

granted

the

discriminatory
by

were

competitors
the

within

taxing

burdening

nonresident

involved

not

warehouses

residents did not share.
companies

are

scheme

an

State.

involved did

outsiders;

businesses

of

rather,

exemption

it
that

Since the foreign and domestic
not

competing

to

provide

warehousing services, granting the former an exemption did
not

directly

affect

adversely

·•'

.. .

'

the

domestic

companies

22.

subject to the tax.

On its facts, then, Allied Stores is

not inconsistent with our holding here that promotion of
domestic
against
there,

industry
foreign

within

a

State,

corporations

that

by
wish

is not a legitimate state purpose.

discriminating
to

do

business

See 358 u.s.,

at 532-533 (JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring).
B

The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible
to view a

discriminatory tax

issue here as
This

~e

approach,

it

contends,

amounts

because Congress,

to

no

more

than

in equal protection clothing."

Brief for Appellee Ward, p. 22.

u.S. C.

the one at

violative of the Equal Protection Clause.

"Commerce Clause rhetoric

"' 15

such as

~

~

The State maintains that

in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act,

§§1011-1015,

intended

to

authorize

States

to

\\

..

'

•,

~·

23.

impose

that

taxes

burden

insurance field,

the tax at

concerns

much

are

interstate

commerce

in

issue here must stand.

more

fundamental

than

the
Our

L1frt.4

as

y~

characterized

by

the

State.

Although

the

McCar ran-

~J..r,
lfl

St:J ,..

Ferguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Commerce
Clause restrictions,

it does not purport to limit in

way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause.
noted above,

our opinion in Western

&

an~
As

Southern expressly

reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on
discriminatory taxes in the insurance context. 8

8

In fact,
as
we noted
in Western & Southern,
the
legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals
that the Act was Congress's response only to the SouthEastern Underwriters case, and that Congress did not
intend thereby to give the States any power to tax or
regulate the insurance industry other than what they had
previously
possessed.
Thus
Congress
expressly
left
undisturbed this Court's decisions holding that the Equal
Protection Clause places limits on a State's ability to
tax out-of-state corporations.
See 451 u.s., at 655 n. 6.

'··

'

24.

Moreover,
~tween

the

State's

view

ignores

the

differences

Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and

the consequent different purposes those two constitutional
provisions
State's

serve.

interest,

Under
if

Commerce

legitimate,

Clause

analysis,

the

is weighed against the

burden the state law would impose on interstate commerce.
In the equal protection context, however,

if the State's

purpose is found to be legitimate, the state law stands as
long as the burden it imposes
related to that purpose,
pass.

See Western

protection
question
debatable'"

&

challenge
of

a test that is not difficult to
451

may

prevail

not

relationship

United

States

Co • , 3 0 4 U• S . 14 4 , 15 4 ( 19 3 8) ) •

.; l-.r.

u.s.,

Southern,

rational
(quoting

is found to be rationally

v.

so
is

at

674

long
"'at

Carolene

(equal
as

the

least
Products

25.

The

two

functions

constitutional

in the

provisions

analysis of

State's power--one protects
other

protects

persons

the permissible

foreign
State,

interstate

scope of a

9

from

and the

unconstitutional

The effect of the statute

is to place a discriminatory tax burden on

insurers
thereby

different

interstate commerce,

discrimination by the States.
at issue here

perform

who

also

desire

to

do

incidentally

commerce.

business

placing

~
~
because

the

a

within

the

burden

on

effect

of

the

type

of

1\

discrimination

in

this

case

is

similar

to

the

~
burden with which the Commerce Clause would be concerned
'\

does

not

mean

that

the

statute

is

not

subject

to equal

9 It is well established that a corporation is a "person"
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
~,
western & Southern, 451 u.s., at 660 n.l2.

26.

protection

We

restraints.

reaffirmed
in the

the

the Equal

Protection Clause

Western

Southern and see no reason now

importance of

insurance context in

~~~
&

In

whatever

acceptance of
is

always

light

its~

a

the

State's

fo ~

r-eading it

position

is

~

cast,

that promotion of domestic industry

legitimate

state

purpose

under

equal

protection analysis would eviscerate the Equal Protection
Clause

in

this

~ 2~s~be

domestic

context.

I' • \.

~

natural

.

. ~q~~-

lnCllnatloH. 1 ~

to prefer domestic business over foreign.

~.

~aus..t:J>i.@-&7

diS'Criminatory taa.

,'~

A State's

t:hi-8, -Aowever,

A discriminatory

~~ill

lee tn:te e£ any

~

e would stand

27.

or fall depending
beneE..i tt i ng

~ate

group or

Gne

framed

its purpose.- as

harmiRg anot:fier.

as

This

r

is a

distinction without a difference, and one that we rejected
~ last

term in an analogous context arising under the

Commerce Clause.
at

Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,

n.6

See

case,

, ~e

promotion

u.s.,

supra.

restraint
Consequent!

__

to

be

so

lightly

hold that under the circumstances of this
of

domestic

~

'\ 1n

us~

nonresidents is not a legitimate state purpose.

IV
The

second

purpose

found

by

the

courts

below

to

be

legitimate was the encouragement of capital investment in
the Alabama assets and governmental securities specified
in the statute.

We do not agree that this is a legitimate

\

;;

28.

state
the

The

purpose.

Alabama

companies

statute

to

statute.

investment

incentive

provision of

~~t-~
~ver

eliminate

the

permits

foreign

insurance

discriminatory effect of

the

No matter how much of their assets they invest

in Alabama, foreign insurance companies are still required
to

pay

a

higher

companies. 10

gross

premiums

Moreover,

domestic

entitled to the more favorable
whether

they

investment

10

invest

incentive

in

than

domestic

insurers

remain

rate of tax regardless of

Alabama

provision

tax

assets.

therefore

The
does

State's

not

cure,

section 27-4-4 (b) of the Alabama Code provides that by
investing ten percent or more of its total assets in
Alabama investments, a foreign life insurer may reduce its
gross premiums tax rate from three to two percent, and a
foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its rate
from four to three percent.
Domestic insurers of all
types, on the other hand, are required to pay tax at a
rate of one percent, regardless of whether they invest in
the specified Alabama investments.
See id., §27-4-5.

"

.

29.

but reaffirms,
based

solely

investment

the statute's impermissible classification
on

in

residence.

Alabama

We

assets

plainly discriminatory manner

hold
and

that

encouraging

securities

in

this

serves no legitimate state

purpose. 11

v
We conclude

that

the

Alabama domestic

preference

tax

statute violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to
appellants.

The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is

reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.

11
we note that Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 u.s.
494, 508-509 (1926), in holding that foreign companies are
entitled to equal tax treatment even if they have very
little permanent investment in the State, also casts some
doubt on the legitimacy of Alabama's investment incentive
provision.

LL(V\liC<. 5iMfSOI\
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__,

1984]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

This
domestic

case

presents

preference

tax

the

question

statute,

Ala.

whether
Code

Alabama's

§§27-4-4 and

27-4-5, which taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a

2.

higher

rate

than

domestic

insurance

companies,

violates

the Equal Protection Clause.
I

Since

1

1955,

the

State

of

Alabama

has

granted

a

preference to its domestic insurance companies by imposing
a substantially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than
m

out-of-state

(foreign)

2

companies.

Under

the current

statutory provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay
a

tax

on

conducted

their
in

gross

Alabama

premiums
at

a

received

rate

of

three

from

business

percent,

and

foreign companies selling other types of insurance pay at
a

rate

of

four

Ala.

percent.

domestic insurance companies,

Code

{1'... " ·!:'-lr

.

!

§27-4-5 (a) •

3

As

a

All

in contrast, pay at a rate

of only one percent on all types of
.Id. ,

§27-4-4(a).

result,

a

insurance premiums.
foreign

insurance

. .to:.

0

'

··~

•
~,.

.

3.

company

doing

the

same

type

a.nd

volume

of

business

in

Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay three to
four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its domestic
competitor.
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide
that

foreign

gross premiums
of

their

Alabama.
more

of

example,

companies
taxes by

worldwide

!d.,

may

reduce

the

differential

in

investing prescribed percentages

assets

§27-4-4(b).

its

total

assets

a

foreign

life

in

specified

By

investing

in

Alabama

insurer

may

investments

in

ten percent or

investments,
reduce

premiums tax rate from three to two percent.

its

for
gross

Similarly, a

foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its tax
rate from four

to three percent.

Smaller tax reductions

are available based on investment of smaller percentages

~..;:·;, ~~t~ ·'

~

'

f·

4.

of a company's assets.
total

assets

a

investments,
premiums

Id.

foreign

however,

tax

Regardless of how much of its

rate

to

company

it
the

can
same

invests

never

in

reduce

level paid

Alabama

its

gross

by comparable

domestic companies, which are entitled to the one percent
tax rate even if
Thus,

the

companies

they have no investments in the State.

investment provision permits foreign
to

discrimination

reduce,

but

inherent

in

never
the

to

domestic

insurance

eliminate,
preference

the
tax

statute.
II
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated
outside

of

the

State of Alabama,

Alabama Department of

filed

claims with the

Insurance in 1981, contending that

the domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them,

•..

.,

5.

violated the Equal Protection Clause.
of taxes paid
Commissioner

for
of

the

They sought refunds

tax years 1977 through 1980.

Insurance denied

all of

The

their claims on

.l..Ily 8, 1981.
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County,

seeking

unconstitutional
the

appropriate

a

judgment

and

declaring

requiring

the

the

Commissioner

Several

refunds.

statute

domestic

to be

to

make

companies

mtervened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals,
selecting
binding
judgment,
statute

two
on

claims

all
the

was

as

lead

claimants.
court

ruled

constitutional.

cases

4

to

be

On cross-motions
on

May

17,

Relying

tried
for

1982,
on

this

and

summary

that

the

Court's

opinion in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Board
of Equalization, 451

.

~,

u.s.

648 (1981), the court ruled that

6.

the Alabama statute did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause

because

it

served

"at

addition to raising revenue:

least

two

purposes,

in

(1) encouraging the formation

of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) encouraging
capital

investment by foreign insurance companies in the

Alabama

assets

the

and

statute."

governmental

App.

to

securities

Juris.

set

Statement

forth

20a-2la.

in
The

court also found that the distinction the statute created
between

foreign

and

domestic

companies

was

rationally

related to those purposes and that the Alabama legislature
could

reasonably

have

believed

that

would have promoted those purposes.
After
appellants

their

motion

appealed

to

for
the

a

classification

Id., at 2la.

new

Court

the

of

trial

was

denied,

Civil

Appeals.

It

affirmed the circuit court's findings as to the existence

.
'

'

..

.

7.

of

legitimate

state

purposes,

but

remanded

for

an

evidentiary hearing on the issue of rational relationship,
ruling

that

summary

judgment

was

inappropriate

question because the evidence was in conflict.

on

that

Appellants

petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for certiorari on
ilie affirmance of the legitimate state purpose issue, and
the State and the intervenors petitioned for review of the
remand order.

Appellants

then waived

their

right

to an

evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the statute's
classification

bore

a

rational

relationship

to

the

two

purposes found by the circuit court to be legitimate, and
they requested a final determination of the legal issues
with

respect

statute.
claims.

The

to

their

supreme

Appellants

equal protection challenge to the
court

again

denied

waived

certiorari
their

rights

on
to

all
an

8.

evidentiary hearing on the rational relationship issue and
filed

a

joint

motion

with

the

rehearing and entry of a final
granted,

and

other

judgment.

judgment was entered for

intervenors.

parties

seeking

The motion was

the State and the

This appeal followed, and we noted probable

u.s.

jurisdiction.

(1984).

We now reverse.

III
Prior to our decision in Western
Co.

v.

State

Board

&

Southern Life Ins.

Equalization,

of

supra,

the

jurisprudence of the applicability of the Equal Protection
Clause

to

checkered
Read, 325

discriminatory
history.

u.s.

tax

Lincoln

statutes

National

had

Life

a
Ins.

somewhat
Co.

v.

673 (1945), held that so-called "privilege"

taxes, required to be paid by a foreign corporation before
it would be permitted to do business within a state, were

··,

9.

immune from equal protection challenge.

That case stood

in stark contrast, however, to the Court's prior decisions
:in

Southern R.

Co.

v.

Greene,

u.s.

216

Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272
well

as

to

later

decisions,

in

400

u.s.

which

(1910),

and

494 (1926), as
the

Court

had

recognized that the Equal Protection Clause placed limits
on other forms of discriminatory taxation imposed on outof-state corporations solely because of their residence.
See,

~

Allied

WHYY,

Stores,

(1959);

Inc. v. Glassboro,
Inc.

Wheeling

of

Steel

Ohio
Corp.

v.

393

u.s.

Bowers,

v • . Glander,

117

(1968);

358

u.s.

522

337

u.s.

562

(1949).
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these
cases
equal

....

.

;
,......
..

for

the

purpose of deciding whether

protection

challenge

to

a

to permit an

California

statute

10.

imposing a retaliatory tax on foreign insurance companies
doing business within the State, when the home states of
those

companies

insurers

imposed

entering

their

a

similar

borders.

tax
We

on

California

concluded

that

Uncoln was no more than "a surprising throwback" to the
days before enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and in
which incorporation of a domestic corporation or entry of
a

foreign

one

had

been

granted

only

as

a

matter

privilege by the State in its unfettered discretion.

u.s.,

at 665.

of
451

We therefore rejected the longstanding but

"anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and explicitly held that
the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits upon a State's
power to condition the right of a foreign corporation to
do

business

within

its

borders.

we

held

that

"[w]e

consider it now established that, whatever the extent of a

11.

State's

authority

to

exclude

foreign

corporations

from

doing business within its boundaries, that authority does
not

justify

burdens

on

imposition
foreign

and

more

onerous

corporations

domestic corporations,
foreign

of

unless

domestic

than

those

corporations

evidentiary

hearing

classification
statute

bears

waived

appellants

in
a

on

the

the

Alabama

rational

or

other

imposed

on

the discrimination between
bears

of

domestic

relation

to

rational

at 667-668.

right

their
issue

a

~

relation to a legitimate state purpose."
Because

taxes

to

an

whether

the

preference

tax

the

two

purposes

sought to be accomplished, the only question before us is
\\hether

those

purposes

found

legitimate.
A

by

the

trial

court

5

are

12.

The first of the purposes found by the trial court to
be a

legitimate

between

reason

foreign

encourages

and

the

for

the

domestic

formation

companies in Alabama.

of

statute's classification
corporations
new

is

domestic

that

it

insurance

The State contends that this Court

has long held that the promotion of domestic industry, in
and

of

itself,

is a

legitimate state purpose

survive equal protection scrutiny.

that will

In so contending,

it

relies on a series of cases, including Western & Southern,
that

have

upheld

discriminatory

u.s.

Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,
Church,
Ohio

v.

Inc., 397

u.s.

Bowers,

supra;

(1943); Carmichael v.

taxes.

See

Bacchus

(1984); Pike v. Bruce

137 (1970); Allied Stores, Inc. of

u.s.

341

Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301

u.s .

.'

Parker

v.

Brown,

317

'

..
'•

'

.

13.

495

(1937):

Board of Education v.

Illinois, 203

u.s.

553

to

the

(1906).
The

cases

State's

cited

lend

little

In

Western

contention.

or

no

support

& Southern,

the

case

principally relied upon, we did not hold that promotion of
domestic
mder

industry

is

always

a

legitimate

equal protection analysis.

California's purpose
promote

the

deterring

6

state

Rather,

we held

States

from

enacting

excessive taxes--was a legitimate one.
In contrast,

that

in enacting the retaliatory tax--to

interstate business of domestic

other

purpose

Alabama

asks

us

insurers by

discriminatory

u.s.,

451

to approve

or

at 668.

its purpose of

promoting the business of its domestic insurers in Alabama
by

penalizing

business

foreign

in the State.

insurers

who

also

want

to

do

Alabama has made no at tempt,

as

...

14.

California did, to influence the policies of other States
in order
operate

to

enhance

interstate;

its

domestic

rather,

foreign companies who wish

ability

to

barriers

to

to do interstate business

in

it

companies'

has

erected

order to improve its domestic insurers' ability to compete
at horne.
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in
the fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry
is purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to
favor domestic industry within the State, no matter what
the

cost

business

to

foreign

there.

California's,

to

Alabama's

constitutes

discrimination
intended

corporations

that

prevent.

the
As

the
Equal

also

seeking

purpose,
very

sort

contrary
of

Protection

JUSTICE

to

BRENNAN,

do
to

parochial
Clause
joined

was
by

15.

Justice
~ores,

Harlan,

observed

Inc. of Ohio v.

in

his

concurrence

in

Allied

Bowers, supra, this Court always

has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a State
to

discriminate

burdening

"the

federation."
tax

involved

in

favor

of

residents

u.s.,

358

in Western

of
at
&

its own residents soley by
other
533.

state
Unlike

Southern,

members
the

which

of

our

retaliatory

only

burdens

residents of a State that imposes its own discriminatory
tax on outsiders,

the domestic preference tax gives

"home

advantage

team"

an

by

burdening

all

the

foreign

corporations seeking to do business within the State, no
matter what they or their States do.
The

validity

of

the

view

that

a

State

may

not

constitutionally favor its own residents by taxing foreign
corporations

•

.

.

,t,.

at

a

higher

rate

solely

because

of

their

16.

residence

is

confirmed

cases so holding.
119-120:

by

WHYY,

Wheeling

Steel

a

long

Inc.

line

of

this

Court's

v. Glassboro, 393 u.s., at

Corp.

v.

Glander,

337

u.s.,

at

571: Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 u.s., at 511:
Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 u.s., at 417.

See Reserve

Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380 u.S. 258 (1965)

(per curiam) •

As the Court stated in Hanover Fire Ins. Co., with respect
to

general

corporation
domestic
511.

tax

burdens

stands

equal,

corporations

of

on
and
the

In all of these cases,

imposed
business

by

the

within

State
the

on
State

business,
is
same

to

be

kind.

11

foreign

the

classified
11

272

with

u.s.,

at

the discriminatory tax was
foreign
solely

corporations

doing

because

their

of

residence, presumably to promote domestic industry within
the

State. 7 Our

reliance

on

them

and

our

rejection

of

;

'

}.

17.

Lincoln in Western & Southern demonstrates the continuing
viability of
challenging
industry

the
a

Equal

statute

within

the

Protection Clause as a means of
that

State

seeks
only

to
by

benefit

domestic

burdening

foreign

competitors.
The

State

Bowers,
held

supra,

true.

challenged

contends
shows
In

on

that

that

equal

that

Allied

Stores

of

Ohio

v.

this principle has not always

case,

a

protection

domestic
grounds

an

merchandiser
Ohio statute

that exempted foreign corporations from a tax on the value
of

merchandise

Court

upheld

held
the

for

storage

within

tax,

finding

that

the
the

State.
purpose

The
of

encouraging foreign companies to build warehouses within
Ohio was a legitimate state purpose.

The State contends

that this case shows that promotion of domestic industry

18.

is

a

legitimate

state

purpose

under

equal

protection

analysis.
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied
~ores

and find that the case is not inconsistent with the

other cases on which we rely.

Allied Stores does not hold

that promotion of domestic industry is a legitimate state
purpose.

Rather,

instead

of

being

concerned

with

promotion of domestic industry, it involves a statute that
encourages

nonresidents--who

residents--to

build

Moreover,

the

not

residents

favor

granted

the

discriminatory
by

were

competitors
the

within

taxing

burdening

nonresident

involved

not

warehouses

residents did not share.
companies

are

scheme

outsiders:

businesses

an

of

State.

involved did
rather,

exemption

it
that

Since the foreign and domestic
not

competing

to

provide

.•

'...

19.

warehousing services, granting the former an exemption did
not

directly

affect

rubject to the tax.

adversely

the

domestic

companies

On its facts, then, Allied Stores is

not inconsistent with our holding here that promotion of
domestic
against
there,

industry
foreign

within

a

corporations

State,
that

by
wish

is not a legitimate state purpose.

discriminating
to

do

business

See 358

u.s.,

at 532-533 (JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring).
B

The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible
to view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here
as

violative

approach,
Clause

the

it contends,

rhetoric

Appellee Ward,

...

of

Equal

Protection

Clause.

This

amounts to no more than "Commerce

in equal protection clothing." Brief for
p.

22 .

The State maintains that because

20.

Congress, in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15

u.s.c.

§§1011-1015,

intended to authorize States to impose taxes

that

interstate commerce

burden

the tax at issue here must stand.
more

fundamental

than

as

in

the

insurance field,

Our concerns are much

characterized

by

Although the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts
industry

from Commerce Clause

the

the

restrictions,

State.

insurance

it does not

purport to limit in any way the applicability of the Equal
Protection Clause.
&

Southern

protection

As noted above, our opinion in Western

expressly
restraints

reaffirmed
on

the

viability

discriminatory

taxes

of
in

equal
the

insurance context. 8
Moreover,

the

State's

view

ignores

the

differences

between Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional

.. ·~

.
'

~

'.

.

21.

provisions
State's

Under

serve.

interest,

if

Commerce

legitimate,

Clause

analysis,

the

is weighed against

the

burden the state law would impose on interstate commerce.
In the equal protection context, however,

if the State's

purpose is found to be legitimate, the state law stands as
long as the burden it imposes

is found to be rationally

related to that purpose, a test that is not difficult to
pass.

See Western

protection
question

challenge
of

debatable'"

&

451

may

prevail

rational
(quoting

u.s.,

Southern,
not

relationship

United

States

v.

so
is

at

674

long

as

"'at

Carolene

(equal
the

least

Products

Co • , 3 0 4 u . s . 14 4 , 15 4 ( 19 3 8 ) ) •
The

two

functions

constitutional

provisions

perform

different

in the analysis of the permissible scope of a

State's power--one protects

interstate commerce,

and the

22.

other

protects

persons

9

discrimination by the States.
at issue here
foreign
State,

thereby

who

also

commerce.

discrimination
burden

with

The effect of the statute

is to place a discriminatory tax burden on

insurers

interstate

unconstitutional

from

in

which

desire

to

do

incidentally
Simply

this
the

case

placing

because
is

Commerce

business

the

similar
Clause

a

within

the

burden

on

effect
to

the

also

of
type

would

the
of
be

concerned does not mean that the statute is not subject to
equal protection restraints.

we reaffirmed the importance

of the Equal Protection Clause in the insurance context in
Western & Southern and see no · reason now for

reassessing

that view.
In

whatever

acceptance

of

its

light

the

contention

State's

position

is

cast,

that promotion of domestic

23.

industry is always a legitimate state purpose under equal
protection analysis would eviscerate the Equal Protection
Clause

in

frequently
foreign.

this

context.

would

be · to

A State 1 s
prefer

natural

domestic

inclination

business

If we accept the State 1 s view here,

over

then any

discriminatory tax would be valid if the State could show
it reasonably was intended to benefit domestic business.
A discriminatory

tax

would

stand

or

fall

primarily on how a State framed its purpose.

depending
This is a

distinction without a difference, and one that we rejected
last

term

in

Commerce Clause.
at

See

an

analogous

context

arising

under

u.s. '

Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,
n.6

supra.

we

hold

that

the

under

the

circumstances of this case, promotion of domestic business

~

,'

'

~·

\

.

24.

by discriminating against nonresidents is not a legitimate
state purpose.

IV
The

second

purpose

found

by

the

courts

below

to

be

legitimate was the encouragement of capital investment in
the Alabama assets and governmental securities specified
in the statute.
state purpose.
Alabama

We do not agree that this is a legitimate
The investment incentive provision of the

statute

does

not

enable

foreign

insurance

companies

to eliminate

the discriminatory effect of

the

statute.

No matter how much of their assets they invest

in Alabama, foreign insurance companies are still required
to

pay

a

companies. 10

higher

gross

Moreover,

premiums
domestic

tax

than

insurers

domestic
remain

entitled to the more favorable rate of tax regardless of

?{~....

,...

25.

whether

they

investment

incentive

but reaffirms,
based

solely

investment

invest

Alabama

provision

The

assets.

therefore

does

State's

not

cure,

the statute's impermissible classification
on

in

in

residence.

Alabama

We

assets

plainly discriminatory manner

hold
and

serves

that

encouraging

securities

in

this

no legitimate state

:p.lrpose. 11

v
We

conclude

that

the

Alabama domestic

preference

tax

statute violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to
appellants.

The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is

reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion •

...
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1 The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute
date back to 1849, when the first tax on premiums earned
cy insurance companies doing business in the state was
limited to companies not chartered by the state. Act No.
1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5.
A domestic preference tax was
imposed on and off throughout the years until 1945, when
the State restored equality in taxation of insurance
mmpanies in response to this Court's decision in United
S:ates v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 u.s. 533
( 1944) •
Act No. 156 [ 1945] Ala. Acts 196-197.
In 1955,
the tax was reinstated, Act No. 77 [ 1955] Ala. Acts 193
(2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amendments, has remained in
effect until the present.
2 For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a
domestic insurer as a company that both is incorporated . in
Alabama and has its principal office and chief place of
business within the State.
Ala. Code §27-4-1(3).
A
corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is
rnaracterized as a foreign insurer.
!d., §27-4-1(2).
3There are
two exceptions
to these
general rules
concerning the rates of taxation of insurance companies.
They are that for annuities, the tax rate is one percent
for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code §27-44(a), and for wet marine and transportation insurance, the
rate is three-quarters of one percent for both foreign and
domestic insurance companies, id., §27-4-G(a).
'\ietropoli tan
Life
Insurance
Company,
a
New
York
corporation, was chosen to represent the life insurance
claimants, and Prudential Property and Casualty Company, a
New Jersey corporation, was chosen as representative of
the non-life claimants. See App. 314-315.
5Altogether, the State and the intervenors have compiled
a list of 17 state purposes they contend are served by the
statute
and
are
legitimate
under
equal
protection
analysis.
See App. 27-33.
We decline to review any of
those except the two found by the circuit court to be
legitimate, as they are not before us, but remand to that

' ··

·'

court for a determination of whether any of them is
legitimate and rationally related to the classification
~t forth in the statute.
Gwe find the other cases relied on by the State also to
this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and
whether promotion of local industry is a
valid state purpose under the Commerce Clause.
The
Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is
integrally
concerned
with
whether
a
state
purpose
implicates
local or
national
interests.
The
Equal
Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned with whether
a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether
the discrimination involves local or other interests is
not central to the inquiry to be made.
Thus, the fact
that promotion of local industry is a legitimate state
interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about
its validity under equal protection analysis.
See infra,
at
•
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's
ability to promote domestic industry was unlimited, even
mder the Commerce Clause.
Thus, in Bacchus, although we
observed as a general matter that "a State may enact laws
pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and
effect of promoting domestic industry," __ U.S. ---.J
(1984) ~w~ held that
in so doing,
a State may not
consti tstionally impose a discriminatory burden upon the
business of other States, merely to protect and promote
local business, id., at
•
Accord Armco Inc. v.
Hardesty, __ U.S.~
"(1984).
Likewise, in Pike,
the Court held that the state statute promoting a
legitimate local interest must "regulate evenhandedly."
397 u.s. 137' 142 (1970).
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to
the legitimacy of promoting local business at all.
Carmichael relates primarily to the validity of a state
unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Education
deals with the State's ability to regulate matters
relating to probate.
Bowers is the only one of the
State's cases that involves the validity under the Equal
Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis
of residence of domestic versus foreign corporations.
That case does little, however, to support the State's
contention that promotion of domestic business is a
~ inapposite to
~rker discussed

legitimate
state
purpose.
It
was
concerned
with
encouraging
nonresidents--who are not competitors of
residents--to build warehouses within the State.
See
infra, at
•
7 Although the promotion of domestic industry was not a
purpose advanced by the states in support of their taxes
in these cases, such promotion is logically the primary
reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such as those at
issue there.
8 In

fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the
legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals
that the Act was Congress • s response only to the SouthEastern Underwriters case, and that Congress did not
intend thereby to give the States any power to tax or
regulate the insurance industry other than what they had
previously
possessed.
Thus
Congress
expressly
left
undisturbed this Court's decisions holding that the Equal
Protection Clause places limits on a State's ability to
tax out-of-state corporations. See 451 u.s., at 655 n. 6.
9 It is well established that a corporation is a "person"
within the meaning of the Fourteenthh_ Amendment.
~,
Western & Southern, 451 u.s., at 660 n.~2.

~I

10 section 27-4-4(b) of the Alabama Code provides that by
investing ten percent or more of its total assets in
Alabama investments, a foreign life insurer may reduce its
gross premiums tax rate from three to two percent, and a
foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its rate
from four to three percent.
Domestic insurers of all
types, on the other hand, are required to pay tax at a
rate of one percent, regardless of whether they invest in
the specified Alabama investments.
See id., §27-4-5.
llwe note that Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 u.s.
494, 508-509 (1926), in holding that foreign companies are
entitled to equal tax treatment even if they have very
little permanent investment in the State, also casts some

..

.
'

doubt on the legitimacy of Alabama's investment incentive
provision .

..

.t

